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Argumentation-based negotiation (ABN) is gaining increasing importance as a funda-
mental method of interaction in multi-agent systems. In essence, ABN enhances the
ways agents can interact within a negotiation encounter. In particular, it allows agents
to justify their demands, criticise each others’ proposals, and add comments to their
statements during a negotiation encounter. Furthermore, ABN gives them the capabil-
ity to exchange explicit arguments, such as promises, threats, appeals, and other forms
of persuasive locutions, to inﬂuence one another during a negotiation dialogue. Such
enhancements lead to richer forms of negotiation than have hitherto been possible in
game-theoretic or heuristic-based models. Therefore, many argue that endowing the
agents with the ability to argue during their negotiation interactions, not only facili-
tates more realistic rational dialogues, but also allows an effective means of resolving
different forms of conﬂicts endemic to multi-agent societies.
Even though ABN is argued to be an effective means of resolving conﬂicts, its opera-
tion within multi-agent systems incurs certain computational overheads. In particular,
it takes time for an agent to argue and convince an opponent to change its demands and
yield to a less favourable agreement within an ABN encounter. It also takes computa-
tional effort for both parties of the conﬂict to carry out the necessary reasoning required
to generate, select, and evaluate an appropriate and a convincing set of arguments re-
quired for such an encounter. On the other hand, within a multi-agent society, not all
conﬂicts need to be resolved. In some instances conﬂicts can be avoided by other non-
arguing means. For instance, in certain situations agents may be able to avoid conﬂicts
by ﬁnding an alternative resource to achieve their actions instead of arguing over a con-
ﬂicting one. They also may be able to re-plan to achieve the same objective through a
different means and, thereby, remove the conﬂict without argument.
In the presence of such overheads and given the alternatives available, this thesis argues
that computationally bounded entities such as agents need to consider two critical ques-
tions before they use ABN to manage their conﬂicts. First is when to argue; that is,ii
under what conditions would ABN, as opposed to other non-arguing methods, present
a better option for agents to overcome conﬂicts. Second is how to argue; that is, a
computationally tractable method and a set of strategies to successfully formulate such
sophisticated ABN dialogues.
To this end, this thesis forwards a detailed theoretical and empirical study to address
both these research questions. In more detail, ﬁrst we formulate a novel ABN frame-
work that allows agents to argue, negotiate and, thereby, resolve conﬂicts in structured
multi-agent systems. The framework is unique in the way that it explicitly captures so-
cial inﬂuences endemic to such agent societies and, in turn, allows agents to use them
constructively in their ABN dialogues. Having formulated the framework, we then map
it into the computational context of a multi-agent task allocation scenario. In so doing,
we bridge the gap between theory and practice and provide a test-bed to evaluate how
our ABN model can be used to manage and resolve conﬂicts in multi-agent societies.
Our experimental analysis on when to argue shows a clear inverse correlation between
the beneﬁt of arguing and the resources available within the context. It also shows that
arguing selectively is both a more efﬁcient and a more effective strategy than doing
so in an exhaustive manner. Furthermore, we show that when agents operate under
imperfect knowledge conditions, an arguing approach allows them to perform more
effectively than a non-arguing one. On the issue of how to argue, we show that arguing
earlier in an ABN interaction presents a more efﬁcient method than arguing later in the
interaction. Moreover, during an ABN interaction, allowing agents to negotiate their
social inﬂuences presents both an effective and an efﬁcient method which will enhance
their performance within a society.Contents
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Introduction
Argumentation-based negotiation (ABN) is emerging as an important interaction mech-
anism for agents within multi-agent communities [Jennings et al., 1998; Parsons et al.,
1998; Rahwan et al., 2003a; Sycara, 1990]. It is argued that using arguments within a
negotiation context not only increases the agent’s ability to reach agreements, but also
enhances the mutual acceptability of the agreement. In this context, this thesis presents
our investigations and ﬁndings on the use of argumentation-based negotiation in multi-
agent systems. Speciﬁcally, we aim to identify and investigate the different means by
which both multi-agent systems and argumentation-based negotiation positively con-
tribute to each other’s performance. In more detail, Section 1.1 ﬁrst lays out the foun-
dation for this discussion by progressively introducing the context and the background
of argumentation-based negotiation as it is viewed in this research. Building upon this
foundation, Section 1.2 identiﬁes the main aims and motivations that drive this research
and outlines the key areas analysed in this study. Subsequently, Section 1.3 speciﬁes
the key contributions we make in this thesis. Finally, Section 1.4 concludes this chapter
by outlining the overall structure of this thesis.
1.1 Background
This section lays the basic foundation for the thesis by introducing the two main areas
fundamental to this research; namely, multi-agent systems and argumentation-based
negotiation. More speciﬁcally, we structure our discussion in the following manner.
Section 1.1.1 ﬁrst introduces the basic concepts of a multi-agent system, points out its
beneﬁts, and highlights the inherent problems present within such contexts. This is
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followed by Section 1.1.2, which explains how negotiation acts as an important inter-
action mechanism for agents to resolve and overcome these inherent problems. It also
discusses the two main approaches of modelling negotiation in multi-agent systems;
namely, the game theoretic approach and the heuristic based approach, and, thereafter,
discusses their respective shortcomings. This lays the groundwork for us to introduce
argumentation-based negotiation in Section 1.1.3, where we explain how ABN can be
used to overcome some of these limitations.
1.1.1 Multi-Agent Systems
Before delving into the speciﬁc details of multi-agent systems, we ﬁrst present a clear
and concise understanding of the notion of agency. For many within the ﬁeld of com-
puter science and artiﬁcial intelligence, an agent represents a computational entity, sit-
uated within an environment, that is capable of both perceiving and actuating changes
to that environment [Wooldridge, 2000, 2002; Wooldridge and Jennings, 1994]. Apart
from being situated within its environment, there is a series of distinctive attributes that
an entity needs to possess in order to be classiﬁed as an agent [Wooldridge and Jen-
nings, 1994]. Generally regarded as one of the most fundamental of these attributes is
the notion of autonomy or the ability to control ones own actions without being dictated
or directed by another entity (human or otherwise). Apart from being autonomous, an
agent should also be capable of performing actions, in both a reactive and a proactive
manner. An agent behaves reactively, when it performs actions in response to the per-
ceptual inputs that it attains from the environment. On the other hand, when an agent
initiates actions to attain its own motivations and goals, it is termed proactive. In short,
it is this balancing of both proactive and reactive behaviours, together with the notion
of autonomy, which represents the essence of the notion of agency.
Nonetheless, an agent acting in a solitary manner has capabilities that are limited to its
own, thus, the goals it can achieve by functioning as an individual entity are rather con-
strained. In this context, the real potential of agents arises when these solitary entities
begin to act as communities, which, in turn, gives rise to the notion of a multi-agent sys-
tem. A multi-agent system, in abstract, represents a collection of autonomous agents,
situated within the same environment, carrying out their activities within that common
environment. Thus, in such a context, opportunities exist for individual agents to com-
pensate for each other’s deﬁciencies by acting in a collective manner, thereby, achieving
a higher overall performance as a system. This advantage has allowed many software
engineering applications to use the multi-agent systems paradigm in analysing, design-
ing and implementing complex software systems [Luck et al., 2005; Jennings, 2001].Chapter 1 Introduction 3
The applications domain is vast and varied [Jennings and Wooldridge, 1998], ranging
from industrial applications such as process control [Jennings et al., 1995], manufac-
turing [Parunak, 1987] and air trafﬁc control [Kinny et al., 1996], to commercial appli-
cations such as information management [Maes, 1994], electronic commerce [Chavez
and Maes, 1996] and business process management [Jennings et al., 1996]. It is also
used in conjunction with other technologies such as semantic web and web services
[Berners-Lee et al., 2001; Huhns, 2003], and also in combination with other computing
environments such as pervasive [Ramchurn et al., 2004], grid [Foster et al., 2004] and
peer-to-peer [Moro et al., 2003].
However, to achieve such collective behaviour and, thereby, reap the beneﬁts present
within a multi-agent community, agents essentially need the ability to interact socially
with each other. In short, they need to manage their inter-dependencies in a coherent
manner [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1994]. To this end, communication (the exchange of
information), coordination (behaving in a coherent manner) and collaboration (working
together to achieve a common objective) present the autonomous agents with the key
mechanisms to achieve this coherent behaviour within a multi-agent community. How-
ever, perhaps the most fundamental mechanism of social interaction available to the
agents to interact socially is negotiation [Huhns and Stephens, 1999]. In the follow-
ing section, we will investigate the notion of negotiation in more detail, highlight why
it is such a fundamental interaction mechanism, and investigate the key approaches of
modelling this ability into agents.
1.1.2 Automated Negotiation
Negotiation is here viewed as a dialectic process that allows two or more parties to
interact and resolve conﬂicts of interest that they have among each other with respect
to some issues of mutual interest [Jennings et al., 2000; Lomuscio et al., 2001]. For
example, in a situation where a buyer agent attempts to purchase a car from a seller
agent, there is a clear conﬂict of interest between the two parties with respect to the
price of the car. The buyer is interested in paying the lowest price possible, whereas the
seller is interested in gaining the highest price possible (thus, the conﬂict of interest).
Similarly, consider a situation where two self-interested agents require the services of
each other to accomplish their respective tasks. In such a context, both agents are keen
to provide the minimum possible service to the other, but gain the maximum, thus,
giving rise to conﬂicts of interests. In both cases, negotiation provides a means for the
two agents to resolve their conﬂict of interest by allowing them to come to a mutually
acceptable agreement. Thus, it can be observed that the ultimate goal of the negotiationChapter 1 Introduction 4
is to arrive at a mutual agreement and, thereby, resolve the conﬂict of interest present
among the different parties.
Now, negotiation is so central and fundamental precisely because it provides the agents
with the means of inﬂuencing the behaviour of their autonomous counterparts. By def-
inition, an autonomous entity cannot be forced or ordered to adopt a certain pattern of
behaviour, unless it is convinced that it needs to act in that particular manner. Thus,
negotiation provides agents with the means to convince their autonomous counterparts
by forwarding proposals, making concessions, trading options, and, by so doing, (hope-
fully) arriving at a mutually acceptable agreement [Jennings et al., 2001]. Apart from
being used as a means to achieve agreements, negotiation also underpins agents’ efforts
to coordinate their activities, achieve cooperation, and resolve conﬂicts in both coopera-
tive [Mailler et al., 2003] and self-interested [Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994] domains.
Given its importance, a number of approaches have been proposed in the negotiation
literature to automate the process of negotiation. In what follows, we outline some of
those techniques, classiﬁed according to the main underlying principle used in their
method of automation [Jennings et al., 2000; Rahwan et al., 2003a].1
1.1.2.1 Game Theoretic Methods
Game theory allows a procedure to analyse the strategic interaction between rational en-
tities2 [Mas-Colell et al., 1995]. In more detail, it speciﬁes how individual participants
of a game can maximise their own returns by analysing the possible moves of their op-
ponents and, in turn, choosing their own moves accordingly in rational manner. This
principle is widely used in multi-agent negotiations to automate the capability for agents
to determine the optimal strategy in environments where the set of possible moves, each
of their possible outcomes, and the rules of encounter are speciﬁed beforehand [Kraus,
2001; Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994; Sandholm and Lesser, 1996]. It is also used to
design interaction mechanisms, or the rules of the game, so that an agent acting ratio-
nally will always behave in a certain predictable manner [Dash et al., 2003]. This allows
designers of negotiation protocols to control the behaviour of self-interested agents in a
negotiation encounter and, thereby, is mainly used in designing auction protocols with
a certain dominant strategy [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002].
1Though a number of methods are used to classify the space of automated negotiation, such as car-
dinality of the negotiation, agents’ characteristics, events parameters [Lomuscio et al., 2001], we use
the classiﬁcation based on the underlying principle because it allows us to compare each method’s key
assumptions and their inherent shortcomings at a high level of abstraction.
2An entity (either human or software agent) is said to be rational if it performs actions so as to
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1.1.2.2 Heuristic Methods
Finding the best possible negotiation strategy by game theoretic analysis, though the-
oretically appealing, is not always practically achievable in multi-agent systems where
time and computational capabilities available for an agent are bounded. For this rea-
son, heuristic approaches have been developed that attempt to attain acceptable ap-
proximations to the theoretically optimal outcomes advocated by game theory within
bounded time intervals and resource constraints. In these methods, each participating
agent typically uses an array of heuristic functions to generate offers and to evaluate
counter-offers with the individual objective of maximising its own utility. These heuris-
tics are designed such that, while they represent the agent’s individual strategy for the
encounter, they will also enable the two parties to converge toward a mutually accept-
able agreement [Faratin et al., 1998; Sierra et al., 1997]. There are number of variants of
heuristic based methods. Some use heuristics that manipulate the overall utility value
of proposals [Barbuceanu and Lo, 2000], whereas others use heuristics that manipu-
late the trade-offs between different issue-values pairs under negotiation [Faratin et al.,
2002], without changing the overall utility value. Other more advanced methods use
dynamically evolving heuristics [Matos et al., 1998] that allow agents to add or remove
different issues under negotiation during their interaction.
1.1.2.3 Common Shortcomings
Even though both the above approaches have produced successful negotiation systems,
severalauthorshavepointedoutanumberofdisadvantagesinherenttotheseapproaches
[Jennings et al., 2001; Rahwan et al., 2003a]. Both approaches, in general, and the
game-theoretic methods, in particular, tend to assume that the participating agents are
fully aware of all their preferences (the issues of interest; e.g., the colour, price, quality
of a car) and the utilities associated with those preferences before they start the negotia-
tion encounter. They also assume that both these preference structures and utility func-
tions stay ﬁxed and do not change during the discourse of the negotiation. However, in
many multi-agent contexts, these assumptions are open to question. Speciﬁcally, within
many multi-agent contexts, agents operate with incomplete information and, therefore,
are not fully aware of all the possible issues with respect to the negotiation object.3
Thus, to assume that the agents are aware of all their preferences beforehand may not
3Here, the“negotiation”objectreferstotherangeofissuesoverwhichtheagreementmustbereached.
For example, when two agents are negotiating the sale of a car they will address a number of issues (i.e.,
price, warranty period, after sale service). Each of these will be a certain negotiation issue, whereas all
of these issues taken together will form the negotiation object. Refer to [Jennings et al., 2001] for further
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be realistic. Furthermore, agents usually attain new information during the negotia-
tion encounter [Jennings et al., 1998; Rahwan et al., 2003b; Wooldridge and Jennings,
1994], which may, in turn, alter their current preferences and the utility values assigned
to these [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1994]. Therefore, to assume these preferences and
the utility functions remain static during the negotiation process may also be unrealistic.
Another disadvantage is that, although both the game theoretic and the heuristic meth-
ods allow the agents to present their positions (e.g., by making an offer of £200, the
agent makes its position with respect to the negotiation issue, price) via offers and
counter-offers, they do not have a mechanism to justify the reasons for taking those
positions. Forwarding justiﬁcations for their position is important in two aspects. First,
justiﬁcations strengthen the position that the proponent takes (e.g., I prefer to buy a
branded laptop because I value a reliable after-sales service). Second, justiﬁcations also
carry meta-information, which enables the opponent to understand the reasons behind
the proponent’s preferences and position (e.g., the previous argument provides the seller
with the meta-information that the buyer highly values after-sales service). This, in turn,
allows the seller to direct its future proposals on laptops that have a reliable after-sales
service. Therefore, justiﬁcations allow the parties in search of an agreement, not only
to search within their own search space (of possible agreeable positions), but also to
get an idea of the possible search space of the counterpart. This, in turn, allows the
parties to conduct their mutual search more effectively, increasing the potential to reach
an agreement faster. To this end, ABN presents a mechanism that allows agents to ac-
commodate the above capabilities into a negotiation interaction, thus, allowing agents
to overcome the above shortcomings in a multi-agent negotiation setting. In the fol-
lowing section, we look more closely into ABN and explain how it can overcome the
shortcoming highlighted above.
1.1.3 Argumentation-Based Negotiation
In its simplest form, ABN allows agents to add accompanying meta-information to
their negotiation proposals, which provides support and justiﬁcation for their negotia-
tion moves. To illustrate this effect consider the following example:
A: Proposal: Give me a black car for £5,000
B: Response: Reject proposal
Even though the above simple proposal-response model conveys the information to
agent A that B is not willing to accept the above proposal, it gives no informationChapter 1 Introduction 7
back to A to help it decide what to do next (i.e., whether to offer a higher price, go for
a different model of a car, or walk away and go to a new dealer). However, instead of
just retorting back with a reject, if B supported its reject with an explanation to justify
why it rejected that offer, which would provide more information for A to reconsider
its initial proposal and, thereby, forward a better more suitable proposal later on. For
example:
A: Proposal: Give me a black car for £5,000
B: Response: Reject proposal, because I do not have black cars in stock at the mo-
ment.
A: Proposal: I don’t mind buying a dark coloured car.
Apart from this simpler form of providing justiﬁcations, ABN also allows agents to
exchange explicit arguments, such as critics, appeals, and other forms of persuasive lo-
cutions, to inﬂuence and persuade the opponent to change its negotiation stance4 [Par-
sons and Jennings, 1996; Parsons et al., 1998; Rahwan et al., 2003a; Kraus et al., 1998;
Sycara, 1990]. The following dialogue illustrates the use of these persuasive locutions
in our example negotiation context detailed above:
A: Proposal: Give me a black car for £5,000
B: Response: Reject proposal, because I do not have black cars in stock at the mo-
ment.
A: Critique: Obviously you can make a deal with your suppliers to make a special
delivery.
B: Response: Its not economically viable to obtain one off deliveries from the sup-
pliers.
A: Appeal to precedents or counterexample: But three months ago we had the same
situation with respect to a red car. Then you acted differently and made a special
order.
4The distinction between justiﬁcations and explicit arguments is subtle and depends on the terminol-
ogy used by different authors. Both are types of arguments used within a negotiation encounter. How-
ever, generally justiﬁcations are used within ABN literature to refer to arguments used by the proponent
to justify or support its own proposals, whereas the explicit arguments are generally used to inﬂuence
the opponent to change its position (refer to [Jennings et al., 1998]). We shall adopt this terminology
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A: Response: Three months ago we had a different service contract with the suppli-
ers, which allowed us to make such special requests without incurring additional
costs.
A: Argument with an implicit threat: I am one of your regular customers. If you
don’t provide me with a car I will not buy anything from you in the future. Also,
I believe if I stop purchasing from you and start dealing with your competitor it
would cost you more in the long term. I urge you to reconsider your position.
B: Response: OK. I will deliver you a black car in time.
Allowing the agents to incorporate these justiﬁcations and explicit arguments within
their negotiation interaction helps them to achieve an agreement in a number of different
ways:5
1. Justiﬁcations add support and strengthen the agent’s position.
Incorporating justiﬁcations enables the agents to add support to their propos-
als, thus, strengthening their positions in a negotiation interaction. For example
(adapted from [Sycara, 1990]), consider an employee, who instead of merely re-
questing an increase in wages accompanies its request with reasons, such as him
having the best working record in the past year. Now, if the manager wishes to
reject the employee’s proposal, he has to overcome the additional burden of proof
of explaining why he wishes to deny the wage raise in spite of the best working
record held by the employee. Thus, not only do the accompanying reasons add
further justiﬁcation to proposals, but also they strengthen the proponent’s position
in the negotiation interaction by passing on the additional burden of proof to the
opponent.6
2. Meta-information allows parties to dynamically alter their preferences and utility
functions.
The exchanged meta-information (either as justiﬁcations or as explicit arguments)
allows both parties in a negotiation interaction to constantly modify their prefer-
ences, and revise and update their utility functions. For example (adapted from
[Rahwan et al., 2003b]), consider a situation where an agent attempts to purchase
5It is important to note that the following only represents an illustrative set of ways of how incorpo-
rating argumentation helps the agents in their negotiation interactions. It is not, however, meant to be an
exhaustive list.
6We use the proponent to describe the entity that formulates and forwards the arguments and the
opponent to represent the entity that receives and evaluates this argument. This represents the normal
way these terms are used within argumentation literature [Walton and Krabbe, 1995].Chapter 1 Introduction 9
a family car from a car dealer who does not have family cars in stock. If the agent
incorporates its reasons explaining why it prefers a family car (i.e., because it has
a large family that a regular car cannot comfortably accommodate), it will allow
the car dealer to suggest a waggon (which he has in stock) that may satisfy the
agent’s need. Thus, incorporating arguments, allows the car dealer to revise the
agent’s preference of a family car to a waggon, which may, in turn, result in an
agreement.
3. Explicit arguments and justiﬁcations allow agents to inﬂuence and modify their
opponent’s preferences.
Explicit arguments and justiﬁcations can be used to inﬂuence and modify the op-
ponent’s preferences and thereby direct the search for an agreement with a partial
idea of the constraints of the opponent. For example (adapted from [Sierra et al.,
1998]), consider a situation where a certain employee agent refuses to carry out
a particular activity required by the manager agent in an organisational context.
The manager agent, in this context, can use its organisational authority as an ar-
gument of implicit threat by reminding the employee agent of its obligation to
carry out a directive given by the superior. This, in turn, inﬂuences the position
of the employee agent and convinces it to agree and carry out that task. Thus,
here the explicit argument is used to inﬂuence and alter the behaviour of the other
party, thereby, resolving their conﬂict of interest by reaching an agreement by the
employee to carry out its task.
Givenanintroductionintothebackgroundofbothmulti-agentsystemsandargumentation-
based negotiation, in the following section, we can now detail the motivations for this
research and outline the contributions we aim to make through this study.
1.2 Research Aims and Motivations
As noted in Section 1.1, this research effort spans into two broad areas of artiﬁcial
intelligence (AI); namely multi-agent systems and argumentation-based negotiation. In
particular, the overall aim of this research is to investigate the different means by which
both multi-agent systems and argumentation-based negotiation can positively contribute
to each other’s performance and, thereby, mutually enhance their potential within AI.
With this as our main motivation, our interests within this investigation focuses on two
speciﬁc aspects. First, we are interested in the broader impact of using ABN in multi-
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pans out into a number of speciﬁc research questions. In particular, how could ABN en-
able a multi-agent community to argue and negotiate between one another to achieve
agreements? How would this, in turn, allow the agents to resolve different conﬂict
situations within a society? And, at a higher level, how would such a mechanism en-
hance the performance of the society? Second, we are interested in enhancing ABN’s
actual operation and, thereby, enabling it to function efﬁciently and effectively within a
multi-agent society. In particular, this involves developing novel mechanisms for sys-
tematically identifying and extracting possible arguments, devising new strategies and
algorithms for generating, selecting, and evaluating these different arguments, and, ﬁ-
nally, designing languages and protocols that would guide the agents to successfully use
such encounters to interact and resolve conﬂicts within multi-agent systems.
Given these distinct motivations and interests that inspire this research, we now present
an overall view of our investigation. This thesis centres around computational conﬂicts,
an inherent and an endemic feature in multi-agent systems, and how agents can use
ABN as a coherent mechanism to manage and resolve these conﬂicts in a multi-agent
society. In more detail, such conﬂicts are endemic in multi-agent systems in which
autonomous entities pursue their own goals (whether they do so in a self-interested or in
a collaborative manner) [Tessier et al., 2000]. They cover physical conﬂicts arising due
to resource limitations (e.g., multiple agents attempting to use a non-shareable resource
at the same time) and knowledge conﬂicts resulting due to discrepancies in viewpoints
or opinions (e.g., a contradiction between agents’ beliefs about a particular proposition)
[Tessier et al., 2000; Castelfranchi, 2000; Walton and Krabbe, 1995]. In either case,
however, they present hurdles for the agents that have to be overcome if they are to
achieve their goals and actions in a coordinated manner.
Againstthisbackground, ABNisincreasinglyadvocatedinrecentliteratureasapromis-
ing means of interaction that can allow the agents to argue, negotiate, and, thereby,
resolve such conﬂicts (refer to Section 1.1.3). In essence, ABN allows agents to ex-
change additional meta-information such as justiﬁcations, critiques, and other forms
of persuasive locutions within their interactions. These, in turn, allow agents to gain
a wider understanding of the preferences and constrains affecting their counterparts,
thereby, making it easier to resolve certain conﬂicts that may arise due to incomplete
knowledge. Furthermore, the negotiation element within ABN also provides a means
for the agents to achieve mutually acceptable agreements and, thereby, resolve conﬂicts
of interests that they may have in relation to certain limited resources within the society.
However, most of the existing literature investigates the use of ABN (as a method to
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ysis can prove the soundness and the completeness of the model, any computational
overheads associated with its use are largely overlooked. In more detail, it takes time
for an agent to argue and convince an opponent to change its stance and yield to a less
favourable agreement within an ABN encounter. It also takes computational effort for
both parties of the conﬂict to carry out the necessary reasoning required to generate and
select a set of convincing arguments and also to evaluate the incoming arguments and
reason whether to accept or reject them. Thus, in practice, ABN consumes both time
and computational resources to effectively resolve conﬂicts.
Furthermore, within a multi-agent society, not all conﬂicts need to be resolved. Specif-
ically, when an agent is faced with a conﬂict, it may, in certain instances, ﬁnd an alter-
native means to work around the conﬂict situation; thereby evading the conﬂict rather
than attempting to resolve it. By way of an example consider the case where an agent
(A) requiring the services of another (B), which are also demanded by agent C. Now if
B is unwilling to provide its service, instead of attempting to argue and persuade it to
change its conﬂicting stance, A could simply attempt to ﬁnd another more willing part-
ner (D) who has a similar capability. The result would still be A overcoming the conﬂict
situation, but not through ABN. In addition to either evading the conﬂict or arguing and
resolving it, an agent could also attempt to re-plan and alter the means by which it
intends to achieve the objective so that the conﬂict situation is removed. For instance,
within the previous example, agent A could delay its task until the conﬂicting agent B
becomes available, thus, alter its plan in such a manner that the conﬂict is removed.
In the presence of such overheads and the alternatives available, we believe, computa-
tionally bounded entities such as agents need to consider two critical questions before
they are to use ABN as a viable and a feasible means to manage their conﬂicts. First is
when to argue. Speciﬁcally, under what conditions would argumentation, as opposed to
evasion or re-planning, present a better option for agents to overcome conﬂicts. Second
is how to argue. In particular, agents need a computationally tractable method to suc-
cessfully formulate, select, and evaluate arguments within their ABN encounters. Our
main contribution in this thesis is to forward such an ABN model and carry out a de-
tailed scientiﬁc analysis on the performance of this model in line with these two critical
questions. Against this background, the following presents a more detailed overview of
how we achieve these objectives during the course of our research.Chapter 1 Introduction 12
1.2.1 Deciding When to Argue
Given the overheads of argumentation, and the alternative methods available for over-
coming conﬂicts (evade and re-plan), we believe it is important for agents to be able
to weigh up the relative advantages and disadvantages of arguing, before attempting to
resolve conﬂicts through argumentation. This acts as the main underlying objective of
our research in this line of thought. Speciﬁcally, here we aim to empirically evaluate
the effectiveness and efﬁciency of ABN as a conﬂict resolution mechanism with respect
to these other non-arguing alternatives available to the agents. To date, this issue has
largely been overlooked in existing literature. Current ABN simply assumes that the
agent has already made this decision to argue (typically without any consideration) and
the focus is on the internal mechanisms of argumentation (i.e., how agents can generate,
select and evaluate arguments).7
Our work, detailed in Chapter 5 in particular, presents an initial attempt to bridge this
gap. In particular, to assist our experiments, we design and implement a multi-agent
context in which a number of agents interact and conﬂicts arise as a natural conse-
quence of these interactions (refer to Chapter 4). Then, in order to answer the question
when to argue, we implemented a series of interaction strategies into this context. These
allow the agents to selectively combine the three methods argue, evade and re-plan to
overcome conﬂicts that may arise in this experimental setting. In turn, we observe
the relative performance beneﬁts of these strategies (in terms of effectiveness and ef-
ﬁciency) and, thereafter, analyse them to identify the different conditions under which
ABN would present a better option for agents to overcome conﬂicts.
1.2.2 Deciding How to Argue
Next, our investigation moves forward to address our second research question of how
to argue within a multi-agent society. Unlike the above, this area is densely researched
within ABN literature. In particular, a number of approaches to date propose different
mechanisms to generate, select, and evaluate arguments in an ABN context. In addi-
tion, they also investigate different interaction protocols to allow agents to argue and
negotiate with one another.
However, most of these efforts to date suffer from a common fundamental drawback.
Speciﬁcally, they model and analyse their systems within a two-agent context and,
thereafter, attempt to extrapolate or generalise their ﬁndings into a larger multi-agent
7For a more detailed analysis on the state of the art related to this area refer to Section 2.3.Chapter 1 Introduction 13
context with more than two-agents. However, in doing so, they largely ignore the im-
pact of the society (the social structure and the various inﬂuences within it) in their
models. In particular, we can observe this fundamental drawback resulting in the fol-
lowing two broad forms of shortcomings.
First, ABN frameworks designed in two-agent contexts, largely ignore the social con-
text. Thus, theyfailtocapturetheinﬂuenceofcertainsocietalelementsthatareendemic
to multi-agent systems. For instance, different roles that agents may act, different rela-
tionships that they are part of, and different normative constructs that govern the society
inﬂuence the actions and behaviour of the agents within a multi-agent society (refer
to Section 2.3.1). ABN is also a form of inﬂuence within a society allowing agents
to argue and negotiate and change each others’ decisions. However, if ABN systems
are studied in isolation, without giving due consideration to its social context, it would
fail to give a true picture of ABN’s effect within a society because such an analysis
ignores its interplay with other social inﬂuences present within such systems. There-
fore, to gain a better understanding of the real impact of arguing in a social context,
it is extremely important to analyse the effect of ABN in the presence of such social
inﬂuences. Therefore, frameworks designed for two-agent systems, which do not give
the due consideration to its social context, present an over simpliﬁed generalisation in
their results.
Second, ABN frameworks designed for two-agent systems, make certain design as-
sumptions that are not scalable. Therefore, even though they present a good point of
departure for a theoretical analysis of ABN in a small two-agent society, they fail to
provide a computationally tractable and feasible means to implement and empirically
analyse their effect in larger agent systems. One of the key elements here is how they
enable agents to capture and derive arguments during the course of their ABN encoun-
ters. Speciﬁcally, most existing research on ABN advocates agents to use a belief-based
reasoning approach to derive arguments (refer to Section 2.3.2). In more detail, agents
are required to maintain belief models about their counterparts and reason about these
to identify attacks and arguments during the course of their dialogue. Even with recent
advances in literature, this form of belief-based reasoning is still generally accepted by
the AI community as a computationally costly function even in a two-agent situation.
Now, doing so in a multi-agent context would require agents to maintain belief models
about each of their counterparts. This, in turn, requires more computational resources
both in terms of representation and reasoning. Moreover, doing such a form of rea-
soning in every instance that an agent requires an argument does not present an easily
implementable solution in a multi-agent context.Chapter 1 Introduction 14
In our research, we address both these shortcomings and present an ABN framework
that is both theoretically sound and computationally tractable for multi-agent systems.
Theframeworkexplicitlycapturessocialinﬂuencesthatareendemictostructuredmulti-
agent systems. Thereafter it explores the different ways that social inﬂuences and ABN
can positively contribute to one another, and, thereby extracts arguments to allow agents
to (i) socially inﬂuence one other’s decisions and (ii) argue about and negotiate such so-
cial inﬂuence. In addition, the framework captures inspiration from computational con-
ﬂicts literature and proposes a language and protocol to guides the agents to exchange
such arguments in the form of a dialogue to resolve conﬂicts. Finally, it deﬁnes the var-
ious decision functions required by the different agents to participate in such dialogues
to resolve conﬂicts.
In order to evaluate the effect of this theoretical framework, we then encode the vari-
ous elements of our framework as concrete algorithms in a multi-agent task allocation
scenario. In so doing, we also demonstrate the computational tractability of our frame-
work. In addition, we combine these basic algorithms to derive various ABN strategies
and allow agents to use these to manage the various conﬂicts that arise within the con-
text. In particular, these strategies are inspired from the social science literature and
demonstrate different ways that agents can argue to resolve conﬂicts in a social context.
We in turn measure the relative performance beneﬁts (both in terms of efﬁciency and ef-
fectiveness) of using these strategies to derive general guidelines on how argumentation
can be used within a multi-agent context.
Givenanoveralldescriptionofourresearchaimsandmotivationsandgivenanoverview
of our research, next we state our contributions within this research effort.
1.3 Research Contributions
The work described in this thesis presents the following three major contributions to the
state of the art:
1. Contribution to Theory
This thesis forwards a comprehensive ABN framework for agents to argue, ne-
gotiate, and, thereby, resolve conﬂicts in a structured multi-agent society. In so
doing, this thesis presents a strong theoretical contribution to both argumentation
and multi-agent systems literature.
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• A schema to capture how agents reason within a structured society,
• A mechanism to systematically use this schema to extract arguments,
• A language and protocol to exchange these arguments,
• A set of decision mechanisms for individual agents to participate in such
dialogues.
These four elements interact in a coherent and a systematic manner. In more
detail, the schema that captures agents’ social reasoning is used to extract so-
cial arguments. The language (more speciﬁcally the domain component of the
language) ﬂows naturally from this schema and, in turn, is used to encode these
social arguments. The communication component of the language is strongly
linked to the protocol which deﬁnes the rules of encounter to guide the agents
to resolve conﬂicts. And the protocol is, in turn, used to identify the various in-
dividual decision mechanisms. Thus, the framework presents a coherent and a
comprehensive model to argue and negotiate within a structured society.
Moreover, our framework is unique in the fact that it explicitly captures social
inﬂuences endemic to structured agent societies and identiﬁes the different ways
agents can use these inﬂuences constructively in their dialogues. Thus, the frame-
work leads the way to a thorough analysis on the constructive interplay of ABN
and social inﬂuences. Even though a number of authors have argued for the need
for such an analysis [Rahwan et al., 2003a; Reed, 1997], no computational frame-
work has previously addressed this issue.
In addition to this main theoretical contribution, the respective elements within
the framework add a number of sub-contributions to the ﬁeld. In particular, our
social inﬂuence schema proposes a simple, yet coherent, model to capture how
agents reason within a structured agent society. One of the key attributes of our
schema is that it allows agents to reason about their social inﬂuences at the level
of actions and commitment, without the need to go into a more detailed cognitive
level. Indoingso, ourmethodstandsapartfromthedeliberativecognitivemodels,
which are difﬁcult to implement within a larger agent context, and the prescriptive
models, which do not allow agents to choose and selectively violate their social
inﬂuences.
From an argumentation point of view, our social inﬂuence schema presents a new
argumentation scheme for reasoning within structured societies. Moreover, the
way we used our schema to systematically identify arguments within an agent
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contexts. Thus, in both these aspects, our work extends the state of the art in argu-
mentation in multi-agent systems. Furthermore, in deﬁning a detailed language
and the formalised protocol, we extend the state of the art in dialogue games lit-
erature. In addition, by grounding the operational semantics of this protocol we
bridge the rules of encounter with the individual decision functions and, thereby,
forward a comprehensive dialogical framework for agents to resolve conﬂicts in
multi-agent systems.
2. Contribution to Bridging the Theory to Practice
Next, we successfully map this formalised ABN model into a computational con-
text and design concrete algorithms to implement the distinct decision mecha-
nisms deﬁned in our theoretical framework. This is a signiﬁcant contribution to
the state of the art in ABN in multi-agent systems. As pointed out in Section 1.2,
there is large gap between the theory and the practice in argumentation research.
Most frameworks tend to focus more on the theoretical element (the soundness
and completeness of their models) and choose to ignore the computational cost
associated with their suggested models. They either present no experimental anal-
ysis on their models, or in very rare instances, experiment their effect on highly
constrained two-agent systems.
Furthermore, apart from implementing our model in a multi-agent context, we
devise and encode agents with an array of ABN strategies to manage and resolve
conﬂicts in such a context. Therefore, in bridging this theory to practice, we ex-
tend our contribution to the application of ABN in multi-agent systems. Speciﬁ-
cally, we contribute to the state of the art in computational models of arguments,
computational conﬂicts in multi-agent systems, and at large the ﬁeld of computer
science.
3. Contribution to Experimental Findings
Our empirical study identiﬁes a series of general guidelines on when and how to
use ABN in agent societies. The following represent a summarised version of
these results:
(a) In general, the beneﬁt of arguing is inversely correlated to the resources
available within the context. In particular, when the resource levels are
highly constrained an arguing approach will give correspondingly better so-
lutions. On the other hand, when resource levels increase within the context,
the relative beneﬁt of an arguing approach (as opposed to a non-arguing one)
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(b) Arguing selectively is both a more efﬁcient and a more effective strategy
than doing so in an exhaustive manner.
(c) When agents operate under imperfect knowledge conditions, an arguing
approach in general allows them to perform more effectively than a non-
arguing one.
(d) Arguing earlier in an ABN interaction in general presents a more efﬁcient
method than arguing later in the interaction.
(e) During an ABN interaction, if individual agents choose to reveal informa-
tion in a selective manner, that will adversely affect the performance of the
society.
(f) During an ABN interaction, allowing agents to negotiate their social inﬂu-
ences presents both an effective and an efﬁcient method which will enhance
their performance within a society.
Since ABN has never been properly tested in larger multi-agent systems, these
computational questions have not been addressed in the existing literature. Thus,
by so doing, these results add a signiﬁcant contribution to the state of the art
both in the application of social science in AI and the use of ABN in multi-agent
systems.
These contributions are peer-reviewed and published in the following papers:
• N. C. Karunatillake, N. R. Jennings, I. Rahwan, and S. D. Ramchurn. (2006).
Managing Social Inﬂuences through Argumentation-Based Negotiation. In: Proc.
of the 3rd Int. Workshop on Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems (ArgMAS),
pages 35-52, Hakodate, Japan. – This paper supports the above contributions 2
and 3, speciﬁcally, 3.c and 3.d.
• D. Kalofonos, N. C. Karunatillake, N. R. Jennings, T. J. Norman, C. Reed and
S. Wells (2006). Building Agents that Plan and Argue in a Social Context. In:
Proc. of the 1st International Conference on Computational Models of Argument
(COMMA), pages 15-26, Liverpool, UK. – This paper supports the above contri-
bution 2.
• N.C.Karunatillake, N.R.Jennings, I.Rahwan, andT.J.Norman(2005). Arguing
and negotiating in the presence of social inﬂuences. In: Proc. of the 4th Int.
Central and Eastern European Conf. on Multi-Agent Systems (CEEMAS), LNAI
3690, Springer-Verlag, pages 223-235, Budapest, Hungary. – This paper supportsChapter 1 Introduction 18
the above contribution 1, speciﬁcally, the language and the protocol elements of
the framework.
• N. C. Karunatillake, N. R. Jennings, I. Rahwan, and T. J. Norman (2005). Argum-
entation-based negotiation in a social context. In: Proc. of the 2nd Int. Workshop
on Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems (ArgMAS), pages 74-88, Utrecht,
Netherlands. – This paper supports the above contribution 1, speciﬁcally, the
social inﬂuence schema and the argument extraction element of the framework.
• N. C. Karunatillake and N. R. Jennings (2004). Is it worth arguing? In: Proc. of
ArgumentationinMulti-AgentSystems(ArgMAS),LNAI3366, Springer-Verlag,
pages 134-250, New York, USA. – This paper supports the above contribution 3,
speciﬁcally, 3.a and 3.b.
• N. C. Karunatillake, N. R. Jennings, I. Rahwan and S. D. Ramchurn (2006). Man-
aging Social Commitments through Argumentation-based Negotiation. In: Proc.
of the 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems (AAMAS), pages 426-428, Hakodate, Japan. – This paper supports the
above contributions 2 and 3, speciﬁcally, 3.c and 3.d.
• N.C.Karunatillake, N.R.Jennings, I.Rahwan, andT.J.Norman(2005). Argume-
ntation-Based Negotiation in a social context. In: Proc. of the 4th Int Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages
1331-1332, Utrecht, The Netherlands. – This paper supports the above contribu-
tion 1, speciﬁcally, the social inﬂuence schema element of the framework.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is structured in the following manner:
• Chapter 2 Related Work: presents a detailed analyses on the state of art related
to and inspired by both our research themes; namely when to argue and how to
argue in multi-agent systems.
• Chapter 3 Argumentation Framework: presents a detailed discussion of our for-
mal and computational framework that allows agents to argue, negotiate, and re-
solve conﬂicts in the presence of social inﬂuences.Chapter 1 Introduction 19
• Chapter 4 Argumentation Context: presents a detailed speciﬁcation of our exper-
imental context, highlighting the various parameters and the different algorithms
used to map our theory into a computation setting.
• Chapter 5 Deciding When to Argue: presents a detailed empirical analysis that
identiﬁes when and under what conditions argumentation gives a better option
for agents to overcome conﬂicts.
• Chapter 6 Deciding How to Argue: presents a detailed empirical analysis on how
agents can use our ABN framework to argue, negotiate, and, thereby, resolve
conﬂicts both efﬁciently and effectively in a multi-agent context.
• Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work: concludes this thesis by identifying the
main ﬁndings of this study and the potential future directions of this research.Chapter 2
Related Work
As introduced in Chapter 1, this research explores the use of argumentation-based nego-
tiation in multi-agent systems. More speciﬁcally, here we focus on two research issues
central to its application within such computational contexts. The ﬁrst is when to argue;
that is, under what conditions does ABN present a good option for agents to overcome
conﬂicts. The second is how to argue; that is, how to devise a computationally tractable
set of strategies and methods for agents to argue in a multi-agent society. To this end,
this chapter presents a detailed analysis on the state of art related to both of these areas
of research.
In more detail, Section 2.1 presents a background to the work in argumentation theory,
identifying its different areas and situating our work in this domain. Having placed our
work within the literature, we then proceed to detail the state of the art related to and
have inspired our research. In particular, Section 2.2 reviews the work related to our
empirical analysis on the value of arguing within an agent society, clearly highlighting
the need and the absence of such an evaluation. Subsequently, Section 2.3 reviews the
related literature on how to argue, identifying the main elements involved with such
a study and the different techniques advocated in the current state of art to modelling
these. Finally, Section 2.4 concludes this chapter by summarising its key elements.
2.1 Background
Research in argumentation has a rich background in philosophy that dates back to as far
as the ﬁfth century BC. The early work by Socrates on critical reasoning (later docu-
mented by Plato [Plato, 1995]), the essays by Plato on rationalism and dialectics [Plato,
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1991], and, more importantly, the logical theory proposed by Aristotle on the art of
rhetoric [Aristotle, 1991] laid the basic foundations to modern research. Since then, ar-
gumentation has established itself as an integral branch within philosophy having strong
linkstologicandrhetoric. Later, inthemidtwentiethcentury(1960s–1970s), theinﬂu-
ential writings of Perelman and Toulmin grounded these theories by capturing the nat-
ural process of everyday argument into actual models [Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca,
1969; Toulmin, 1958]. In particular, the work by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, ti-
tled “The New Rhetoric”, documented the different techniques that people use to argue
and obtain the approval of others for their opinions. The contemporary work by Toul-
min, titled “The Uses of Arguments”, analysed different forms of rational arguments to
forward a systematic and a logical model to capture their generic structure.
Building upon this early background, argumentation developed itself as a signiﬁcant
branch of research. Furthermore, it has attracted signiﬁcant interests and contributions
to and from a number of other areas such as law, social science, artiﬁcial intelligence
(AI), logic, and linguistics. Speciﬁcally, within the ﬁeld of AI, the use of argumenta-
tion has become more pronounced. Applications in areas such as non-monotonic rea-
soning [Prakken and Vreeswijk, 2002], decision support systems [Parsons and Green,
1999], natural language processing [Grasso, 2000; Reed, 1998; Elhadad, 1995], plan-
ning [Sycara, 1989], legal and medical applications [Verheij, 1999], and multi-agent
systems [Rahwan et al., 2004] bears ample evidence to its wide and varied contribu-
tions.
Over the last few years, the inter-disciplinary research of argumentation and multi-agent
systems, in particular, has gained increased momentum within the AI community. Re-
searchers in both ﬁelds became increasingly aware of the unique opportunities and po-
tential of integrating the two ﬁelds and using the argument-inspired notions in multi-
agent systems. The beneﬁts have been mutual to both the ﬁelds. On one hand, the
multi-agent community has gained two broad advantages by applying the argument-
inspired techniques in designing their agent systems. First, it has provided a means
to facilitate rational interaction (i.e., interaction which involves the giving and receiv-
ing of reasons) between agents within multi-agent systems. In more detail, allowing
agents to argue with one another (i.e., by challenging and exchanging reasons for their
actions) has allowed researchers to design, implement, and analyse sophisticated forms
of interaction among rational agents. Second, argumentation has also found its use in
modelling the reasoning and deliberation processes of individual agents. In particular,
the defeasible reasoning approaches developed in argumentation theory have inspired
researchers to design agent reasoning mechanisms to make decisions under complex
preferences policies and in highly dynamic environments. On the other hand, argu-Chapter 2 Related Work 22
mentation theory gained a large application domain including: legal disputes, business
negotiations, labour disputes, team formation, scientiﬁc injury, deliberative democracy,
ontology reconciliation, risk analysis, scheduling, and logistics (for more detail refer to
[Rahwan et al., 2004]).
Against this background, this thesis explores the application of argumentation tech-
niques in a multi-agent negotiation context. More speciﬁcally, as introduced in Sec-
tion 1.2, the central objective of this thesis is to investigate how argumentation-based
negotiation can allow agents to interact and resolve different forms of conﬂicts that may
occur in a multi-agent society. To this end, it is argued that, computationally bounded
entities such as agents need to consider two critical questions before they use ABN to
manage their conﬂicts; namely when to argue and how to argue. In this context, the
remainder of this chapter presents a detailed analysis on the state of art related to both
of these areas of research.
2.2 Deciding When to Argue
Argumentation-based negotiation is fast emerging as an important means of interaction
for agents to resolve conﬂicts that arise when they operate in multi-agent communi-
ties (refer to Section 1.1.3). To date, most work in this area has focused on the internal
mechanisms of argumentation; that is how arguments are generated [Sycara, 1990; Rah-
wan et al., 2003b; Reed et al., 1996], selected [Kraus et al., 1998; Ramchurn et al., 2003;
Amgoud and Maudet, 2002] and evaluated [Parsons et al., 1998; Sierra et al., 1998], and
how the process of argumentation can resolve conﬂicts and achieve agreements [Jung
et al., 2001; McBurney et al., 2003].1 However, no real attention is given to the overall
impact of the decision made by the agents to resolve their conﬂicts by arguing. Rather,
it is simply assumed that the agent has already made that decision and the focus is on
how the agent can use arguments to resolve the conﬂict. Thus, unanswered questions
remain, such as:
• when to use argumentation?,
• under what conditions does arguing yield better results than non-arguing strate-
gies?, and
• what are the performance implications of using ABN within multi-agent systems?
1We shall review some of these works in Section 2.3.Chapter 2 Related Work 23
In the presence of the various overheads associated with arguing and the other non-
arguing approaches (i.e., evasion and re-planning) available for use within multi-agent
systems (refer to Section 1.2.1), these become fundamental questions that need address-
ing before an agent can decide on using ABN in a multi-agent society.
In tackling these problems we draw inspiration from a number of previous efforts in
the ABN literature. Speciﬁcally, the empirical work by Jung et al. [2001] acted as an
important impetus for our effort. Their work attempts to evaluate the overall impact of
using meta-information within a negotiation process to resolve conﬂicts. To do so, their
work models a set of collaborative agents attempting to solve a distributed constraint
satisfaction problem (DCSP) [Yokoo and Hirayama, 1998] as an argumentation prob-
lem. More speciﬁcally, it maps the external constraints affecting the local variables in
the DCSP as conﬂicts between agents, the process of exchanging values of the internal
variables as the pure negotiation process, and the propagation of internal constraints as
the meta-information (or argument) exchange between agents. Motivated by the desire
to resolve the DCSP, the agents can either interact to resolve these conﬂicts via pure
negotiation (without arguments) or using ABN. However, the main motivations of our
work are quite different from theirs. In particular, their work assumes that all conﬂicts
need to be resolved, and thus they compare ABN to negotiation without argumenta-
tion in order to assess the impact that meta-information exchange has on the conﬂict
resolution effort. In contrast, we do not believe that all conﬂicts need to be resolved,
because they can sometimes be avoided through evasion or re-planning. Therefore, our
motivation is to evaluate the importance of ABN as a conﬂict resolution mechanism, as
opposed to using other non-arguing means to overcome conﬂicts.
In this context, Kraus et al. [1998], to a limited extent, consider whether argumentation
should be used when faced with a conﬂict situation. They use a ﬁxed heuristic to enable
the agent to decide when to argue and when to stop the argument and re-plan. In their
experiments, two self-interested agents are assigned a particular task, which neither has
the capability to achieve alone. Thus, the agents must cooperate to achieve the task. The
mechanism of achieving cooperation is by using negotiation and persuasion dialogues.
According to their heuristic, the agent will always ﬁrst try to argue and reason with the
other party and try to achieve an agreement. However, if the agent is unsuccessful in
achieving an agreement in a given ﬁxed time schedule, it will stop the argument. In the
next time slot it will re-plan, generate a new set of goals and intentions, and will start the
process all over again. However, this heuristic is rather rigid and is but one possibility.
Moreover, it was tested in a two-agent context where the only option available to an
agent was to make the other agent agree (otherwise, it could not complete its task).
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for the arguer are severely limited. Thus, the always argue approach becomes more
viable. Avoiding conﬂicts is not a possibility, because the agent that wants to achieve
the task has to somehow convince the only other agent within the system to provide
its services. However, its usage in a multi-agent context, where there are many other
potential alternative agents that might be willing to cooperate, is questionable.
Given a detailed analysis on the literature related to our work on when to argue, we now
proceed to analyse the very much larger state of the art related to the issue of how to
argue in a multi-agent society.
2.3 Deciding How to Argue
We now focus our attention on our second research issue of how to argue in an agent
society. In abstract, we believe that to argue and resolve conﬂicts in a multi-agent con-
text, agents need to possess four fundamental capabilities. First, they need to have a
clear and a concise model that captures and represents their social behaviour within
such a multi-agent context. In particular, the model should capture the different forms
of motivations that inﬂuence the agents’ actions, how such inﬂuences affect their indi-
vidual behaviour, when and under what conditions these result in conﬂicts, and, ﬁnally,
how the model allows the agents to reason within the society to manage such conﬂicts.
Second, agents need a mechanism to systematically extract a suitable set of arguments
that would allow them to argue, negotiate, and resolve these conﬂicts. Third, once the
agents have access to the possible set of arguments, they require a language to encode
and express these arguments and a protocol to guide their dialogue to resolve conﬂicts.
Finally, each individual agent requires a set of decision making functions to select and
evaluate their arguments exchanged within the dialogue. These four elements are the
the fundamental components of the argumentation framework proposed in this thesis
(refer to Chapter 3).
To this end, the remainder of this section gives a comprehensive background to each
of these components, highlighting the main theories and techniques proposed in the
existing literature that inspired and paved the basic foundation within this research. In
each section we ﬁrst present the main pieces of literature that have contributed to this
area and at the end of each section we analyse how our research gains from these distinct
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2.3.1 Capturing Social Behaviour
Modelling, managing, and coordinating the social behaviour of agents in multi-agent
systems is an area extensively researched in multi-agent literature (see [Excelente-
Toledo, 2003] for an overview). In this context, some of the earlier efforts propose
the use of mutual beliefs2 coordinated through the use of shared plans [Grosz and Sid-
ner, 1990]. In more detail, Grosz and Sidner suggest that if agents maintain mutual
beliefs about each others’ capabilities, goals, and sub-goals, (thus maintaining a full
representation about what goals each agent aims to achieve and how they are going to
achieve them), it would allow them to achieve collective behaviour.
Now, one of the main criticisms levelled against this model is its extensive reliance
on mutual beliefs, which is argued to be unsuitable for implementation without sig-
niﬁcant simplifying assumptions. To address this issue, the work of Levesque et al.
[1990] formulated the notion of joint-commitment as a means of achieving cooperative
social behaviour with agents only maintaining mutual beliefs about each others’ persis-
tent goals. In more detail, rational agents are said to hold an individual commitment to
their own persistent goals (goals that are currently deemed to be achievable and so far
haven’t been achieved). Analogously, when they work as group, agents will collectively
hold a joint commitment towards the common goal. Thus, within a group, individual
agents can rely on the commitments of others and, thereby, undertake activities in the
knowledge that others are working towards the same overall objective and if some-
thing goes awry they will be informed. Thus, this notion of joint commitment allows
agents to achieve collective social behaviour only by maintaining mutual beliefs about
each others’ persistent goals (since they rely on each others’ commitment to goals and
on communication in the event that such a commitment is dropped). The subsequent
work by Jennings [1993, 1995] further exempliﬁes the importance of commitments as a
tool of modelling collective social behaviour within multi-agent systems and how it, in
conjunction with the use of conventions (means of monitoring commitments in chang-
ing circumstances), allows agents to achieve such behaviour in a more computationally
tractable manner.
In such a context where the importance of commitment was becoming increasingly em-
phasised as a tool of modelling social behaviour, Castelfranchi [1995] presented a major
impetus to this effort by way of a critical analysis of the different notions of commit-
ments. Speciﬁcally, he argued that commitments are central to the understanding of the
2The notion of mutual beliefs advocates agents maintaining beliefs about each other to unbounded
levels of nesting (i.e., a believes φ, b believes that a believes φ, a believes that b believes that a believes
φ and so on). For a more formalised representation of mutual-beliefs refer to [Wooldridge, 2000].Chapter 2 Related Work 26
individual’s functioning in groups and organisations and argued that they arise in three
different variations within multi-agent systems. First, the internal commitment arises
due to an agent’s individual commitment to its actions, which corresponds to the notion
of commitment deﬁned in the work of Cohen and Levesque [1990]. The second form of
commitment, which is prevalent in collective behaviour of agents, is termed as collec-
tive commitment and is deﬁned as the internal (joint) commitment of a group (instead of
a single agent). This is similar to the notion of joint commitment deﬁned by Levesque
et al. and later explored in more detail by Jennings. Alternatively to both these forms,
Castelfranchi introduces a third notion of commitment that he terms social commitment
(SC) that is prevalent in agent societies. In more detail, he argues that a SC arises when
one agent commits itself to another to perform a certain action. More speciﬁcally, it is
deﬁned as a four-tuple relation:
SC = (x,y,θ,w)
where x identiﬁes the agent who is socially commitment to carry out the action (termed
the debtor), y the agent to whom the commitment is made (termed the creditor), θ the
associated action, and w the witness of this social commitment.
Having deﬁned social commitment as such, Castelfranchi further explains its conse-
quences for both the agents involved. In detail, a social commitment results in the
debtor attaining an obligation toward the creditor, to perform the stipulated action. The
creditor, in turn, attains certain rights. These include the right to demand or require
the performance of the action, the right to question the non-performance of the ac-
tion, and, in certain instances, the right to make good any losses suffered due to its
non-performance. Thus, this notion of social commitment provides a natural means of
capturing social inﬂuences between two agents. In more detail, when a certain agent is
socially committed to another to perform a speciﬁc action, it subjects itself to the social
inﬂuences of the other to perform that action. The ensuing obligation, on one hand,
allows us to capture how an agent gets subjected to the social inﬂuence of another,
whereas, the rights to exert inﬂuence, on the other hand, model how an agent gains the
ability to exert such social inﬂuence upon another.
Against this background, the work of Cavedon and Sonenberg [1998] explored this idea
further into multi-agent systems. In abstract, they presented a framework to model ex-
ternal social inﬂuences, which arise due to the roles the agent occupy and its designated
relationships, and how they impact the agent’s prioritising of goals. More speciﬁcally,
they argue that roles and relationships embody a collection of goals and a set of social
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comes a part of them. That is, when an agent assumes a role or becomes a party to such
a relationship, they are socially committed (to which ever other agents involved with
the role or the relationships) to automatically adopt those associated goals. Thereby,
roles and relationships inﬂuence the agent’s functionality. Based on this philosophy,
and using the notion of social commitment as a means of capturing social inﬂuences,
they extend Bell and Huang [1997]’s goal revision model to incorporate such external
social inﬂuences into the agent’s deliberation model. More speciﬁcally, they deﬁne a
predicate termed Inﬂuence, which translates the degree of social commitment (stronger
and weaker) to a degree of inﬂuence. The agents, in turn, use this degree of inﬂuence
as a deliberation parameter to decide whether to adopt such a socially inﬂuenced goal
as an intention.
Building upon this idea of socially inﬂuenced goals, Panzarasa et al. [2001] argue that it
is not only goals, but also an agents’ beliefs, desires, and intentions that can get directly
inﬂuenced by the society. To this end, they develop a more extensive model to capture
how an agent’s attitudes (beliefs, desires, goals, and intentions) are inﬂuenced through
the society. In a similar way to Cavedon and Sonenberg, they represent the society as
a structure of roles interconnected via different forms of relationships. However, un-
like Cavedon and Sonenberg who represent roles and relationships as an encapsulation
of social commitments inﬂuencing role based goals for the agents, their formalisation
treats roles and relationships as sub-cognitive entities (entities with mental notions, but
that lack the ability to deliberate as a fully cognitive entity can) with beliefs, desires,
goals, and intentions. Thus, they argue that when an agent assumes a role or is part
of a relationship, it will be socially inﬂuenced to adopt these mental attitudes. In turn,
they prescribe a series of consistency axioms that dictate which rules a rational agent
should follow when adopting such cognitive notions. However, they do not say why
(what is the motivation) or when (under what conditions) would agents be inﬂuenced
to adopt these attitudes, but rather say when they do so, they need to adhere to a pre-
scribed series of axioms in order to maintain cognitive coherence. These two questions
— (i) what would motivate an agent to adhere to its social inﬂuences — and (ii) when
and under what conditions would an agent be inﬂuenced to adopt these attitudes — are
key questions when developing a mechanism for managing social inﬂuences within a
multi-agent system.
To this end, the work by Fasli [2001] presents an initial formalisation in an attempt to
address the ﬁrst issue on why agents may be motivated to change their attitudes. Speciﬁ-
cally, she uses the basic concepts of deontic logic [˚ Aqvist, 1984] to present a formalised
representation of how social commitments embodied within roles and relationships of
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nenberg, she argues that social commitments are embodied within the structure (i.e., the
roles and relationships) of the society. In such a context, when an agent assumes one
of these roles and becomes party to a certain relationship, it inherits the social commit-
ments embodied within that relationship. However, instead of arguing that these social
commitments induce agents to automatically adopt the goals related to such constructs
(as suggested in Cavedon and Sonenberg), she argues that these social commitments
entail obligations to the agent. Thus, she revisits Castelfranchi’s original deﬁnition of
social commitments in order to formalise why agents may be motivated to change their
attitudes due to the inﬂuence of the society. To this end, she goes on to deﬁne axioms
on these obligations and connects them to the internal belief, desire, intention (BDI)3
model of the individual agent.
However, in answering when and under what conditions an agent would change its
mental notions due to the inﬂuence of the society, her axioms suggest that whenever an
agent attains an obligation, it automatically forms an intention to achieve that obligated
action. In other words, social commitments automatically result in agents adopting in-
tentions to perform related actions to honour those commitments without any form of
deliberative reasoning. However, this is not always the case in multi-agent systems.
Agents, in certain instances when inﬂuenced by different contradictory social commit-
ments (one to perform a certain action and another not to do so), may decide to violate
a certain social commitment in favour of another [Castelfranchi, 1998; Castelfranchi
et al., 1999]. Thus, the automatic adoption of intentions does not accurately model the
social behaviour of agents within multi-agent systems.
In their efforts, Dignum et al. [2000, 2001] focus more on the question of when and
the conditions under which an agent would change its mental notions due to the inﬂu-
ence of the society. In abstract, they focus on obligations and norms as the point of
initiation to model social inﬂuence and, thereby, develop a framework titled B-DOING
which integrates these obligations and norms into the internal deliberative functional-
ity of agents. More speciﬁcally, their model represents an agent with the four regular
metal attitudes of beliefs, desires, goals, and intentions, accompanying with two addi-
tional externally inﬂuenced attitudes norms and obligations, which capture the societal
inﬂuence on an agent. The norms, on one hand, represent a set of established practises
that assist in standardising behaviour of the individual, thereby, assisting cooperation in
agent societies. Obligations, on the other hand, are associated with speciﬁc enforcement
strategies, thus, providing an explicit tool to inﬂuence the behaviour of other agents.
Therefore, they argue that both norms and obligations together, capture how society can
3In essence, the theory of BDI analyses how a rational entity can reason about its beliefs and desires
at a cognitive level and formulate intentions to perform actions using this deliberative process.Chapter 2 Related Work 29
externally inﬂuence an individual agent’s behaviour within multi-agent systems.
Once captured as such, they consider norms and obligations on a par with desires as
motivational attitudes, arguing that while desires represent the internal motivations of
the agent, norms and obligations represent the social motivations (more speciﬁcally,
norms are linked as the desires of the society and obligations as the desires of other
agents that inﬂuences the agent). In order to formalise this notion of norms and obliga-
tions, they use a specialised form of deontic logic, termed prohairetic deontic logic that
does not automatically entail intentions from obligations and allows agents to perform
contrary to duty form of reasoning and, thus, deliberate in the presence of conﬂicting
obligations [van der Torre and Tan, 1999]. To enable such reasoning, decision making,
and prioritising within these motivational attitudes (i.e., desires, norms and obligations),
they use their formalisation to deﬁne three speciﬁc preference operators (one for each
modality) that assigns a preference value for each desire, norm and obligation. This,
in turn, is used by the agent within an extended BDI form of a reasoning mechanism
(adapted from the work of Rao and Georgeff [1991, 1995]) to produce socially sophisti-
cated behaviour in their agents within multi-agent societies. Thus, when and under what
conditions an agent would be inﬂuenced by its social motivations or its internal motiva-
tions is decided by the agent’s own deliberative proposes that compares these different
preference values. Therefore, this framework provides a good model for autonomous
agents to interact within the inﬂuences of the society and use its deliberative process to
reason about these different forms of inﬂuences.
While both of the above approaches argue for a more cognitive approach to reason about
social inﬂuences, Singh [1996a,b, 1997, 1999] in series of publications on the sphere of
inﬂuence considers the computational implications of such an approach and highlights
the beneﬁts of staying at the level of commitments and actions. In this context, in order
to reason about these different forms of social and internal commitments, he advocates
the use of sanctions between agents and conventions of the society. This notion of
spheres of inﬂuence and sanctions speciﬁcally embodied within commitments is also
proposed within the work of Sandholm and Lesser [1996]. In more detail, their work
advocatestheideaoflevelled-commitmentswheretheyarguethatallcommitmentshave
a certain degree (level) of commitment associated with them, which, in turn, reﬂects
the degree of commitment that binds or motivates the agent to adhere to it. In a case
where an agent acquires a certain other commitment, which is in conﬂict with one of
its existing ones, and this new commitment contains a stronger level of commitment
than the original, a rational agent will choose to violate and de-commit from its original
commitment and adopt the new one. In de-committing from its original commitment,
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reﬂects the level of that commitment (a rational agent will have a stronger commitment
to an action with a higher penalty value).
Both the cognitive and the commitment based approaches described above enable the
individual agents to take decisions as to when and under what conditions to abide by or
violate their social commitments. An alternative method for managing social commit-
ments in multi-agent systems involves the use of electronic institutions or some form
of authority structure. In this context, ﬁrst, we note the work of [Esteva et al., 2001]
on electronic institutions where commitments of agents resulting due to social inﬂu-
ences are managed through a performative structure. In more detail, they use a central
authority to ensure that such commitments are upheld by controlling the type of locu-
tions agents can issue in certain contexts based on the state of their commitments. In
a similar vein, Fornara [2003] provides a mechanism to control, verify, and manipu-
late commitments through the use of a state machine. Even though both these methods
presentgoodcentralisedenforcementtechniquestoensurethatagentsupholdtheircom-
mitments, they do not investigate how they may resolve any form of conﬂicts that may
arise between these different commitments.
Giventhesedifferenttechniquesformodellingandmanagingsocialbehaviourofagents,
we will now explain how they inspire and contribute to our research. In modelling so-
cial behaviour within our argumentation framework, we use the notion of social com-
mitments (resulting in obligations and rights for the respective agents) introduced by
Castelfranchi as the fundamental building block (refer to Section 3.1). The reasons for
this choice are three fold. First, as highlighted above, it is a widely used approach for
modelling social behaviour within multi-agent systems. Furthermore, it has a simple
deﬁnition that allows us to capture social inﬂuences between two agents and, as shown
in Section 3.1, can be easily extended to cover social inﬂuences resulting due to factors
such as roles and relationships within a wider multi-agent society (i.e., those that rely
on the structure of the society, rather than the speciﬁc individuals who happen to be
committed to one another). Second, even though some authors have used social com-
mitments in conjunction with cognitive notions such as belief, desire, and intentions,
it has a simple original deﬁnition that gives it the expressiveness and the ﬂexibility to
be used at the level of actions. This is important to our experimental work since it al-
lows us to model agents and their behaviour at the level of actions and commitments
without using a more computationally expensive cognitive level such as BDI. This com-
putational advantage has a particular signiﬁcance to our work since we implement and
experiment with multi-agent societies that have signiﬁcant sizes. Third, the notion of
social commitment is consistent with the notion of commitments in dialogue [Walton
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come through the structure of the society) and the commitments to actions that agents
agree to within their negotiations at the same level. This, in turn, reduces the effort in
designing and implementing our experimental context.
Having captured social inﬂuences as such, our next challenge is to model how these
affect the internal decision mechanism of the agents. As discussed above, a range of
approaches are proposed in existing literature. These vary from prescriptive approaches
such the automatic intention adoption suggested by Fasli to comprehensive deliberative
approaches such the one suggested by Dignum et al.. In this context, our requirements
are two fold. On one hand, to argue and negotiate about their social inﬂuences we re-
quire agents to be able to reason about them and make selective choices as to adopt
or violate certain obligations. Thus, a prescriptive approach is not well suited to our
argumentation framework. On the other hand, since we aim to experiment with larger
multi-agent societies, we need the deliberative system to be both simple and computa-
tionally efﬁcient. To this end, we draw inspiration from the Cavedon and Sonenberg’s
model and adopt the notion of degree of inﬂuence into our framework. In particular, we
deﬁne a degree of inﬂuence value for both internal and social motivations. However,
in order to keep the computations simple, we do not go into a more elaborate cognitive
level, as seen in the works of Dignum et al. Rather we use the notion of sanctions and
levelled commitments proposed by Singh and Sandholm and Lesser to produce this de-
gree of inﬂuence as a de-commitment penalty charge. Thus, the higher the penalty, the
higher the motivation to abide by the inﬂuence. Given this degree of inﬂuence value,
we allow the agents to reason about both internal and social inﬂuences at the same level.
This is similar to model proposed by Dignum et al. However, we reason about these in a
much higher level than both Dignum et al. or Panzarasa et al. avoiding the more detailed
cognitive deﬁnitions on how these social and internal motivations changes the beliefs,
desires and intentions of the agents. A formal deﬁnition and the detailed explanations
of the model is given in Section 3.1.
Having explained the literature related to the way we model and capture social be-
haviour within our research, we now proceed to analyse a number of different ways to
extract arguments.
2.3.2 Extracting Arguments
One of the central features required by an agent to argue and resolve its conﬂicts is
its capability to generate arguments during the course of the dialogue. For this reason,
this area is extensively researched in current ABN literature. This work has led to aChapter 2 Related Work 32
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FIGURE 2.1: Goal hierarchy for the company.
number of varied approaches to model this capability within a computational entity.
More speciﬁcally, we can broadly classify these approaches into three broad categories.
The ﬁrst two are belief based reasoning models. In particular, they advocate that agents
should maintain belief models about their counterparts and reason about these represen-
tations to identify arguments. They differ in the manner they use to reason. The former
uses heuristic rules, whereas the latter uses a logic based approach. The third category
ﬂows from the argumentation schemes research and represents a stereotypical pattern of
behaviour within a context as a scheme and uses it, in turn, to derive arguments. In this
context, the following reviews the main approaches in ABN literature related all these
three areas and ﬁnally analyses them and explains where our model ﬁts in.
2.3.2.1 Heuristic Based Approaches
One of the pioneering works in automated argument generation is the work conducted
by Sycara. In a series of papers [Sycara, 1988, 1990], she presents her system (termed
the PERSUADER), which models a central mediator agent using persuasive negotiation
to resolve labour related disputes between a company and a trade union. To facilitate
the automated generation of arguments, the mediator agent maintains two hierarchical
representations of the different goals for both parties (i.e., the company and the trade
union). To this end, Figure 2.1 presents a portion of the company’s goal tree. Here the
main top level goal of the company is to maximise its proﬁts. To achieve this super-goal,
the company has two other sub-goals; namely to increase their sales and to minimise
their production cost. These goals, in turn, have their respective sub-goals as depicted in
Figure 2.1. In a more general form, each node in a particular goal hierarchy represents
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speciﬁc parameters that are deﬁned as follows:
goal(sign,A = amount,I = importance,F = feasibility)
PROFITS(+,A = 8%,I = 9,F = 0.7)
where;
• goal represents the name of the goal.
• sign indicates whether the agent aims to increase (if so the positive sign is used)
or to decrease (if so the negative sign is used) the associated value of the goal.
• amount represents the quantity by which the goal should be increased or de-
creased.
• importancerepresentshowsigniﬁcanttheparticulargoalisfortotheagent, which
varies from 0 to 10, where 10 denotes the highest importance.
• feasibility represents the agent’s own estimation on the likelihood of achieving
this goal (denoted by a probability value of 0 to 1, where 1 is the most feasible).
This representation is used by the agent to generate different types of arguments com-
monly found in labour negotiations.4 The distinct type of argument used depends on
a series of heuristics, which, in turn, vary according to what the proponent aims to
achieve by the argument. This she terms as the goal of the argument and, thus, proceeds
to explain three such goals and the related heuristics used in each such case:
• Attempt to abandon a respondent’s goal.
If the proponent believes that the opponent has a speciﬁc goal that it does not
desire the opponent to pursue, it can try to generate arguments in the form of
threats or promises in order to make the opponent abandon that goal. To illustrate
this, consider a situation where the proponent aims to use an argument to make
the opponent abandon one of its speciﬁc goals G. To do so, the proponent agent
ﬁrst scans its own goal tree to ﬁnd an action G0 that it can perform which counters
the performance of G. If G0 has a higher importance to the opponent than G then
this would be a candidate argument that the agent can choose. For example, if the
4To this end, the author deﬁnes nine different types of argument categories; namely appeal to uni-
versal principle, appeal to theme, appeal to authority, appeal to status quo, appeal to minor standard, ap-
peal to prevailing practice, appeal to precedents as counterexamples, appeal to self-interest, and threats,
promises. To keep within the context of this analysis, we avoid a detailed introduction to these different
classes. Refer to [Sycara, 1990] for more details.Chapter 2 Related Work 34
employer (the proponent) desires the employees (the opponents) to drop the goal
of asking for higher wages and believes that it can make employees redundant,
and it believes that employees value the job more than a wage increase, then the
agent has found a candidate argument (i.e., if you ask for higher wages I have no
option but to make some of you redundant).
• Change the importance value of the respondent’s goal.
Here the proponent’s goal of the argument is to inﬂuence (either enhance or re-
duce) the importance value that the other (opponent) agent assigns to one of its
goals. Similar to above, the author presents a heuristic that would enable the pro-
ponent to generate an argument either of the type appeal to status quo or of type
appeal to authority for this effect (i.e., pensions are not so important since most
of the workers of your union are young).
• Change the respondent’s belief of the value of the goal.
This corresponds to the proponent’s goal of inﬂuencing the amount parameter
of a speciﬁc goal. Similar to above, the author presents a heuristic that would
enable the proponent to formulate an argument either of type appeal to prevailing
practise or of type appeal to counterexample for this effect (i.e., our company has
a typical wage increment structure that we used since its initiation).
This idea of using different forms of heuristic rules to govern the automated genera-
tion of arguments is detailed in a more clear and formalised manner in the subsequent
work presented by Kraus et al.. First, they modify the simple goal hierarchy repre-
sentation used by Sycara, to a more expansive form of a representation that includes
other modalities, such as belief (B), desires (D), goals (G) and intentions (I).5 Thus,
now the proponent represents the opponent by what it believes to be the opponent’s
BDIG, and uses that representation to reason about the different ways to generate ar-
guments. Furthermore, they reﬁne Sycara’s initial classiﬁcation of nine argument types
into six different classes; namely threats, promises, appeals to self interest, appeals to
past promise, counter example and appeals to prevailing practise. For each of these
classes, they also specify a series of heuristics as preconditions (expressed in a multi-
modal temporal logic), which must be satisﬁed within the current context before they
become applicable for use by the proponent. To illustrate this, consider an example pre-
condition deﬁned by the authors that allows the proponent to use an argument of type
threat within a negotiation context:
5These modalities are deﬁned according to the normal classiﬁcation of BDI logic [Rao and Georgeff,
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IF
Agent A (the proponent) has previously requested (in the past) agent
B (the opponent) to perform a certain action α &
B has rejected this request &
A believes B has goals g1 and g2 &
A believes B prefers goal g2 more than g1 &
A believes if B performed α it will achieve −g1 &
A believes if it perform β it will achieve −g2 &
A believes performing β is credible and appropriate6
THEN
Along with the request for B to perform α, the agent A can also for-
ward a threat informing B that if it does not perform α, A will perform
β, which it believes hinders B’s more important goal g2.
More recently, there have been a number of attempts to expand upon these efforts.
Among these, resides the work of Ramchurn et al. [2003], which enhances the argu-
mentation model proposed by Kraus et al.. In more detail, their work further reﬁnes
the notion of preconditions introduced in Kraus et al. by associating an expected utility
value (EV) to enable the agent to numerically evaluate the expected beneﬁt of using a
certain argument, over the expected cost of not doing so. Thus, they deﬁne a series of
pre- and post-condition rules for three types of arguments; namely threats, promises for
rewards and appeals. For example, if an agent A aims to use a threat against agent B,
they specify the following set of preconditions that qualify its use:
Preconditions to accompany a threat th with a proposal p:
• A believes that agent B desires to be in the current state s, more than
the state after executing the proposal p requested by A.
• A believes that agent B desires to be in the current state s, more than
the expected state it will transfer into if A performs threat th.
• A believes that agent B desires the state change that occurs due to
proposal p, more than the state change that occurs due to the threat th.
6In their work they have deﬁned functions to evaluate whether a certain action is credible and appro-
priate. We will abstain from these details to keep to the context of the discussion. Refer to [Kraus et al.,
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In what they term interest-based negotiation, Rahwan et al. [Rahwan et al., 2003b;
Rahwan and Amgoud, 2006] revisit the use of representative models of the opponent’s
goal hierarchies to generate arguments initiallyintroduced by Sycara. More speciﬁcally,
Rahwan et al. argue that agents have varied preferences on different issues of negotia-
tion (i.e., price, after-sales service or brand of a product), which may vary in importance
and value during the course of the negotiation. Thus, to reach an agreement, the agents
engaged within a negotiation must ﬁnd means to inﬂuence each others’ preferences.
The authors, in turn, argue that agents adopt certain preferences (over others) to pur-
sue their independent goals. Thus, a certain proponent agent could inﬂuence and alter
another opponent’s preferences by formulating arguments to inﬂuence its motivating
goals, thereby increasing the likelihood of achieving an agreement.
Inordertohighlighthowagentscanusethisconcepttogeneratearguments, theydiscuss
a sample scenario where two agents argue whether or not to purchase a plane ticket to
attend a conference in Sydney. First, they assume that these agents have formulated a
representation of each others’ goal hierarchies (super-goals and their sub-goals which
is similar to the representation used by Sycara) and the underlying beliefs behind these
goals of the other agent. They then demonstrate how this representation can be used to
construct arguments to attack goals, causing the opponent to drop, replace or even adopt
goals. The authors classify these different methods of attacking goals into three distinct
categories as follows;
• Attacking the underlying beliefs of the goal
• Attacking the sub-goals that stem from the super-goal
• Attacking the super-goal that the goal (which the proponent aims to inﬂuence) is
a sub-goal of.
To illustrate how each of these methods are used to inﬂuence preferences, the authors
consider the case where one agent attempts to purchase a ticket to go to Sydney and
another (the proponent) attempts to hinder it from so doing. To this end, the authors
argue that a particular way that the proponent can attempt to do so is by attacking the
underlying beliefs that provide the basis for the goal. For example, if the proponent
believes that the opponent is going to Sydney to participate in a conference, and it
believes that the conference in Sydney has been cancelled, it can point this out to the
opponent. Thus, eliminating the underlying belief that motivates the goal of purchasing
a ticket. On the other hand, the agent can also attack one of its sub-goals by pointing out
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can point out that to buy a ticket the agent has to spend money from the grant (its sub-
goal to achieve the main goal of buying a ticket) and this will mean the agent no longer
has enough money to buy the proceedings (which happens to be another adopted goal of
the opponent). Thirdly, if the agent is aiming to go to Sydney to achieve its super-goal
of presenting a paper, the agent can argue that the opponent can present the same paper
in a similar conference in Perth (which has a cheaper travel cost), instead of going to
Sydney. Thus, achieving the same super-goal of presenting the paper. These are just a
representative sub-set of ways presented in the paper of how the proponent can use these
goal representations to generate arguments that inﬂuence the opponent’s preferences.
However, all the above approaches model their experiments and investigations within
the rather constrained two agent context (encapsulating only the proponent and the op-
ponent). Thus, the focus of the argument lies predominantly on the opponent’s internal
attitudes and behaviours. However, within a multi-agent society, different social fac-
tors, such as roles that the agent assumes within the society, different relationships it has
with other agent’s within its community and certain normative constructs that governs
the society, also inﬂuence the behaviour of agents (refer to Section 1.2.2). Proponents
arguing within such societies, or more speciﬁcally models that allow agents to generate
arguments in an automated manner within such contexts, need to consider those exter-
nal social factors (apart from the internal attitudes detailed above) that inﬂuences the
behaviour of the opponents.
To this end, an initial attempt to expand the work of Kraus et al. to incorporate these
inﬂuences of the social context into an argument generation model was conducted by
Sierra and colleagues [Sierra et al., 1998]. In their system, each agent maintains a belief
model of the other agent’s metal state (similar to what is done by Kraus et al.). Apart
from this, the agent also maintains a representation of different authority relationships
between different agents depending on the role they assume within the society. This
authority is then used by the proponent whilst generating arguments. However, the
attempt falls short and only considers the impact of authority induced by the role the
opponent assumes. Other forms of social inﬂuences, such as relationships and norms
(explained above) are not considered.
2.3.2.2 Logic Based Approaches
All the literature described above tends to follow a similar pattern in its approach to
automated argument generation. Generally speaking, all the methods ﬁrst allow the
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or as BDIG) of the opponent’s intentional state. The proponent would reason within this
representation along with its own intentional state, thus, attempting to identify certain
distinct characteristics between those two representations. For example, it could be a
particular inconsistency between the two representations or certain pieces of knowledge
that it could constructively use against the opponent (refer to examples detailed above).
Havingidentiﬁedsuchanelementofknowledge, theagentthenusesitwithinsomeform
of reasoning heuristic to formulate the appropriate argument from a pool of argument
types commonly identiﬁed within the psychology of persuasion (i.e., threats, promises
and different forms of appeals).
A different approach to argument generation was adopted by Parsons, Sierra & Jennings
[Parsons and Jennings, 1996; Parsons et al., 1998]. Similar to above, they require the
proponent to maintain a representation of the opponent’s intentional state. However,
instead of using different form of heuristics to formulate arguments, their work takes
inspiration from classical logic where an argument is viewed as a certain sequence of
inferences leading to a logical conclusion. Thus, accordingly, they deﬁne an argument
as a series of logical steps built in as supports, either for or against a certain claim (or
proposal). They represent an argument in the form (H,h) where h represents the claim
(a formula expressed in some propositional language L) and H represents the logical
support for that claim (a subset of a collection of possible formula Σ expressed in L)
[Amgoud et al., 2000]. H is both minimal and consistent. It also satisﬁes the condition
H ` h, which implies that the claim h is a logical consequence of the formula in the
argument H.
In such a context, to generate an argument, the agent has to generate a logical conse-
quence from the set of formulae in Σ such that the claim becomes the conclusion. The
following example illustrates how the proponent would build the supports for a given
proposal:
Request:
• Agent A asks agent B to provide it with a nail.
Arguments:
• A intends to hang a picture. Thus, A believes it can hang a picture.
• A believes that to be able to hang a picture, it needs to have a nail.
• A believes that if someone that has a nail gives it a nail then it will
have a nail.
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• A asks agent B to give it the nail.
Apart from building proposals backed up by support, they also present two general
methods that the agents can use to formulate an attack for such a logical argument.
The ﬁrst is to attack the claim (h), which they term rebutting the claim. Accordingly,
in response to A’s previous argument, B can say that it cannot give the nail because it
needs the nail to hang a mirror, and then support this with its own intentions and beliefs
of hanging a mirror. The second method of attacking the argument is by attacking the
support for that argument, which they term undercutting. For example, B could say that
A’s belief of B having a nail is false by asserting B does not have a nail (agents are
assumed to tell the truth). Or B could show that to hang a picture A does not need a nail,
but could intend use a simple screw, which B believes A possesses. Refer to [Parsons
and Jennings, 1996; Parsons et al., 1998] for a formalised detailed example.
2.3.2.3 Argumentation Scheme Based Approaches
Both the above approaches (i.e., the heuristic and the logic based) advocate agents to
maintain belief representations about their counterparts and perform some form of rea-
soning on these in order to extract the arguments to use within the dialogue. This allows
agents to derive arguments most dedicated to their counterparts. However, within a
multi-agent context, this requires them to maintain respective beliefs models about each
of their counterparts within the society and perform reasoning on these representations
every time they need to generate an argument. Thus, most of these techniques are stud-
ied either at a theoretical level or implemented in a two agent context. Furthermore,
their computational complexity has never been implemented or tested in a larger multi-
agent scenario.
In this context, the concept of argumentation schemes [Walton, 1996] is increasingly
emerging as a mechanism for systematically identifying arguments within multi-agent
literature. In essence, argumentation schemes capture stereotypical patterns of reason-
ing upon which communication structures can be built. In more detail, these schemes
represent patterns of human reasoning, especially defeasible ones, that have proved
troublesome to view deductively or inductively. To illustrate this, consider the follow-
ing scheme for argument from expert opinion extracted from [Walton, 2005]:
In more detail, the above scheme consists of three premises. These represent the as-
sumptions that, if justiﬁed as acceptable, warrant the inference of the conclusion. How-
ever, if the respondent is sceptical about the inference, he can challenge and criticallyChapter 2 Related Work 40
Scheme for Argument from Expert Opinion
E is an expert in domain D.
E asserts that A is known to be true.
A is within D.
Therefore, A may plausibly be taken to be true.
question the different elements within the scheme to establish this justiﬁcation. To this
end, the scheme acts as a stencil for both the participants to direct their challenges to
one another and, thereby, engage in a dialogue to establish the validity of the conclu-
sion. For example, in the above particular case, authors have identiﬁed the following six
possible ways that a respondent can attack the above schema (as per [Walton, 1997]):
• Expertise: How credible is E as an expert source?
• Field: Is E an expert in the ﬁeld that A is in?
• Opinion: What did E assert that implies A?
• Trustworthiness: Is E personally reliable as a source?
• Consistency: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
• Backup Evidence: Is E’s assertion based on evidence?
More recently, a number of authors have argued for the use of argumentation schemes in
computationalcontexts, includingmulti-agentsystems, sincetheyholdpotentialforsig-
niﬁcant improvements in reasoning and communication abilities in such systems [Reed
and Walton, 2004; Walton, 2005]. One of the more recent efforts by Atkinson et al.
[2004], highlights the use of this technique for extracting arguments in a computational
context. In particular, their work extends Walton’s scheme for practical reasoning in a
manner to suit a computational context. This is stated as follows:
Argument Scheme for Practical Reasoning
In the Current Circumstances R
an agent should perform Action A
to achieve the New Circumstances S
which will realise a certain goal G
which will promote a certain value V.
Having used the scheme to state how a rational entity would practically reason to per-
form actions, they then use it as a stencil (or a schema) to identify a number of ways
of attacking this scheme. In particular, they highlight the following ﬁve major ways of
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• Denial of premises
• Alternative ways to satisfy the same value
• Side effects of the action
• Interference with other actions
• Disagreements relating to impossibility
These are then expanded to extract a series of arguments that agents can use to argue
about the validity of that agent’s practical reasoning. For a more detailed analysis on
the use of this technique refer to [Atkinson, 2005].
Having described these different approaches of extracting arguments proposed in litera-
ture, we will now explain how they inspire and contribute to our research. In particular,
our method for extracting arguments beneﬁts mainly from the argumentation schemes
approach discussed above. In essence, analogous to the practical reasoning approach
adopted by Atkinson et al., we represent the social behaviour of agents as a schema for
social reasoning and use this, in turn, to identify social arguments that agents can use to
argue within a multi-agent community (see Section 3.2). The main advantage of using
this method is its ability to identify arguments in an ofﬂine manner. In more detail, as
highlighted above, the argumentation schemes’ approach allow us to identify and ex-
tract a set of possible arguments to use against a typical agent within this context. Since
all agents within the context are deemed to follow this stereotypical line of reasoning,
agents can use these arguments against any typical agent within the community. They
only need to consider which argument to use from this identiﬁed set. Using this ofﬂine
method reduces the computational cost of extracting arguments during the course of the
encounter. Since all agents use this common schema, they only need to represent this
schema and reason within it. Thus, they no longer need to represent a dedicated belief
model for each of their counterparts and do complex reasoning during the encounter.
This not only reduces the space requirement for representation, but also the reasoning
required by an agent to identify arguments.
Furthermore, all these approaches (apart from Sierra et al.), completely ignore the so-
cial context when generating arguments. Even the work of Sierra et al. only considers
authority based relationships, which we believe only capture a specialised form of so-
cial contexts (i.e., institutions or formal organisations). Our work, on the other hand,
explicitly considers this societal element in extracting arguments (for more details refer
to Section 3.2). Moreover, unlike Sierra et al., we present a more generic way of cap-
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with different degrees of inﬂuence; see Section 3.1). This not only provides a simple
uniﬁed mechanism to extract arguments in different social contexts with a wide array
of relationships and social inﬂuences, but also allows us to experiment with our agents’
ability to argue, negotiate and resolve conﬂicts in such disparate social systems.
Given the literature related to the way we extract arguments within our research, we now
proceedtoanalysethestateoftheartrelatedtoexchangingthesearguments, speciﬁcally
those that have inspired our language and protocol elements.
2.3.3 Exchanging Arguments
Having analysed a number of different approaches for extracting arguments, we now
shift our attention to how agents can exchange these arguments during the course of
their dialogue. To successfully do so, agents require two basic mechanisms. First,
they require a language to express and exchange these arguments between one another.
Second, a protocol that deﬁnes the set of rules that governs their dialogue and acts as a
guidancefortheseagentstoresolvetheirconﬂicts. Inthefollowing, wereviewanumber
of techniques proposed in the existing literature that has inspired and contributed to our
study in both of these areas.
2.3.3.1 The Language
The language element within a multi-agent systems has two overall functions. First,
it allows agents to encode and express certain facts about their domain. Second, it
also enables them to communicate and exchange these locutions as messages during the
courseoftheirdialogue. Reﬂectingthesetwodistinctfunctionalities, theABNliterature
usually advocates languages to be deﬁned at two distinct levels; ﬁrst a domain language
to facilitate the former functionality and second, a communication language to provide
for the latter.
Toillustratethis, considerthetwocommunicationlanguagesmostcommonlyadvocated
in the multi-agent systems literature; namely KQML (Knowledge Query and Manipu-
lation Language) [Mayﬁeld et al., 1996] and FIPA ACL (Foundation for Intelligent
Physical Agents’ Agent Communication Language) [FIPA, 2002]. In comparison, both
of these communication languages are essentially similar in their basic concepts. Each
deﬁnes a set of message types to facilitate certain communicative acts (i.e., inform, pro-
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parameters such as the type of the message, its participants, its content, and the de-
scription of the content. For example, the simple inform locution takes the form of
inform(a,b,ψ,lan) allowing an agent a to inform another agent b the statement ψ
that is deﬁned in the language lan. Both KQML and FIPA ACL have their respective
domain (content) language counterparts. In particular, KQML usually uses a domain
language termed KIF (Knowledge Interchange Format) while FIPA-ACL uses the SL
(Semantic Language) to express its contents. However, one of the main advantages of
this two-layered approach is the independence that it gives to the two distinct languages.
For instance, KQML does not necessarily need to use KIF as its domain counterpart.
It can use either XML, Prolog, STEP or another language that is more suited to deﬁn-
ing the current domain. This gives it more ﬂexibility and re-usability in different agent
context. Therefore, this structured approach is used in most languages deﬁned in multi-
agent systems.
Even though both FIPA ACL and KQML offer the beneﬁt of being more or less standard
agent communication languages, both fail to capture a number of utterances required in
an ABN context. For instance, ABN interactions allow agents to compare one or many
proposals and declare certain preferences between these. They also allow agents to
explicitly criticise, question, or challenge the reasons for accepting or rejecting these
proposals and, thereby, argue about these reasons. To this end, both FIPA ACL and
KQML fail to provide the necessary performatives to facilitate these forms of dialogues.
Therefore, to deal with this problem, ABN framework designers often choose to provide
their own communication and domain languages to facilitate argumentative dialogue.
Tothisend, wecitetheworkofSierraetal.[1997]. Inabstract, theyproposeadialogical
framework that speciﬁes both a domain language and a communication language for
agents to argue and negotiate over services. In particular, their domain language (L) has
the capability to express different forms of proposals as issue, value pairs. For instance,
a typical proposal would take the form:
(Price = £10) ∧ (Quality = high) ∧ (Penalty = ?).
Here, elements such as Price, Quality, and Penalty reﬂects the different issues in the
proposal, while £10, high, and ? identify their values (? is a special constant used to
denotetheabsenceofavalueandallowsagentstospecifyunder-deﬁnedproposals). ‘=’
denotes equality and ‘∧’ denotes conjunction. On top of this basic domain language,
they deﬁne an additional meta language (ML) that allows agents to compare and express
their preferences over different proposals. To this end, an additional predicate Pref is
deﬁned to allow agents to compose sentences such as Pref((Price = £10),(Price =Chapter 2 Related Work 44
£20)) expressing their desire for the price to be £10 rather than £20. To allow agents
to exchange these proposals and preferences and, thereby, negotiate and argue with
one another, they deﬁne a communication language (CL). In detail, CL has predicates
of two basic types. The ﬁrst set is used for negotiation (deﬁned as (Inego)) while the
second is for persuasion (deﬁned as (Ipers)). Speciﬁcally, (Inego) has ﬁve elements;
namely {offer, request, accept, reject, withdraw} and (Ipers) has
three elements; namely {appeal, threaten, reward}.
Even though this dialogical framework does provide an initial point of departure (with
explicit locutions both for negotiation and exchanging arguments such as appeals, re-
wards, and threats), it does not provide locutions for challenging the reason for certain
decisions (i.e., acceptance or rejection of a proposal), commenting and criticising these
proposals, arguing about them, or sharing additional meta-information about them. To
this end, we cite the work of Amgoud et al. [2000]. In abstract, inspired from the dia-
logue systems DC introduced in MacKenzie [1979], they capture a series of communi-
cation predicates that allows agents to negotiate as well as to argue about their proposals
by challenging, questioning, undercutting and rebutting7 their proposals within an ABN
context. Similar to Sierra et al., they deﬁne two sets of communication predicates, one
to facilitate negotiation and the other for argumentation. The negotiation predicates
include request, promise, accept, and refuse, while the argumentation predicates are
assert, challenge, and question. However, their content (domain) language is deﬁned
rather openly giving it the ability to express any well formed formulae. Furthermore,
depending on the contents of the locution, the same communication language can be
used to express different forms of utterances. For instance, they have two forms of as-
serts, the ﬁrst deﬁned as assert(p) allowing agents to assert a certain premise and second
as assert(S) allowing agents to state their reason S as an answer to a certain challenge
or a question by their counterpart.
In deﬁning the language element within our framework, we draw inspiration from all
these methods (refer to Section 3.3.1). Speciﬁcally, we follow the same two layered ap-
proach advocated in the agent communication literature, and deﬁne two languages; one
to express the domain and the other to communicate messages. Our domain language
naturally ﬂows from our schema and allows agents to express facts about their social
structure and inﬂuences. Our communication language, on the other hand, follows the
approach by Amgoud et al. and deﬁnes a number of communicative predicates to allow
agents to both argue and negotiate with one another within a multi-agent context.
7The notion of undercut and rebut is deﬁned in Section 2.3.2.Chapter 2 Related Work 45
2.3.3.2 The Protocol
Having analysed the work that contributed to deﬁning our language, we now proceed to
detail the state of the art that inspired our protocol. The primary function of a protocol
is to provide the participants with a set of rules to govern their interaction and, thereby,
guide them to realise their main objective of the dialogue (i.e., reach a mutually accept-
able agreement, persuade the other party, acquire or give information, etc). To this end,
the protocol speciﬁes guidelines at two basic levels; the overall level and the operational
level. The former outlines the overall stages that a dialogue would take to realise the
main objection (i.e., resolve the conﬂict) and the latter deﬁnes the detailed speciﬁc rules
on who is allowed to say what at each stage of their encounter.
This two levelled approach to designing protocols is highlighted in the work by McBur-
ney et al. [2003]. In particular, their work aims to develop a protocol for automating
consumer purchase negotiations. In more detail, they capture inspiration from market-
ing theory, speciﬁcally Hulstijn [2000]’s model on consumer purchase behaviours, to
formulate two automated negotiation protocols for multi-agent systems. The former
identiﬁes seven distinct stages in these forms of dialogues; namely the opening, inform,
form consideration set, select option, negotiate, conﬁrm, and closing. The latter, for-
wards a more detailed model with nine stages; namely opening, inform, seek criteria,
assess criteria, form consideration set, select option, negotiate, conﬁrm, and closing.
These two additional stages, seek criteria and assess criteria, allows the latter proto-
col to function even under conditions where the participants would not have complete
knowledge about the product they are looking for.
Analogous to their approach, we capture inspiration from the work on computational
conﬂicts, speciﬁcally from the work by Tessier et al. [2000], and deﬁne our protocol
to have six distinct stages; namely (i) opening, (ii) conﬂict recognition, (iii) conﬂict
diagnosis, (iv) conﬂict management, (v) agreement, and (vi) closing (for a more detailed
discussion on these different stages of our protocol refer to Section 3.3.2)
As mentioned above, at the operational level, a protocol speciﬁes rules on who is al-
lowed to say what at each stage of the encounter. For instance, after an agent has made
a proposal, the other agent may be able to accept it, reject it, or criticise it, but might not
be allowed to ignore it or make a counter-proposal. They might be based solely on the
last utterance made, or might depend on a more complex history of messages between
agents. In either case, these rules specify guidelines for the agents, and if followed,
would help them realise the main objective of the dialogue. The following highlights
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• Admission rules: specify when and under what conditions a certain participant
can enter the dialogue,
• Locution rules: specify the types of locutions that are permitted during the dia-
logue,
• Structural rules: specify the types of locutions that are permitted after each utter-
ance,
• Commitment rules: specify commitments that each participant may incur as a
result of each utterance,
• Win-and-loss rules: specify what counts as a winning and a losing position in the
dialogue,
• Termination rules: specify how the dialogue can come to an end.
ABN protocols use two main ways of explicitly specifying these different operational
rules in their frameworks. The ﬁrst method uses ﬁnite-state machines. These specify
the structural and the locution rules of the dialogue using a graph with nodes and edges
[Parsons et al., 1998; Sierra et al., 1997]. More speciﬁcally, the nodes (states) represent
the various stages the participants need to go through during their encounter. The edges
(transitions), on the other hand, show the various locutions that will take the agents from
one such state to another. While this approach may be useful to specify interactions that
involve a limited number of permitted locutions, it becomes increasingly difﬁcult both
to specify and interpret when the number of locutions and their interactions increases
signiﬁcantly.
To remedy this, most ABN protocol designers tend to use a concept known as dialogue
games to specify their protocols [McBurney and Parsons, 2002; McBurney et al., 2003;
Amgoud et al., 2000]. In essence, a dialogue game perceives a dialogue as a game be-
tween its participants, where each forward utterances (termed dialogue moves) to win
or tilt the favour of the game toward itself. As with any game, a dialogue game then
prescribes a number of rules on these utterances. These correspond to the operational
rules for the dialogue stated above. Unlike the state diagram method, dialogue games
have the advantage of providing clear and precise semantics of the dialogues. By stating
the pre-and post-conditions of each locution, it allows agents to clearly deﬁne the ax-
ioms of a more complicated protocol with a large number of possible utterance. Apart
from stating the basic pre and the post condition rules, dialogue games also provide the
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they may have on the private knowledge of the participants. For instance, the follow-
ing shows a dialogue game style speciﬁcation of a locution from the protocol presented
by McBurney et al.. In particular, this locution allows a seller (or adviser) agent to
announce that it (or another seller) is willing to sell a particular option.8
Locution: willing to sell(P1,T,P2,V ), whereP1 iseitheranadviseroraseller,
T is the set of participants, P2 is a seller, and V is a set of sales options.
Preconditions: some participant P3 must have previously uttered a locution seek-
info(P3,S,p) where P1 ∈ S (the set of sellers), and the options in V satisfy con-
straint p.
Meaning: the speaker P1 indicates to the audience T that agent P2 is willing to supply
the ﬁnite set V = {¯ a,¯ b,...} of purchase options to any buyer in set T. Each of these
options satisfy the constraint p uttered as part of the prior seek(.) locution.
Response: none required.
Information store updates: for each ¯ a ∈ V , the 3-tuple (T,P2,a) is inserted into
IS(P1), the information store for agent P1.
Commitment store updates: no effects.
Taking into account these relative advantages, we also use a dialogue games approach
in deﬁning the protocol within our framework. In particular, in a similar way to McBur-
ney et al., we ﬁrst deﬁne the various operational rules of the dialogue as set of axioms
for each communicative act within our language. We then use this axiomatic seman-
tics and amalgamate with the various decision elements (discussed next) to deﬁne the
operational semantics of the protocol. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 specify our model in more
detail.
Given the literature related to both our language and the protocol elements, next we
analyse the state of the art related to the main decision mechanisms involved in our
ABN framework.
8In essence, the “information stores” and the “commitment stores” are used to store and maintain the
information and the commitments that the agents gain during their encounters. In our framework, we use
them in the same way as McBurney et al.. Therefore, since these two aspects are not central or novel to
our work, this review does not explicitly analyse the different ways of implementing them in detail. For
a more detailed discussion refer to [Rahwan et al., 2003a].Chapter 2 Related Work 48
2.3.4 Decision Mechanisms
The protocol only deﬁnes the rules of the dialogue. In particular, it deﬁnes certain
guidelines. However it leaves the agents with a number of different options, at various
stages, as to what utterances to make. For instance, after a proposal the receiving agent
could either accept or reject it. After a rejection, the agent may choose to challenge this
rejection, end the dialogue, or forward an alternative proposal. An agent, therefore, still
requires two important decision mechanisms. One for selecting a particular utterance
among the available legal options. And second for evaluating incoming arguments in
order to respond to them (i.e., accept or reject a proposal). To this end, we next analyse
the work related to both these areas. In particular, ﬁrst we investigate the state of the
art related to argument selection and subsequently move towards the work on argument
evaluation.
2.3.4.1 Selecting Arguments
Mostoftheexistingapproachesintheliteratureuseheuristicsforargumentselection. In
general, these heuristics consider different factors that they argue will inﬂuence the ap-
propriateness or ﬁtness of an argument. The persuasive strength of the argument [Kraus
et al., 1998; Sycara, 1990], the argument’s impact on the trust level of the relationship
[Ramchurn et al., 2003], and its ability not to be defeated by other arguments in its can-
didate set [Amgoud and Maudet, 2002] are a few examples of these different factors. In
these models, each argument is assigned a ﬁtness value depending on its characteristic
on those factors. Then the agent will select the argument with the highest ﬁtness value
to forward as the next argument.
The early work of Sycara, and the subsequently extended version of Kraus et al., used
the persuasive strength of the argument as their factor of consideration. Sycara argues
that the convincing power of an argument is derived from the strength of its justiﬁcation.
Accordingly, the arguments in the candidate argument set are classiﬁed into a series of
justiﬁcation categories. For example, a threat is argued to carry its own justiﬁcation,
but an appeal to prevailing practise form of argument derives its justiﬁcation from the
strength of the prevailing practise. Thus, a threat is argued to carry a higher persuasive
strength than an appeal to prevailing practise. Therefore, in the hierarchy of justiﬁca-
tion categories, the threat category stands higher than the appeal to prevailing practises
category. Sycara’s initial work deﬁned nine such categories which were subsequently
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1. Appeal to prevailing practise
2. Counterexample
3. Appeal to past promise
4. Appeal to self-interest
5. Promise of a future reward
6. Threat
According to their classiﬁcation, a threat carries the highest persuasive strength, while
the appeal to prevailing practise is deemed to have the lowest. Once the arguments are
classiﬁed into these justiﬁcation categories, an argument from the lowest available per-
suasive strength is selected as the next argument to forward. If that argument fails to
convince the opponent, then the next weakest argument is selected. This process con-
tinues till either the opponent concedes to an agreement or the proponent runs out of
arguments. The rationale for using this ramping approach (a selection heuristic start-
ing from the lowest strength argument and progressing toward increasing strength cat-
egories) is justiﬁed for two reasons. First, they argue that by putting forward lower
strength arguments ﬁrst, the proponent does not waste its stronger arguments on dis-
putes that could be settled by weaker forms of arguments. Also since weaker arguments
do little damage to the relationship with the opponent, it is to the proponent’s advan-
tage to try the weaker arguments ﬁrst. Second, they argue that the weaker arguments
forwarded initially will have a wearing down effect on the opponent, thus making the
stronger arguments presented later more effective. However, neither these justiﬁcations
have been substantiated by empirical evidence.
Recent work of Ramchurn et al. [2003] critically questions these justiﬁcations. They
argue that a static ordering, only dependent on the type of argument, is counter produc-
tive since it fails to reﬂect the dynamic nature of argumentation. They argue that the
justiﬁcation strength derived by the type of argument is but one factor among several
that need to be considered. To this end, they propose a method based on two dynamic
factors; namely the desirability of the argument to the proponent (expressed and evalu-
ated by calculating the expected utility derived by the argument) and its impact on the
trust level of the relationship between the proponent and the opponent. Together these
two factors capture the current dynamic state of the argument and prescribe to the pro-
ponent which type of argument to select (the strength of the argument required). The
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RULE 1:
If trust is low and utility of the proposal high
Then select a strong argument to forward
This speciﬁes that the agent should select a strongly justiﬁed argument if
the proponent has a low level of trust on the opponent and its expected
utility from the proposal is high.
The two variables trust and utility are evaluated via two fuzzy heuristics. Both can take
either high or low values. The arguments then fall into three justiﬁcation categories,
threatsbeingthestrongest, followedupbypromises, whileappealsaretheweakesttype.
An empirical evaluation, conducted in their work, substantiates the fact that the fuzzy
heuristic based method of argument selection outperforms Kraus & Sycara’s ramping
method of selection.
However, all of their agents’ evaluation methods do consider trust to be an important
factor. Even the agents that do not consider trust in their argument selection (agents that
use the ramp function), consider trust to be a factor whilst evaluating the argument of
others. In such a context, the superior performance of the fuzzy heuristic that considers
trust is not a surprising outcome. However, if these experiments did consider the mixed
interaction between agents that value trust in their selection heuristic, with agents that
do not consider trust to be an important factor in their evaluation functions, then these
experiments would be far more compelling. Nonetheless, this approach signiﬁcantly
extendsthestateoftheartinargumentselectionbypresentingawaytomodelthenotion
of argument strength and by carrying out an empirical evaluation to draw conclusions
on the impact of using different strategies in argument selection.
Apart from these two empirical efforts, a number of theoretical techniques presented
within the existing argumentation literature propose different heuristics and formalisa-
tions for argument selection. Among these are the works of Parsons et al. [1998], which
prescribes arguments into a series of acceptability classes based on whether they may
have a certain undercut or rebut (refer to Section 2.3.2) that might undermine its effect.
In more detail, these are as speciﬁed from classes A1 to A5 as follows (here Γ deﬁnes
the set of formulae available within the language for building arguments):
A1 The class of all arguments that may be made from Γ.
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A3 The class of all arguments that may be made from Γ for propositions for which
there are no rebutting arguments that may be made from Γ.
A4 The class of all arguments that may be made from Γ for propositions for which
there are no undercutting arguments that may be made from Γ.
A5 The class of all tautological arguments that may be made from Γ.
Here, these classes adhere to the relationship A5(Γ) ⊆ A4(Γ) ⊆ A3(Γ) ⊆ A2(Γ) ⊆
A1(Γ). Thus, according to their deﬁnition, an argument from the class A5 (i.e., a tautol-
ogy) is speciﬁed to have the highest strength (because it is not defeated by any undercut
or rebut), while a one from A1 is the lowest.
Expanding upon this, in a series of publications Amgoud et al. [Amgoud and Maudet,
2002; Amgoud and Prade, 2004; Amgoud and Hameurlain, 2006] propose a two tier
decision model for argument selection. Speciﬁcally, they argue that when selecting the
nextmovetoforwardwithinanargumentativedialogue, agentsarerequiredtomaketwo
decisions. First, at the strategic level, the agents need to decide which type locution to
utter (e.g., either propose, question, or challenge). Second, at the functional level, what
contents to embody within this utterance (e.g., if a proposal is chosen then what should
go in as the request and the reward within it?). To this end, they propose two factors that
agents should consider in both these cases. First, certainty level of the argument, which
deﬁnes how certain the next move is to succeed in relation to the beliefs (the strategic
beliefs when selecting the utterance and the basic beliefs when selecting the contents) of
the agent. Second, the degree of satisfaction of the argument which deﬁnes how likely
it is that this choice will enable the agent to achieve its goals (the strategic goals when
selecting the utterance and the functional goals when selecting the contents).
The recent work of Bentahar et al. [2006], also prescribes this two tier mechanism,
which they term strategic and tactical, for argument selection. In more detail, their
model deﬁnes the following four steps approach for argument selection; namely (i)
elimination of irrelevant arguments, (ii) construction of new relevant arguments, (iii)
ordering of the relevant arguments using the relevance order, and (iv) the selection of
one of relevant arguments. The relevance of a certain argument is judged according to
its adherence to the context of the dialogue. To enable the agents to have a preference
ordering over arguments (required for step iii.), they deﬁne a concept termed as the risk
of failure of that argument. In abstract, the risk of failure of an argument is the compos-
ite risk of failure for all premises that embody that argument. They argue that this notion
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based on the consistency with one’s own knowledge base (similar to the certainty level
proposed in [Amgoud and Hameurlain, 2006]).
Our work uses a mixture of heuristic rules (similar to Kraus et al. and Ramchurn et al.)
and experimental techniques for argument selection in multi-agent systems. For exam-
ple we use a heuristic rule to classify proposals according to the cost associated with
its reward. In particular, a proposal that promises a lower reward is deemed to be more
appealing to the proponent than one that promises to give away a higher value. On the
other hand, when selecting whether to challenge a particular rejection or choose to for-
ward an alternative offer we do not pre-deﬁne a certain heuristic. Rather we implement
both these techniques as two possible strategies and empirically evaluate their effect
using our experimental context. All our heuristic rules use a utilitarian approach and do
a cost-beneﬁt analysis to select the appropriate utterance. Our experimental strategies
are driven by our schema. Speciﬁcally we use the different rights (i.e., right to de-
mand compensation, right to question non-performance) identiﬁed in the schema to de-
sign different selection strategies and evaluate their relative beneﬁts using experiments.
Given this, we will next analyse the state of the art related to argument evaluation.
2.3.4.2 Evaluating Arguments
In addition to the selection of arguments (as discussed above), the ability to evaluate
arguments forwarded by their counterparts is also an important feature that agents need
to possess to interact within an ABN encounter. This is a central and an extensively
studiedtopicwithintheﬁeldofargumentation. Inabstract, theseeffortscanbeclassiﬁed
into two broad categories [Rahwan et al., 2003a].
• Objective Consideration: In general, an argument may be perceived as a tentative
proof for some conclusion (i.e., a series of premises leading to a certain conclu-
sion). Given this, such an argument can be evaluated either by examining the
validity of the premises or by investigating the correctness of the different infer-
ence steps. For instance, the work of Elvang-Goransson et al. [1993] proposes a
notion of individual acceptability of an argument based on the existence of direct
defeaters (arguments that directly attack it either by undercutting or rebutting).
This leads to a classiﬁcation scheme for arguments termed acceptability classes
(e.g., a tautology is more acceptable than an argument that may have a rebuttal)
as listed in Section 2.3.4. The work of Dung [1995] expands this concept of at-
tack and deﬁnes a notion of joint acceptability. Speciﬁcally, an argument is said
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it is itself attacked by at least one argument from that set. In a series of efforts,
Amgoud and colleagues [Amgoud et al., 1996; Amgoud and Cayrol, 1998, 1997,
2002] expand and amalgamate both these notions of acceptability and propose a
coherent model termed preference-based argumentation. In abstract, they argue
that an argument is acceptable under three conditions; namely (i) if it is not de-
feated, (ii) if it defends itself against its defeaters (because it is preferred to its
defeaters), and (iii) if all its defeaters are defended by other arguments. They
model these via preference relations between arguments and theoretically prove
their effect.
• Subjective Consideration: Instead of merely considering the contents and con-
struction of an argument, here the agent would evaluate the argument in relation
to its preferences or motivations. For instance, within the argumentation system
proposed by Bench-Capon [2001] each participant in a persuasion dialogue may
have their own individual preferences over the “values” of arguments. Therefore,
the strength of a certain argument can be subjective to the agent that is evaluating
that argument.
Most ABN frameworks proposed to date use both these forms of objective and sub-
jective techniques in evaluating arguments. For instance, the framework proposed by
Parsons et al. [1998] uses the notion of acceptability along with a simple benevolent
normative rule for argument evaluation: if a certain agent does not require a speciﬁc
resource, it will give it away if requested. In more detail, when an agent receives an
argument, it will ﬁrst try to establish if it can attack that argument by examining its
different premises and the inference steps. If an attack can be formulated they will do
so by means of either an undercut or a rebut (see Section 2.3.2). On the other hand, in
cases where the agent ﬁnds that argument acceptable and it has no current use for the
requested resource, then it will accept the argument and hand over the resource.
In their work, Sadri et al. [2001] present a similar benevolent approach for argument
evaluation. However, unlike Parsons et al., their heuristic focuses on the goals of the
agents, rather than the beliefs. In more detail, an agent would accept a justiﬁed pro-
posal for a particular resource if it does not hold a current goal which plans to use that
resource. However, if the agent currently plans to use that resource, then its counterpart
must produce an alternative acceptable plan that would enable the agent to realise its
original goal without using that resource. If the counterpart fails to do so, the agent
would reject the proposal. Here, the agents are assumed to have some ordering over
plans that allows them to choose between different alternatives.Chapter 2 Related Work 54
Algorithm 1 Argument evaluation algorithm as per Kraus et al..
1: if ((Collision-Flag = true) AND (Convincing-Factor < 1)) then
2: reject
3: else if ((Collision-Flag = false) AND (Convincing-Factor > 1)) then
4: accept
5: else
6: if (Acceptability-Value > Performance-Threshold) then
7: accept
8: else
9: reject
10: end if
11: end if
An alternative approach to argument evaluation is to use the notion of utility, which
is increasingly becoming popular in current ABN literature (refer to [Rahwan et al.,
2003a]). The basic idea here is that an agent would calculate the expected utility in the
cases where it accepts and rejects a particular proposal and, thereby, make a decision
that would maximise its utility. For instance, the framework proposed by Kraus et al.
considers three factors in evaluating arguments:
• The Collision-Flag: indicates whether the results of the requested action are in
conﬂict with any of the agents’ current goals;
• The Convincing-Factor: indicates how convincing the argument is in relation to
the requested action (e.g., an appeal to a past promise is assigned a value of 1 if
the agent believes it has actually made such promise, and 0 otherwise); and
• The Acceptability-Value: indicates the utility value of the proposal calculated
based on the cost (in terms of the number of intentions required) of performing
the request as opposed to not doing so.
Using these three factors in conjunction, they propose the following algorithm for eval-
uating arguments within a negotiation context (for more details refer to [Kraus et al.,
1998]).
A number of approaches build upon and extend this model for evaluating arguments.
Among these are the works of Ramchurn et al., which proposes incorporating trust as
a criteria for evaluating arguments. In abstract, they propose that when considering
an argument forwarded by a certain proponent, an agent should take into account the
trust level it has on that proponent. Doing so, they argue, will give a more realistic and
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deceptive self-interested agent from trying to lie within their ABN interactions. In their
more recent works, they develop this idea further by modelling agents that use future
rewards as a means to augment their negotiation interaction [Ramchurn et al., 2006].
Sierra et al. [1998] propose the use of authority as a criteria for evaluating arguments.
In particular, their work represents the society as an authority based structure of roles
interconnected via a set of relationships. In this context, they argue that the strength of
an argument is a function of the authority level of the proponent of that argument. For
instance, an argument expressed by a manager of an organisation will be stronger than
an argument forwarded by a fellow co-worker. This, in turn, they use as rule for eval-
uating arguments. However, this method can be criticised for ignoring the contents of
the argument and relying solely on the authority level of the proponent. While author-
ity seems to be a useful factor in evaluating arguments within an organisation, many
argue that it needs to be used in conjunction with other factors such as trust level of
the proponent, utility for the evaluating agent, persuasive strength of the argument, and
acceptability of the contents of the argument.
Similar to argument selection, we again use a heuristic based approach to evaluate ar-
guments. Thus, our work again sits in line with the frameworks proposed by Ramchurn
et al. and Kraus et al.. For instance, when a respondent receives a certain proposal
from its counterpart, it will again use an analogous cost-beneﬁt analysis to determine
its acceptability. In particular, it will compare the cost of performing the requested ac-
tion in relation to the beneﬁt of the reward. If more than one proposal is acceptable, it
will accept the one with the highest cumulative beneﬁt. On the other hand, when com-
paring two assertions, the agent will compare their respective justiﬁcations. However,
we do not specify a speciﬁc decision function to ascertain which justiﬁcation defeats
which. Rather we abstract away this functionality by using a validation heuristic which
simulates a defeasible model such as [Amgoud and Prade, 2004]. For a more detailed
discussion on this refer to Section 6.2.
2.4 Summary
This chapter presents a detailed literature analysis on two areas central to this research.
First, we analyse how ABN is applied within multi-agent systems to resolve conﬂicts.
We highlight that there are two key questions that an agent needs to consider before
they are to use ABN to manage conﬂicts within a multi-agent context; namely when
to argue and how to argue. Along these two research themes, we analyse a series of
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emphasising the common patterns and any shortcomings. In addition, we also explain
the different ways that we beneﬁt from these efforts and highlight their speciﬁc contri-
bution to this study. Given a detailed analysis of the relevant literature that inspired our
research study, next we proceed to detail the ABN framework proposed in this thesis.Chapter 3
Argumentation Framework
Given a detailed analysis of the related literature that inspired this research, this chap-
ter goes on to give a detailed discussion of our formal and computational framework
that allows agents to argue, negotiate, and resolve conﬂicts in the presence of social
inﬂuences. In abstract, our framework consists of four main elements: (i) a schema for
reasoning about social inﬂuence, (ii) a set of social arguments that make use of this
schema, (iii) a language and protocol for facilitating dialogue about social inﬂuence,
and (iv) a set of decision functions that agents may use to generate dialogues within
the protocol. In the following sub-sections, we discuss each of these elements in more
detail.
3.1 Schema
As the ﬁrst step in modelling our argumentation framework, here we formulate a coher-
ent mechanism to capture the notion of social inﬂuences within a multi-agent society.
As explained in Section 2.3.1, many different forms of external inﬂuences affect the ac-
tions that an agent performs within a society. Moreover, these social inﬂuences emanate
from different elements of the society. In particular, many researchers now perceive a
society as a collection of roles inter-connected via a web of relationships [Cavedon and
Sonenberg, 1998; Panzarasa et al., 2001]. These roles and relationships represent two
important aspects of social inﬂuence within a society. Speciﬁcally, when an agent op-
erates within such a social context, it may assume certain speciﬁc roles, which will, in
turn, guide the actions it performs. In a similar manner, the relationships connecting the
agents enacting their respective roles also inﬂuence the actions they perform. To date,
an array of existing research, both in social science and in multi-agent systems, attempt
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to capture the inﬂuences of these social factors on the behaviour of the individual (see
Section 2.3.1). Nevertheless, there is little in the way of consensus at an overarching
level. Some tend to be overly prescriptive, advocating that agents abide by their social
inﬂuences without any choice or reasoning. While others advocate a detailed delibera-
tive approach, analysed at a theoretical level without evaluating its computational costs.
Given this, in the following we progressively introduce what we believe are a mini-
mal set of key notions and explain how we adapt them to build a coherent schema that
captures the notion of social inﬂuence.
The notion of social commitment introduced by Castelfranchi [1995] acts as our basic
building block for capturing social inﬂuence (refer to Section 2.3.1). In essence, a social
commitment (SC) is a commitment by one agent to another to perform a stipulated
action. More speciﬁcally, it is deﬁned as a four tuple relation:
SC = (x,y,θ,w)
where x identiﬁes the agent who is socially commitment to carry out the action (termed
the debtor), y the agent to whom the commitment is made (termed the creditor), θ
the associated action, and w the witness of this social commitment. It is important to
note that, here, in the desire to maintain simplicity within our schema, we avoid incor-
porating the witness in our future discussions (as Castelfranchi did in his subsequent
expositions). This allows us to denote a social commitment using the abbreviated form
SC
x⇒y
θ .
As explained in Section 2.3.1, having deﬁned social commitment, Castelfranchi further
explains its consequences for both the agents involved. In detail, a social commitment
results in the debtor attaining an obligation toward the creditor, to perform the stipulated
action. The creditor, in turn, attains certain rights. These include the right to demand
or require the performance of the action, the right to question the non-performance of
the action, and, in certain instances, the right to make good any losses suffered due
to its non-performance. We refer to these as rights to exert inﬂuence. This notion of
social commitment resulting in an obligation and rights to exert inﬂuence, allows us a
means to capture social inﬂuences between two agents. Thus, when a certain agent is
socially committed to another to perform a speciﬁc action, it subjects itself to the social
inﬂuences of the other to perform that action. The ensuing obligation, on one hand,
allows us to capture how an agent gets subjected to the social inﬂuence of another,
whereas, the rights to exert inﬂuence, on the other hand, model how an agent gains
the ability to exert such social inﬂuence upon another. Thereby, the notion of social
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two agents.
However, within a society not all social commitments inﬂuence the agent to the same
degree. Certain social commitments may cause a stronger social inﬂuence than oth-
ers. In order to capture this concept, here, we do not strictly adhere to the analysis of
Castelfranchi that an honest agent will always gain an internal commitment (resulting
in an intention to perform that action) for all its social commitments. On the contrary, in
accordance with the work of Cavedon and Sonenberg [1998] and Dignum et al. [2000,
2001], we believe that all social commitments encapsulate their own degree of inﬂuence
that they exert upon the individual. This will, in turn, result in agents being subjected
to obligations with different degrees of inﬂuence. This is, we believe, an important
characteristic in realistic multi-agent societies, where autonomous agents are subjected
to contradicting external inﬂuences (which may also conﬂict with their internal inﬂu-
ences). Therefore, if an agent is subjected to obligations that either contradict or hinder
each other’s performance, the agent will make a choice about which obligation to hon-
our. To facilitate this choice, we associate with each social commitment a degree of
inﬂuence f. Thus, when a certain agent attains an obligation due to a speciﬁc social
commitment, it subjects itself to its associated degree of inﬂuence. We believe this de-
gree of inﬂuence is dependent on two main factors. The ﬁrst is the relationship that the
social commitment is a part of. In more detail, two different social commitments related
with the same action, but part of different relationships, can cause different degrees of
external inﬂuence to the agent. Second, it is also dependent on the associated action.
Thus even in the same relationship, certain social commitments associated with certain
actions may cause a stronger inﬂuence than others.1
In order to reﬂect this degree of inﬂuence within our notation, we incorporate f as
an additional parameter that gives us the extended notation for social commitment as
SC
x⇒y
θ,f . Given this, we can formally capture the notion of social inﬂuence between a
speciﬁc pair of agents as:
Deﬁnition1: LetSC denoteaﬁnitesetofsocialcommitmentsandSC
x⇒y
θ,f ∈ SC. Thus,
as per [Castelfranchi, 1995], SC
x⇒y
θ,f will result in the debtor attaining an obligation
toward the creditor to perform a stipulated action and the creditor, in turn, attaining
the right to inﬂuence the performance of that action:
SC
x⇒y
θ,f → O
x⇒y
θ,f− ∧ R
y⇒x
θ,f+, (S-Com Rule)
1However, giving a formal deﬁnition on how this degree of inﬂuence is calculated is beyond the scope
of this work. Therefore, here we do not deﬁne how inﬂuences are translated into a deﬁnitive value, but
assume that it can be achieved. An interested reader is pointed toward van der Torre and Tan [1999] and
Ross [1941] for possible paths of formalisation. For a more detailed discussion refer to Section 7.2.2.Chapter 3 Argumentation Framework 60
where:
- O
x⇒y
θ,f− represents the obligation that x attains that subjects it to an inﬂuence of
a degree f toward y to perform θ (here the f− sign indicates the agent being
subjected to the inﬂuence) and
- R
y⇒x
θ,f+ represents the right that y attains which gives it the ability to demand, ques-
tion, and require x regarding the performance of θ (here the f+ sign indicates that
the agent attains the right to exert inﬂuence).
Given this basic building block for modelling social inﬂuence between speciﬁc pairs
of agents, we now proceed to explain how this notion is extended to capture social
inﬂuences resulting due to factors such as roles and relationships within a wider multi-
agent society (i.e., those that rely on the structure of the society, rather than the speciﬁc
individuals who happen to be committed to one another). Speciﬁcally, since most rela-
tionships involve the related parties carrying out certain actions for each other, we can
view a relationship as an encapsulation of social commitments between the associated
roles. To illustrate this, consider the relationship between the two roles supervisor and
student. For instance, assume the relationship socially inﬂuences the student to produce
and hand over his thesis to the supervisor in a timely manner. This inﬂuence we can
perceive as a social commitment that exists between the roles supervisor and student
(the student is socially committed to the supervisor to perform the stipulated action).
As a consequence of this social commitment, the student attains an obligation toward
the supervisor to carry out this related action. On the other hand, the supervisor gains
the right to exert inﬂuence on the student by either demanding that he does so or through
questioning his non-performance. In a similar manner, the supervisor may be inﬂuenced
to review and comment on the thesis. This again is another social commitment asso-
ciated with the relationship. In this instance, it subjects the supervisor to an obligation
to review the thesis while the student gains the right to demand its performance. In
this manner, social commitment again provides an effective means to capture the social
inﬂuences emanating through roles and relationships of the society (independently of
the speciﬁc agents who take on the roles).
This extension to the basic deﬁnition of social commitment is inspired primarily by the
work of Cavedon and Sonenberg [1998]. Their work investigates how different social
inﬂuences emanating via roles and relationships affect the agent’s prioritising of goals.
However, we refrain from going into the level of modalities of agents (such as goals,
beliefs, and intentions), but rather stay at the level of actions.2 The motivation for doing
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so is twofold. First, our primary interest in this work is to use our model to capture
arguments that our agents can use to argue about their actions in an agent society. We
aim to do so by implementing this argumentation system and testing its performance
under various arguing strategies (see Chapters 5 and 6). To this end, we believe a model
that focuses on the level of actions, as opposed to goals, beliefs and intentions, will
reduce the complexity of our effort. Second, an agent adopting a goal, a belief or an
intention can also be perceived as an action that it performs. More speciﬁcally, when
an agent changes a certain belief it has (for instance the colour of the sky is not red,
but blue), it can be perceived as performing two actions. First, it performs the action of
dropping the existing belief (that the sky is red), and, second, it performs the action of
adopting the new belief (that the sky is blue). Therefore, focusing on the level of actions
loses little in terms of expressiveness.
It is important to note that our extension also modiﬁes the original deﬁnition of social
commitment. Speciﬁcally, we allow a social commitment to exist between roles and
not only between agents. The rationale for doing so is to relax the highly constrain-
ing requirement present within Cavedon and Sonenberg’s model that forces all known
roles in a relationship to be ﬁlled if any one is occupied. To explain this, consider the
previous example relationship between the roles student and supervisor. If we deﬁne
the social commitment between these two roles it captures the general inﬂuence within
the relationship. Thus, if some particular person assumes the role of student, he would
still be obligated to produce the thesis to his supervisor even though, at the moment, the
school has not appointed a speciﬁc supervisor to him. Therefore, this subtle deviation
allows the agents to maintain a social commitment even though the other party of the
relationship is not instantiated. Given this descriptive deﬁnition of our model, we now
formulate these notions to capture the social inﬂuences within multi-agent systems as a
schema (refer to Figure 3.1 and formulae (3.1) through (3.6)):
the goals, of an agent are affected via social inﬂuences refer to [Panzarasa et al., 2001].Chapter 3 Argumentation Framework 62
An agent ai acting the role ri
Leads it to be part of the relationship p
With another agent aj acting the role rj
A social commitment SC
ri⇒rj
θ,f associated with p
• Leads to ai attaining an obligation O toward rj,
Which subjects it to an inﬂuence of degree f
To perform the action θ
• And, in turn, leads to aj attaining the right R toward ri
Which gives it the ability to exert an inﬂuence of degree f
To demand, question, and require the performance of action θ
FIGURE 3.1: Schema of social inﬂuence.
Deﬁnition 2: For nA,nR,nP,nΘ ∈ N+, let:
• A = {a1,...,anA} denote a ﬁnite set of agents,
• R = {r1,...,rnR} denote a ﬁnite set of roles,
• P = {p1,...,pnP} denote a ﬁnite set of relationships,
• Θ = {θ1,...,θnΘ} denote a ﬁnite set of actions,
• Act : A × R denote the fact that an agent is acting a role,
• RoleOf : R × P denote the fact that a role is related to a relationship, and
• In : A×R×P denote the fact that an agent acting a role is part of a relationship.
If an agent acts a certain role and that role is related to a speciﬁc relationship, then
that agent acting that role is said to be part of that relationship (as per [Cavedon and
Sonenberg, 1998]):
Act(a,r) ∧ RoleOf(r,p) → In(a,r,p) (Rel Rule)Chapter 3 Argumentation Framework 63
Deﬁnition 3: Let:
• DebtorOf:(R ∪ A)×SC denote that a role (or an agent) is the debtor in a social
commitment,
• CreditorOf:(R ∪ A) × SC denote that a role (or an agent) is the creditor in a
social commitment,
• ActionOf:Θ×SC denote that an act is associated with a social commitment, and
• AssocWith:SC × P denote that a social commitment is associated with a rela-
tionship.
If the roles associated with the relationship are both the creditor and the debtor of a
particular social commitment, then we declare that social commitment is associated
with the relationship.
Given these deﬁnitions, applying the Rel Rule to a society where: ai,aj ∈ A ∧ ri,rj ∈
R ∧ p ∈ P such that Act(ai,ri), Act(aj,rj), RoleOf(ri,p), RoleOf(rj,p) hold true,
we obtain:
Act(ai,ri) ∧ RoleOf(ri,p) → In(ai,ri,p) (3.1)
Act(aj,rj) ∧ RoleOf(rj,p) → In(aj,rj,p). (3.2)
Now, consider a social commitment SC
ri⇒rj
θ,f associated with the relationship p in this
society. Applying this to Deﬁnition 3 we obtain:
(DebtorOf(ri,SC) ∧ RoleOf(ri,p)) ∧ (CreditorOf(rj,SC) ∧ RoleOf(rj,p))
∧ ActionOf(θ,SC) → AssocWith(SC
ri⇒rj
θ,f ,p). (3.3)
Applying the S-Comm Rule to SC
ri⇒rj
θ,f we obtain:
SC
ri⇒rj
θ,f → O
ri⇒rj
θ,f− ∧ R
rj⇒ri
θ,f+ . (3.4)
Combining (3.1), (3.3) and (3.4) we obtain:
In(ai,ri,p) ∧ AssocWith(SC
ri⇒rj
θ,f ,p) → O
ai⇒rj
θ,f− . (3.5)
Combining (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) we obtain:
In(aj,rj,p) ∧ AssocWith(SC
ri⇒rj
θ,f ,p) → R
aj⇒ri
θ,f+ . (3.6)
Having captured the notion of social inﬂuences as a schema, we now explain how agentsChapter 3 Argumentation Framework 64
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Decisions Decisions
Negotiate
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(a) Socially Inﬂuencing Decisions
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Decisions Decisions
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(b) Negotiating Social Inﬂuence
FIGURE 3.2: Interplay of social inﬂuence and ABN.
can use this to systematically identify and extract the different types of social arguments
to use within a multi-agent society.
3.2 Social Arguments
As explained in Section 1.2, when agents operate within a society of incomplete infor-
mation with diverse and conﬂicting inﬂuences, they may, in certain instances, lack the
knowledge, the motivation and the capacity to enact all their social commitments. How-
ever, to function as a coherent society it is important for these agents to have a means
to resolve such conﬂicts and come to a mutual understanding about their actions. To
this end, ABN is argued to provide such a means (see Section 1.1.3). However, to argue
in such a society, the agents need to have the capability to ﬁrst identify the arguments
to use. To this end, here we present how agents can use our social inﬂuence schema
to systematically identify arguments to negotiate within a society. We term these argu-
ments social arguments, not only to emphasise their ability to resolve conﬂicts within a
society, but also to highlight the fact that they use the social inﬂuence present within the
system as a core means in changing decisions and outcomes within the society. More
speciﬁcally, we have identiﬁed two major ways in which social inﬂuence can be used
to change decisions and outcomes and thereby resolve conﬂicts between agents. These
are depicted in Figure 3.2 and are described in more detail in the following.Chapter 3 Argumentation Framework 65
3.2.1 Socially Inﬂuencing Decisions
One way to affect an agent’s decisions is by arguing about the validity of that agent’s
practical reasoning [Atkinson et al., 2004; Walton, 1996]. Similarly, in a social context,
an agent can affect another agent’s decisions by arguing about the validity of the latter’s
social reasoning. In more detail, agents’ decisions to perform (or not to perform) actions
are based on their internal and/or social inﬂuences. Thus, these inﬂuences formulate
the justiﬁcation (or the reason) behind their decisions. Therefore, agents can affect
each other’s decisions indirectly by affecting the social inﬂuences that determine their
decisions (see Figure 3.2(a)). Speciﬁcally, in the case of actions motivated via social
inﬂuences through the roles and relationships of a structured society, this justiﬁcation to
act (or not to act) ﬂows from the social inﬂuence schema (see Section 3.1). Given this,
we can further classify the ways that agents can socially inﬂuence each other’s decisions
into two broad categories:
1. Undercut3 the opponent’s existing justiﬁcation to perform (or not) an action by
disputing certain premises within the schema which motivates its opposing deci-
sion.
2. Rebut the opposing decision to act (or not) by,
(a) Pointing out information about an alternative schema that justiﬁes the deci-
sion not to act (or act as the case may be).
(b) Pointing out information about conﬂicts that could or should prevent the
opponent from executing its opposing decision.
Given this, in the following we highlight how agents can systematically use the social
inﬂuence schema to identify these possible types of arguments to socially inﬂuence each
other’s decisions.4
1. Dispute (Dsp.) existing premises to undercut the opponent’s existing justiﬁca-
tion.
i. Dsp. ai is acting role ri
ii. Dsp. aj is acting role ri
3The notion of undercut and rebut we use here is similar to that of [Parsons and Jennings, 1996] as
explained in Section 2.3.2.2.
4It is important to note that the following is not intended as an exhaustive list of social arguments.
Rather, they highlight number of important ways of using the schema to extract arguments to socially
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iii. Dsp. ri is related to the relationship p
iv. Dsp. rj is related to the relationship p
v. Dsp. SC is associated with the relationship p
vi. Dsp. f is the degree of inﬂuence associated with O
vii. Dsp. θ is the action associated with O
viii. Dsp. θ is the action associated with R
2. Point out (P-o) new premises about an alternative schema to rebut the opposing
decision.
i. P-o ai is acting the role ri
ii. P-o aj is acting the role rj
iii. P-o ri is related to the relationship p
iv. P-o rj is related to the relationship p
v. P-o SC is a social commitment associated with the relationship p
vi. P-o f is the degree of inﬂuence associated with the obligation O
vii. P-o θ is the action associated with the obligation O
viii. P-o θ is the action associated with the right R
ix. P-o ai’s obligation O to perform
x. P-o aj’s right to demand, question and require the action θ
3. Point out conﬂicts that prevent executing the decision to rebut the opposing
decision.
(a) Conﬂicts with respect to O.
i. P-o a conﬂict between two different obligations due toward the same role
ii. P-o a conﬂict between two different obligations due toward different roles
(b) Conﬂicts with respect to R.
i. P-o a conﬂict between two different rights to exert inﬂuence upon the same
role
ii. P-o a conﬂict between two different rights to exert inﬂuence upon different
roles
(c) Conﬂicts with respect to θ and another action θ0 such that (i) θ0 is an alternative to
the same effect as θ; (ii) θ0 either hinders, obstructs, or has negative side effects
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3.2.2 Negotiating Social Inﬂuence
Agents can also use social inﬂuences within their negotiations. More speciﬁcally, as
well as using social argumentation as a tool to affect decisions (as above), agents can
also use negotiation as a tool for “trading social inﬂuences”. In other words, the so-
cial inﬂuences are incorporated as additional parameters of the negotiation object it-
self [Faratin et al., 2002] (see Figure 3.2(b)). For instance, an agent can promise to (or
threaten not to) undertake one or many future obligations if the other performs (or not) a
certain action. It can also promise not to (or threaten to) exercise certain rights to inﬂu-
ence one or many existing obligations if the other performs (or not) a certain action. In
this manner, the agents can use their obligations, rights, and even the relationship itself
as parameters in their negotiations. To this end, the following highlights a number of
possible ways that agents can negotiate their social inﬂuences.
4. Use O as a parameter of negotiation.
i. Promise to (or threaten not to) undertake one or many future obligations if the
other agent performs (or not) a certain action θ.
ii. Promise to (or threaten not to) honour one or many existing obligations if the
other agent performs (or not) a certain action θ
5. Use R as a parameter of negotiation.
i. Promise not to (or threaten to) exercise the right to inﬂuence one or many exist-
ing obligations if the other agent performs (or not) a certain action θ
6. Use third party obligations and rights as a parameter of negotiation.
i. Third party obligations
i. Promise to (or threaten not to) undertake one or more future obligations
toward ak to perform θ0, if aj would (or would not) exercise its right to
inﬂuence a certain agent al to perform θ
ii. Promise to (or threaten not to) honour one or more existing obligations
toward ak to perform θ0, if aj would (or would not) exercise its right to
inﬂuence a certain agent al to perform θ
ii. Third party rights
i. Promise to (or threaten not to) exercise the right to inﬂuence one or many
existing obligations toward ak to perform θ0, if aj would honour its existing
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7. Use P as a parameter of negotiation.
i. Threaten to terminate p (its own relationship with aj) or p0 (a third party rela-
tionship that ai has with ak), if the agent aj performs (or not) a certain action
θ
ii. Threaten to inﬂuence another agent (ak) to terminate its relationship p00 with aj,
if aj performs (or not) a certain action θ.
In summary, these social arguments allow agents to resolve conﬂicts in two main ways.
The ﬁrst set of arguments facilitate critical discussion about the social inﬂuence schema;
thus, these allow the agents to critically question and understand the underlying reasons
for each others’ action. This form of engagement not only allows the agents to extend
their incomplete knowledge of the society, but also provides a means to convince their
counterparts to changedecisions based on such incomplete information, thereby, resolv-
ing conﬂicts within a society. The second set of arguments allows the agents to exploit
social inﬂuences constructively within their negotiations, thus, providing agents with
additional parameters to inﬂuence their counterpart to reach agreements and thereby
resolve conﬂicts through a negotiation encounter.
3.3 Language and Protocol
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 formulated a schema that captures the notion of social inﬂuences
and, in turn, we systematically used that schema to identify social arguments that allow
agents to resolve conﬂicts within a social context. However, identifying such arguments
is merely the ﬁrst step. Agents also require a means to express such arguments and a
mechanism to govern their interactions that would guide them to resolve their conﬂicts
in a multi-agent society. To this end, the following presents the language and the proto-
col components deﬁned within our ABN framework.
3.3.1 Language
The language plays an important role in an ABN framework. It not only allows agents
to express the content and construct their arguments, but also provides a means to com-
municate and exchange them within an argumentative dialogue. Highlighting these two
distinct functionalities, we deﬁne the language in our framework at two levels; namely
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to specify certain premises about their social context and also the conﬂicts that they
may face while executing actions within such a context. The latter provides agents with
a means to express these arguments and, thereby, engage in their discourse to resolve
conﬂicts. Inspired by the works of Sierra et al. [1998], this two tier deﬁnition not only
allows us an elegant way of structuring the language, but also provides a means to easily
reuse the communication component within a different context merely by replacing its
domain counterpart. The following explains these two components in more detail:
3.3.1.1 Domain Language
The domain language consists of ten elocutionary particles. Of these, eight allow the
agents to describe their social context and these ﬂow naturally from our social inﬂuence
schema (i.e., Act, RoleOf, In, DebtorOf, CreditorOf, ActionOf, InﬂuenceOf, and As-
socWith). In addition to these, we deﬁne two additional predicates that provide a means
to express the conﬂicts that the agents may face while executing their actions. Extend-
ing the notation detailed in Section 3.1, we can formally deﬁne our domain language as
follows:
Deﬁnition 4:
- Act : A × R denote the fact that an agent is acting a role
- RoleOf : R × P denote the fact that a role is related to a relationship
- In : A × R × P denote the fact that an agent acting a role is part of a relationship
- DebtorOf : (R ∪ A) × SC denote that a role (or agent) is the debtor in a social
commitment
- CreditorOf : (R∪A)×SC denote that a role (or agent) is the creditor in a social
commitment
- ActionOf : Θ × SC denote that an act is associated with a social commitment
- AssocWith : SC × P denote that a social commitment is associated with a rela-
tionship
- InﬂuenceOf : O × f denote the degree of inﬂuence associated with an obligation
- do : A × Θ denote the fact that an agent is performing an action (expressed in the
abbreviated form do(θ) when the agent is unambiguous). Two speciﬁc forms of
actions commonly used within this context are adopting a new obligation, right,
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do predicate to denote these, to clearly highlight them within our notation we use
two additional predicates adopt and drop respectively.
- Conﬂict : do(A×Θ)×do(A×Θ) denote the fact that performing the correspond-
ing actions gives rise to a conﬂict
3.3.1.2 Communication Language
The communication language consists of seven predicates; namely OPEN-DIALOGUE,
PROPOSE, ACCEPT, REJECT, CHALLENGE, ASSERT, and CLOSE-DIALOGUE. Mainly
inspired from the works of Amgoud et al. [2000], MacKenzie [1979], and McBurney
et al. [2003], these form the building blocks of our dialogue game protocol explained
below (refer to Section 3.3.2). To specify these locutions we use a notation similar to
that of McBurney et al. [2003] (refer to Section 2.3.3). In particular, we deﬁne the
different locutions of our communication language as follows where ap denotes the
proposing agent as ap and the responding agents as ar:
Deﬁnition 5:
• OPEN-DIALOGUE
– Usage:
∗ L1 : OPEN-DIALOGUE(ap,ar) or
∗ L2 : OPEN-DIALOGUE(ar,ap)
– Meaning: Indicates the willingness to engage in the negotiation dialogue.
More speciﬁcally, the former is used by the proposing agent to initiate the
dialogue while the latter is used by the responding agent to express its will-
ingness to join that dialogue.
• PROPOSE
– Usage:
∗ L3 : PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
– Meaning: A proposal from ap to ar requesting ar to perform θr and in return
for ap performing θp. Thus, the request of this proposal is do(ar,θr) and the
reward is do(ap,θp).
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– Usage:
∗ L4 : ACCEPT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
– Meaning: Accept the proposal, thereby agree to perform the requested θr in
return for do(ap,θp).
• REJECT
– Usage:
∗ L5 : REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
– Meaning: Rejecttherequesttoperformtherequestedθr inreturnfordo(ap,θp).
• CHALLENGE
– Usage: CHALLENGE(l)
Here, l can be either a rejected offer or a certain assertion. To this end, it has
two variations:
∗ L6: CHALLENGE(ap,ar,REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp)))
∗ L7: CHALLENGE(ax2,ax1,ASSERT(ax1,ax2,l))
– Meaning: Challenge the justiﬁcation for a certain premise. In particular, this
can challenge:
∗ the justiﬁcation for a reject, or
∗ the justiﬁcation for a certain assertion.
• ASSERT
– Usage: ASSERT(ax1,ax2,l)
Here, l can be a particular set of premises or their negations:
∗ L8: ASSERT(ax1,ax2,l)
∗ L9: ASSERT(ax1,ax2,¬l)
– Meaning: Asserts a particular set of premises or their negations. Here, as-
serting a particular negation would account to disputing the premise.
• CLOSE-DIALOGUE
– Usage:
∗ L10: CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ap,ar) or
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– Meaning: Indicates the termination of the dialogue.
Both these language components (the domain and the communication) collectively al-
low the agents to express all the social arguments identiﬁed in Section 3.2 and, thereby
allow the agents to resolve conﬂicts within a multi-agent society both through socially
inﬂuencing decisions (see Table 3.1) and negotiating social inﬂuences (see Table 3.2).
3.3.2 Protocol
Given the language component of our ABN framework, we will now proceed to de-
scribe the protocol, which governs the agents’ interactions and guides them to resolve
their conﬂicts. While the overall structure of our protocol is inspired from the work on
computational conﬂicts by Tessier et al. [2000], the works on pragma-dialectics pro-
posed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst [1992], and that on dialogue games conducted
by McBurney et al. [2003], and Amgoud et al. [2000] contributed greatly in deﬁning its
operational guidelines (refer to Section 2.3.3.2).
In overview, our protocol consists of six main stages: (i) opening, (ii) conﬂict recog-
nition, (iii) conﬂict diagnosis, (iv) conﬂict management, (v) agreement, and (vi) clos-
ing. The opening and closing stages provide the important synchronisation points for
the agents involved in the dialogue, the former indicating its commencement and the
latter its termination [McBurney et al., 2003]. The four remaining stages not only ad-
here to the computational conﬂict work by Tessier et al., but also comply well with the
pragma-dialectics model for critical discussion proposed by van Eemeren and Groo-
tendorst [1992]. In more detail, in the conﬂict recognition stage, the initial interaction
between the agents brings the conﬂict to the surface. Subsequently, the diagnosis stage
allows the agents to establish the root cause of the conﬂict and also decide on how to
address it (i.e., whether to avoid the conﬂict or attempt to manage and resolve it through
argumentation and negotiation [Karunatillake and Jennings, 2004]). Next, the conﬂict
management stage allows the agents to argue and negotiate, thus, addressing the cause
of this conﬂict. Finally, the agreement stage brings the argument to an end, either with
the participants agreeing on a mutually acceptable solution or agreeing to disagree due
to the lack of such a solution. As mentioned above, these four stages map seamlessly
to the four stages in the pragma-dialectics model; namely confrontation, rather infelici-
tously termed opening, argumentation, and concluding respectively.
In operation, our protocol follows the tradition of dialogue games [McBurney et al.,
2003] where a dialogue is perceived as a game in which each participant make movesChapter 3 Argumentation Framework 73
Natural Language Representation Notational Representation
1. Dispute (Dsp.) existing premises to undercut
the opponent’s existing justiﬁcation.
i. Dsp. ai is acting role ri ASSERT(¬Act(ai,ri))
ii. Dsp. aj is acting role ri ASSERT(¬Act(aj,rj))
iii. Dsp. ri is related to the relationship p ASSERT(¬RoleOf(ri,p))
iv. Dsp. rj is related to the relationship p ASSERT(¬RoleOf(rj,p))
v. Dsp. SC is associated with the relationship p ASSERT(¬AssocWith(SC
ri⇒rj
θ ,p))
vi. Dsp. f isthedegreeofinﬂuenceassociatedwith
O
ASSERT(¬InﬂuenceOf(O,f))
vii. Dsp. θ is the action associated with O ASSERT(¬ActionOf(O,θ))
viii. Dsp. θ is the action associated with R ASSERT(¬ActionOf(R,θ))
2. Point out new premises about an alternative
schema to rebut the opposing decision.
i. P-o ai is acting the role ri ASSERT(Act(ai,ri))
ii. P-o aj is acting the role rj ASSERT(Act(aj,rj))
iii. P-o ri is related to the relationship p ASSERT(RoleOf(ri,p))
iv. P-o rj is related to the relationship p ASSERT(RoleOf(rj,p))
v. P-o SC is a social commitment associated with
the relationship p
ASSERT(AssocWith(SC
ri⇒rj
θ ,p))
vi. P-o f is the degree of inﬂuence associated with
the obligation O
ASSERT(InﬂuenceOf(O,f))
vii. P-o θ is the action associated with the obligation
O
ASSERT(ActionOf(O,θ))
viii. P-o θ is the action associated with the right R ASSERT(ActionOf(R,θ))
ix. P-o ai’s obligation O to perform ASSERT(O
ai⇒rj
θ )
x. P-o aj’s right to demand, question and require
the action θ
ASSERT(R
aj⇒ri
θ )
3. Point out conﬂicts that prevent executing the
decision to rebut the opposing decision.
(a) Conﬂicts with respect to O
i. P-o a conﬂict between two different obligations
due toward the same role ASSERT(Conﬂict(do(O
ai⇒rj
θ ),
do(O
ai⇒rj
θ0 )))
ii. P-o a conﬂict between two different obligations
due toward different roles ASSERT(Conﬂict(do(O
ai⇒rj
θ ),
do(O
ai⇒rk
θ0 )))
(b) Conﬂicts with respect to R
i. P-o a conﬂict between two different rights to ex-
ert inﬂuence upon the same role ASSERT(Conﬂict(do(R
aj⇒ri
θ ),
do(R
aj⇒ri
θ0 )))
ii. P-o a conﬂict between two different rights to ex-
ert inﬂuence upon different roles ASSERT(Conﬂict(do(R
aj⇒ri
θ ),
do(R
aj⇒rk
θ0 )))
(c) Conﬂicts with respect to θ and another action
θ0 such that (i) θ0 is an alternative to the same
effect as θ; (ii) θ0 either hinders, obstructs, or
has negative side effects to θ.
ASSERT(Conﬂict(do(θ),do(θ0)))
TABLE 3.1: Notational representation of social arguments to socially inﬂuence deci-
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Natural Language Representation Notational Representation
4. Use the obligation (O) as a parameter of
negotiation.
i. Promise to (or threaten not to) undertake
one or many future obligations if the other
agent performs (or not) a certain action θ.
PROPOSE(do(aj,θ),adopt(ai,O
ai⇒aj
θ0 ))
PROPOSE(do(aj,θ),¬adopt(ai,O
ai⇒aj
θ0 ))
PROPOSE(¬do(aj,θ),adopt(ai,O
ai⇒aj
θ0 ))
PROPOSE(¬do(aj,θ),¬adopt(ai,O
ai⇒aj
θ0 ))
ii. Promise to (or threaten not to) honour one
or many existing obligations if the other
agent performs (or not) a certain action θ
PROPOSE(±do(aj,θ),±drop(ai,O
ai⇒aj
θ ))
5. Use the right (R) as a parameter of nego-
tiation.
i. Promise not to (or threaten to) exercise
the right to inﬂuence one or many existing
obligations if the other agent performs (or
not) a certain action θ
PROPOSE(±do(aj,θ),±drop(ai,R
ai⇒aj
θ0 ))
6. Use third party obligations and rights as
a parameter of negotiation.
(a) Third party obligations
i. Promise to (or threaten not to) undertake
one or more future obligations toward ak to
perform θ0, if aj would (or would not) ex-
ercise its right to inﬂuence a certain agent
al to perform θ
PROPOSE(±do(aj,R
aj⇒al
θ ),
±adopt(ai,O
ai⇒ak
θ0 ))
ii. Promise to (or threaten not to) honour one
or more existing obligations toward ak to
perform θ0, if aj would (or would not) ex-
ercise its right to inﬂuence a certain agent
al to perform θ
PROPOSE(±do(aj,R
aj⇒al
θ ),
±drop(ai,O
ai⇒ak
θ0 ))
(b) Third party rights
i. Promise to (or threaten not to) exercise
the right to inﬂuence one or many existing
obligations toward ak to perform θ0, if aj
would honour its existing obligation to per-
form θ
PROPOSE(do(aj,O
ai⇒aj
θ ),¬drop(ai,R
ai⇒ak
θ0 ))
PROPOSE(¬do(aj,O
ai⇒aj
θ ),drop(ai,R
ai⇒ak
θ0 ))
7. Use P as a parameter of negotiation.
i. Threaten to terminate p (its own relation-
ship with aj) or p0 (a third party relation-
ship that ai has with ak), if the agent aj
performs (or not) a certain action θ
PROPOSE(±do(aj,θ),drop(ai,p))
PROPOSE(±do(aj,θ),drop(ai,p0))
ii. Threaten to inﬂuence another agent (ak) to
terminate its relationship p00 with aj, if aj
performs (or not) a certain action θ.
PROPOSE(±do(aj,θ),do(ai,R
ai⇒ak
drop(ak,p00)))
TABLE 3.2: Notational representation of social arguments to negotiate social inﬂu-
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REJECT ASSERT
OPEN−DIALOGUE PROPOSE ACCEPT CLOSE−DIALOGUE
CHALLENGE
FIGURE 3.3: Dialogue interaction diagram.
(termed dialogue moves) to win or tilt the favour of the game toward itself. In such
a context, the protocol deﬁnes the different rules for the game such as locutions rules
(indicating the moves that are permitted), commitment rules (deﬁning the commitments
each participant incurs with each move), and structural rules (that deﬁne the types of
moves available following the previous move).5
Against this background, Figure 3.3 depicts the overall structure of our protocol as a
graph with nodes and edges. In more detail, the nodes represent the various commu-
nication predicates used in our ABN protocol and edges denote the legal transitions
permitted between these distinct dialogue move. A more detailed axiomatisation of our
protocol is given in the following. Here, for each communicative predicate, we deﬁne
the purpose of that move, its structural rules by way of pre- and post-conditions utter-
ances, and its effects on both the commitment and the information stores of the related
agents.6
OPEN-DIALOGUE: Thisindicatestheentrypointofthatagenttothedialogue. Itwould
result in an entry in either agents’ commitment stores corresponding to the dialogical
commitment [Walton and Krabbe, 1995] of having made the move (i.e., commitment
to the fact that the agent has uttered OPEN-DIALOGUE). An agent receiving an OPEN-
DIALOGUE will retort back (if it hasn’t already initiated it) by uttering the same. This
would put both these agents in the opening stage and their negotiation over actions can
commence. For simplicity, we assume that the ﬁrst agent opening the dialogue is the
5Note, this is not intended to be an exhaustive list of rules, but rather the most important ones in our
context. For instance, if the aim of the dialogue governed by the protocol is persuasion, the win-loss rules
specifying what counts as a winning or losing position would become a vital component. For a more
detailed discussion refer to Section 2.3.3.2.
6As explained in Section 2.3.3.2, agents participating in dialogue games would establish and maintain
their individual commitment and information stores to record both dialogical and action commitments
(refer to [Walton and Krabbe, 1995]) as well as any knowledge (or information) gained during the dia-
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one attempting to make its counterpart perform (or abstain from performing) an action.
Thus, we denote that agent as ap; the proponent of the dialogue and its counterpart as
ar the respondent. Using this notation, the following deﬁnes its axiomatisation giving
the pre-conditions, valid responses, and their effects on the agents’ commitment and the
information stores respectively.
• Usage:
– L1 : OPEN-DIALOGUE(ap,ar) or
– L2 : OPEN-DIALOGUE(ar,ap)
• Meaning: Indicates the willingness to engage in the negotiation dialogue. More
speciﬁcally, the former is used by the proposing agent ap to initiate the dialogue
while the latter is used by the responding agent ar to express its willingness to join
that dialogue.
• Pre-conditions:
– For OPEN-DIALOGUE(ap,ar): none
– For OPEN-DIALOGUE(ar,ap): OPEN-DIALOGUE(ap,ar) ∈ CSi−1(r)
• Valid Responses:
– For OPEN-DIALOGUE(ap,ar): OPEN-DIALOGUE(ar,ap)
– For OPEN-DIALOGUE(ar,ap): PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
• IS (information store) updates: none
• CS (commitment store) updates:
– For OPEN-DIALOGUE(ap,ar):
∗ CSi(ap) ← CSi−1(ap) ∪ OPEN-DIALOGUE(ap,ar)
∗ CSi(ar) ← CSi−1(ar) ∪ OPEN-DIALOGUE(ap,ar)
– For OPEN-DIALOGUE(ar,ap):
∗ CSi(ap) ← CSi−1(ap) ∪ OPEN-DIALOGUE(ar,ap)
∗ CSi(ar) ← CSi−1(ar) ∪ OPEN-DIALOGUE(ar,ap)
PROPOSE: Each proposal is composed of two basic elements; the request that the pro-
ponent wants the respondent to perform and the reward that the proponent is willing to
perform in return. Therefore, in general, a proposal will have the form PROPOSE(ap,ar,
do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp)). Here, the request from the proposing agent ap to the respondent
ar is θr and the reward in return is θp. Here, both θp and θr could be a single atomic
action (e.g., I will perform (or will not perform) a certain action in return or I will make
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and θ2) or (θ1 or θ2)). Thus, this generic form of proposal allows the agents not only to
make simple offers of payment over actions, but also to make simple or composite re-
wards and/or threats over actions. In this manner, this allows the agents to negotiate and
also to use social inﬂuences as parameters within their negotiations to resolve conﬂicts
(see Section 3.2). Furthermore, both the elements request and reward can also be null.
This allows the agents to express proposals that are mere requests without an explicit
reward (such as demands, pleads, and orders) and solitary rewards (such as offers, gifts,
and suggestions) that they deem to be viable during their negotiation. Once received, as
an effect of the proposal, ar will gain the information that ap requires θr and that ap has
the ability to perform θp.
• Usage:
– L3 : PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
• Meaning: A proposal from ap to ar requesting ar to perform θr and in return for
ap performing θp. Thus, the request of this proposal is do(ar,θr) and the reward is
do(ap,θp).
We assume that these rewards have a particular ordering based on the cost incurred
by ap when performing them. Thus, we denote the ﬁrst reward as do(ap,θp0), the
next as do(ap,θp1), the ith as do(ap,θpi−1)), and the last as do(ap,θpt).
• Pre-conditions:
– For PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp0)): OPEN-DIALOGUE(ar,ap)
– For PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θpi)):
∗ REJECT(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp(i−1))) or
∗ ASSERT(ap,ar,l)
• Valid Responses:
– For PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θpi)):
∗ ACCEPT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θpi)) or
∗ REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θpi))
• IS (information store) updates:
– ISi(ar) ← ISi−1(ar) ∪ need(ap,θr) ∪ capable(ap,θp)
• CS (commitment store) updates:
– CSi(ap) ← CSi−1(ap) ∪ PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
– CSi(ar) ← CSi−1(ar) ∪ PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))Chapter 3 Argumentation Framework 78
ACCEPT: Upon receiving a proposal, the respondent agent ar may choose to either
accept or reject it. Now, in order to make this decision, it will need to evaluate the pro-
posal (see Section 3.4.1 for a detailed discussion on this evaluation decision algorithm).
During this evaluation, if the proposal satisﬁes the respondent acceptance conditions, it
will retort back with an acceptance. Once accepted, both agents will incur commitments
to perform their respective actions.
• Usage:
– L4 : ACCEPT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
• Meaning: Accept the proposal, thereby agree to perform the requested θr in return
for do(ap,θp).
• Pre-conditions:
– For ACCEPT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
∗ PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp)) ∈ CSi−1(ar)
• Valid Responses:
– For ACCEPT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp)): CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ap,ar)
• IS (information store) updates:
– ISi(ap) ← ISi−1(ap) ∪ capable(ar,θr)
• CS (commitment store) updates:
– CSi(ap) ← CSi−1(ap) ∪
[ACCEPT(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))] ∪ [do(ap,θp)] ∪ [do(ar,θr)]
– CSi(ar) ← CSi−1(ar) ∪
[ACCEPT(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))] ∪ [do(ap,θp)] ∪ [do(ar,θr)]
REJECT: If the received proposal failed to satisfy the respondent acceptance condi-
tions, it will retort back with a rejection. In effect both agents would record a dialogical
commitment to the fact that the respondent rejected the proposal.
• Usage:
– L5 : REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
• Meaning: Reject the request to perform the requested θr in return for do(ap,θp).
• Pre-conditions:
– For REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
∗ PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp)) ∈ CSi−1(ar)Chapter 3 Argumentation Framework 79
• Valid Responses:
– For REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θpi)):
∗ PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp(i+1)))
∗ CHALLENGE(REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θpi)))
∗ CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ap,ar)
• IS (information store) updates: none
• CS (commitment store) updates:
– CSi(ap) ← CSi−1(ap) ∪ REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
– CSi(ar) ← CSi−1(ar) ∪ REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
CHALLENGE: Upon rejection of a proposal by its counterpart (ar), ap may choose to
either forward a modiﬁed proposal (i.e., if the reason is apparent such that there can
be only one possibility) or challenge ar’s decision in order to identify the underlying
reasons for rejection. Apart from this, an agent can also challenge a certain assertion
by its counterpart if either that assertion or its contradiction is not within its knowledge.
Using the notation ∆(ai) to denote the agent ai’s knowledge-base we can axiomatise
the CHALLENGE locution as follows.
• Usage: CHALLENGE(l)
Here, l can be a rejected offer, a certain assertion, or a certain challenge where
the right to that challenge is not clear. Thus, it can be used in the following three
forms:
– L6: CHALLENGE(ap,ar,REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp)))
– L7: CHALLENGE(ax2,ax1,ASSERT(ax1,ax2,l))
• Meaning: Challenge the justiﬁcation for a certain premise. In particular, this can
challenge:
– the justiﬁcation for a reject, or
– the justiﬁcation for a certain assertion, or
• Pre-conditions:
– For CHALLENGE(ap,ar,REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp)))
∗ REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp)) ∈ CSi−1(ap) and
∗ reason(REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))) / ∈ ∆i−1(ap)
– For CHALLENGE(ax2,ax1,ASSERT(ax1,ax2,l))
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∗ reason(ASSERT(ax1,ax2,l)) / ∈ ∆i−1(ax2)
• Valid Responses:
– For CHALLENGE(ax2,ax1,l)
∗ ASSERT(ax1,ax2,H) where H ` l
• IS (information store) updates: none
• CS (commitment store) updates:
– CSi(ap) ← CSi−1(ap) ∪ CHALLENGE(l)
– CSi(ar) ← CSi−1(ar) ∪ CHALLENGE(l)
ASSERT: An agent can assert a certain fact in two possible situations. First, if the agent
is challenged for some justiﬁcation on its decision it can assert that justiﬁcation. Sec-
ond, if its counterpart has made an assertion (l), but the agent has justiﬁcation to believe
its contradiction (¬l), then the agent can assert its negation to dispute its counterpart’s
assertion. This will allow agents to undercut and rebut each others’ social reasoning,
and, thereby, resolve conﬂicts (see Section 3.2). Assert can result in one of ﬁve re-
sponses; namely (i) counterpart generating an alternative proposal (taking into account
the reason given), (ii) re-forwarding the same proposal (if, while arguing, the agents
realise that the original proposal was rejected due to incorrect reasons), (iii) challenging
the justiﬁcation for assertion, (iv) disputing the assertion by asserting its negation, or
(v) closing the dialogue by agreeing to disagree.
• Usage: ASSERT(ax1,ax2,l)
Here, l can be a particular set of premises or their negations:
– L8: ASSERT(ax1,ax2,l)
– L9: ASSERT(ax1,ax2,¬l)
• Meaning: Asserts a particular set of premises or their negations. Here, asserting a
particular negation would account to disputing the premise.
• Pre-conditions:
– For ASSERT(ax1,ax2,H)
∗ CHALLENGE(ax2,ax1,l) ∈ CSi−1(ax1) where H ` l
– For ASSERT(ax1,ax2,¬l)
∗ ASSERT(ax2,ax1,l) ∈ CSi−1(ax1)
• Valid Responses:
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∗ PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp+1))
∗ PROPOSE(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
∗ CHALLENGE(ax2,ax1,ASSERT(ax1,ax2,l))
∗ ASSERT(ax2,ax1,¬l)
∗ CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ap,ar)
• IS (information store) updates: none
• CS (commitment store) updates:
– CSi(ap) ← CSi−1(ap) ∪ ASSERT(l)
– CSi(ar) ← CSi−1(ar) ∪ ASSERT(l)
CLOSE-DIALOGUE: When either the counterpart has accepted a certain proposal or
the proposing agent has no other feasible and worthwhile proposals to forward, an agent
will utter CLOSE-DIALOGUE (echoed in return by its counterpart) to bring the dialogue
to an end.
• Usage:
– L10: CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ap,ar) or
– L11: CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ar,ap)
• Meaning: Indicates the termination of the dialogue.
• Pre-conditions:
– For CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ap,ar)
∗ REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp)) ∈ CSi−1(ap),
∗ ACCEPT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp)) ∈ CSi−1(ap), or
∗ ASSERT(ar,ap,l) ∈ CSi−1(ap)
– For CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ar,ap)
∗ CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ap,ar)
• Valid Responses:
– For CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ap,ar): CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ar,ap)
– For CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ar,ap): none
• IS (information store) updates: none
• CS (commitment store) updates:
– For CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ap,ar):
∗ CSi(ap) ← CSi−1(ap) ∪ CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ap,ar)Chapter 3 Argumentation Framework 82
∗ CSi(ar) ← CSi−1(ar) ∪ CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ap,ar)
– For CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ar,ap):
∗ CSi(ap) ← CSi−1(ap) ∪ CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ar,ap)
∗ CSi(ar) ← CSi−1(ar) ∪ CLOSE-DIALOGUE(ar,ap)
3.4 Decision Functions
The protocol described in the previous sub-section gives agents a number of different
options, at various stages, as to what utterances to make. For instance, after a pro-
posal the receiving agent could either accept or reject it. After a rejection, the agent
may choose to challenge this rejection, end the dialogue, or forward an alternative pro-
posal. An agent, therefore, still requires a mechanism for selecting a particular utter-
ance among the available legal options. To this end, in the following we deﬁne the
operational semantics of our argumentation framework detailing the various decision
functions involved with it and its operation. This form of representation is similar to
that of [McBurney et al., 2003], which investigates the use of dialogue games protocols
for modelling consumer purchase negotiations (refer to Section 2.3.3.2). It allows a co-
herent way of modelling the decision functions in line with the protocol, which, in turn,
help us deﬁne the operational semantics of the protocol in a systematic manner.
3.4.1 Decision Mechanisms
Here we ﬁrst deﬁne an array of decision mechanisms required by both the proponent
and the respondent agent to use the deﬁned protocol to argue, negotiate, and thereby
resolve conﬂicts.
3.4.1.1 Decision Mechanisms for the Proponent
P1: Recognise Need: A mechanism that allows the agent to decide whether it requires
the services of another to achieve its action. This will have two possible outcomes.
In case the mechanism recognises the need to acquire the services of another agent
it will forward the outcome needService(θ). Otherwise, it will have the outcome
noNeedService(θ).
P2: Generate Proposals: A mechanism that allows the proponent to generate propos-
als in order to negotiate the required service from its counterpart. In generatingChapter 3 Argumentation Framework 83
Algorithm 2 Decision algorithm for generating proposals.
1: if (Capable(do(ap,θp)) ∧ B
ap
do(ar,θr) > C
ap
do(ap,θp)) then
2: PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
3: end if
such proposals, each proponent would take two rationality conditions into consid-
eration; namely (i) the feasibility of the proposal and (ii) its viability.7 In more
detail, given that we assume our agents do not intentionally attempt to deceive one
another, the proponent must have the capability to perform the reward suggested
in each proposal. Thus, they will only generate proposals that they believe they
have the capability to honour. Furthermore, given that we also assume our agents
to be self-interested, each proposal that they generate also needs to be viable on
their behalf. Thus, the cost incurred by the proponent in performing the reward
(for the generic proposal PROPOSE(ap,ar,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp)) this is denoted as
C
ap
do(ap,θp)) should not exceed the beneﬁt it gains from its respondent performing the
requested action (denoted as B
ap
do(ar,θr)). This is highlighted in Algorithm 2.8 The
outcome of this decision mechanism would be a non-empty set of proposals with
the required action θ as the request and an array of both feasible and viable rewards.
We denote this unordered non-empty ﬁnite set as Q(θ).
P3: Rank Proposals: A mechanism that allows the proponent to rank its generated set
of proposals. In more detail, the agent would use the cost of performing the reward
(C
ap
do(ap,θp)) as the parameter used for ranking. More speciﬁcally, a proposal that
contains a reward that costs less to perform will rank higher than one which costs
more. Thus, the outcome of this mechanism is an ordered list of proposals denoted
as:
S(θ) = {S0,S1,...,Si,...,St} where cost(Si) < cost(Si+1)
P4: Select Proposal: A mechanism that allows the agent to select a proposal and for-
ward it to its counterpart. Generally, the agent will take the next highest ranked
proposal from its ordered proposal list and forward it. If there is no such proposal
(the ﬁnal possible proposal is forwarded) the agent will proceed to terminate the
7Under these assumptions of self-interest and non-deceit, we believe, viability and feasibility are
the two most important factors to consider. However, they do not represent the only two factors. For
instance, when agents generate proposals, issues such as trust and reputation of their counterpart would
also be important especially in open multi-agent systems [Huynh, 2006]. By incorporating such elements
into the decision criteria of the above algorithm, our model can be easily extended to accommodate these
different issues. However, such an extension is beyond the scope of this thesis.
8Here, we deﬁne these algorithms at an abstract level that is independent of any domain. However,
by deﬁning how the agents can evaluate these costs, beneﬁts, and feasibility these can be set to reﬂect a
particular context. Sections 4.2.4 and 6.2 presents such a mapping within our experimental context.Chapter 3 Argumentation Framework 84
dialogue. Thus, it has two possible outcomes. First, if there is a proposal to for-
ward next, then it will return that proposal Si. Otherwise the decision mechanism
will return ∅.
P5: Find Justiﬁcation, Continue Negotiation, or Terminate: If a certain proposal is
rejected, the proponent would need to decide whether to ﬁnd the justiﬁcation for
rejection or to continue negotiation with an alternative proposal. This is a tactical
choice for the agent and the decision criteria will depend on the agent’s argumen-
tation strategy. It will have three possible outcomes. First, is to ﬁnd justiﬁcation
for the rejection challengeReject(Si). Second, it may decide to continue negotia-
tion in which case continue(Si) is returned. Third, it may decide to terminate the
interaction in which case terminate(Si) is returned.
P6: Extract Justiﬁcation: A mechanism that allows the agent to search within its own
knowledge-base and extract the justiﬁcation for a certain premise. Even though
our framework has two speciﬁc types of challenges, L6 and L7 (see Section 3.3.2),
only L7 is applicable to the proponent. Reasoning about challenges of type of
L6 (i.e., challenge to establish the reason for rejection) is only applicable to the
responding agent. In more detail, if the challenge is of type L7 (i.e., challenge to
establish the justiﬁcation for a particular assertion), the reason behind this assertion
is forwarded as the justiﬁcation. Thus, the mechanism will return a single outcome
H as justiﬁcation.
P7: Evaluate Justiﬁcations: A mechanism that allows the agent to compare its own
justiﬁcation (Hp) with its counterpart’s (Hr) and analyse any inconsistencies be-
tween them. A number of different approaches can be used to design this mecha-
nism ranging from a simple arbitration heuristic to a more complicated defeasible
system that is based on the strength of justiﬁcation or even a repeated learning
heuristic. In our implementation, we use a simple validation heuristic that has the
ability to identify the accuracy of these justiﬁcations by examining the validity of
each of their respective premises (refer to Algorithm 9 in Section 6.2). Irrespec-
tive of how this is implemented, in essence, the decision mechanism will have four
possible outcomes. First, if the mechanism ﬁnd all premises within a certain justi-
ﬁcation (either the proponent’s or the respondent’s) to be valid, then it will indicate
this through the valid(H) outcome where H = {Hp,Hr}. Second, if it ﬁnds a cer-
tain premise in either the proponent’s or the respondent’s justiﬁcation to be invalid,
it will then indicate this via the invalid(l) outcome where l = {lp,lr} with lp ∈
Hp and lr ∈ Hr. Third, if the mechanism requires more information to accurately
identify a certain premise as either valid or invalid then it will indicate this via the
outcome needMoreJustiﬁcation(l) where l = {lp,lr} with lp ∈ Hp and lr ∈ Hr.Chapter 3 Argumentation Framework 85
Algorithm 3 Decision algorithm for evaluating proposals.
1: if (Capable(do(ar,θr)) ∧ B
ar
do(ap,θp) > C
ar
do(ar,θr)) then
2: ACCEPT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
3: else
4: REJECT(ar,ap,do(ar,θr),do(ap,θp))
5: end if
Finally, once the validation is complete, the mechanism will forward the outcome
evaluationComplete().
P8: UpdateKnowledge: Amechanismwhichallowsanagenttoupdateitsknowledge-
base with a certain fact. It will have a single outcome l that represents the updated
fact.
P9: Terminate Interaction: A mechanism that allows the agent to consider termi-
nating the interaction through exiting the dialogue. Here, the single outcome is
exitDialogue(θ) where θ represents the corresponding action under negotiation.
3.4.1.2 Decision Mechanisms for the Respondent
R1 Consider Participation: A mechanism that allows the agent to consider whether
to participate in the negotiation interaction. Here, we assume that all agents would
be willing to participate. Thus, this mechanism will lead a single outcome enter-
Dialogue().9
R2 Evaluate Proposal: A mechanism that allows the respondent agent to evaluate
a proposal forwarded by its counterpart. Similar to when generating a proposal,
the respondent agent will need to consider two analogous rationality conditions for
evaluating proposals; namely (i) the feasibility of the proposal and (ii) its viability.
More speciﬁcally, (i) the respondent ar needs to have the capability to perform the
requestedactionand(ii)thebeneﬁtofthesuggestedrewardfortherespondingagent
(denoted as B
ar
do(ap,θp)) should outweigh the cost of performing the requested action
(denoted as C
ar
do(ar,θr)). If both these conditions are satisﬁed the agent will accept
the proposal, otherwise it will reject it. Thus, the mechanism has two possible
outcomes accept(Si(θ)) or reject(Si(θ)).
9As explained in Section 3.4.1.1, all these decision mechanisms assume that the agents are self-
interested. Therefore, all the service providers aim to maximise their earnings. To this end, even if
respondents are already committed to a particular action, they are always willing to listen to proposals,
since they have the ability to de-commit if they perceive a more proﬁtable opportunity. Due to this reason,
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R3 Extract Justiﬁcation: A mechanism that allows the respondent agent to search
within its own knowledge-base and extract the justiﬁcation for a certain premise.
This is similar to the P6 decision mechanism of the proponent. However, unlike
above, a respondent can get two (L6 and L7) types of challenge. Thus, the justiﬁca-
tion would depend on the type of the challenge. More speciﬁcally, if the challenge
is of type L6 (i.e., challenge to establish the reason for rejection) then the outcome
would be the reason for rejecting that proposal. On the other hand, if the challenge
is of type L7 (i.e., challenge to establish the justiﬁcation for a particular assertion),
the the reason behind this assertion is forwarded as the justiﬁcation. In both cases
the mechanism will return a single outcome H as the justiﬁcation.
R4 UpdateKnowledge: Amechanismwhichallowstheagenttoupdateitsknowledge-
base with a certain fact. It will have a single outcome l that represents the updated
fact.
R5 Terminate Interaction: A mechanism that allows the respondent to react to a dia-
logue termination initiated by the proponent. Similarly, here the single outcome is
exitDialogue(θ) where θ represents the corresponding action under negotiation.
3.4.2 Operational Semantics
Finally, we deﬁne the operational semantics, giving the different transitions between the
various decision mechanisms between the agents. It is important to note that the oper-
ational semantics of a protocol are distinct and different from the axiomatic semantics
deﬁned in Section 3.3.2. In essence, the axiomatic semantics deﬁne the static state of
the protocol whereas the operational semantics merge these static state rules with the
internal decision mechanisms of the agents and deﬁnes the actual operation of the proto-
col (refer to [McBurney et al., 2003]). In so doing, we bring together the protocol (that
deﬁnes the rules of the encounter) and the various decision mechanisms (that allows
agents to participate in such encounters), and, thereby, specify the coherent operation
of our model.
TR1: If the agent does not require the services of another to accomplish a certain action
θi, it will consider the next action θi+1. To evaluate whether or not the agent re-
quires the services of another, it would use its decision mechanism P1 Recognise
Need:
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TR2: If the agent recognises that it requires the services of another to accomplish a
certain action, it will initiate a dialogue with that agent through the L1: OPEN-
DIALOGUE locution. Similar to above, the agent uses the P1: Recognise Need
decision mechanism to evaluate whether or not it requires the services of another.
When its counterpart receives this locution it will initiate its decision mechanism
R1: Consider Participation.
[ap,P1,needService(θi)]
L1 → [ar,R1,.]
TR3: When an agent receives an invitation to enter into a dialogue via the L1: OPEN-
DIALOGUE locution, itwillindicateitsreadinessviaitsownL2: OPEN-DIALOGUE
locution. Once the proponent receives this reply it will, in turn, initiate the deci-
sion mechanism P2: Generate Proposals attempting to formulate a viable and a
feasible set of proposals.
[ar,R1,enterDialogue()]
L2 → [ap,P2,.]
TR4: Onceanagenthasgeneratedafeasibleandaviablesetofproposals, itwillinitiate
its own decision mechanism P3: Rank Proposals in order to obtain an ordered
ranking on this set.
[ap,P2,Q(θ)] → [ap,P3,.]
TR5: Once the proposals are ranked, the agent will initiate its own P4: Select Proposal
mechanism to a select a proposal to forward to its counterpart.
[ap,P3,S(θ)] → [ap,P4,.]
TR6: If there is no other proposal left to select (i.e., all possible proposals were for-
warded and justiﬁably rejected) and the P4: Select Proposal mechanism returns
null (∅), then the agent will initiate its own P9: Terminate Interaction mecha-
nism to end the dialogue.
[ap,P4,∅] → [ap,P9,.]
TR7: If the P4: Select Proposal decision mechanism returns a proposal (i.e., P4 will
only return proposals that have not been previously forwarded and justiﬁably
rejected within the encounter), then the agent will forward it to its counterpart
via a L3: PROPOSE locution. Once received, the respondent will initiate the
decision mechanism R2: Evaluate Proposal to consider whether to accept or
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[ap,P4,Si(θ)]
L3 → [ar,R2,.]
TR8: If the respondent decides to accept the current proposal within its R2: Evalu-
ate Proposal mechanism, then it will indicate its decision via the L4: ACCEPT
locution. Once a proposal is accepted, the proponent will initiate the decision
mechanism P9: Terminate Interaction to bring the dialogue to an end.
[ar,R2,accept(Si(θ))]
L4 → [ap,P9,.]
TR9: If the respondent decides to reject the current proposal within its R2: Evalu-
ate Proposal mechanism, then it will indicate its decision via the L5: REJECT
locution. Once received, this REJECT will prompt the proponent to initiate the
mechanism P5: Find Justiﬁcation, Continue Negotiation, or Terminate, to
decide its next course of action.
[ar,R2,reject(Si(θ))]
L5 → [ap,P5,.]
TR10: While considering its next course of action (via P5), if the proponent decides to
terminatethedialogue, itwillinitiateitsowndecisionmechanismP9: Terminate
Interaction to bring the dialogue to an end.
[ap,P5,terminate(Si(θ))] → [ap,P9,.]
TR11: If the proponent decides to continue negotiating with its counterpart (via P5), it
will attempt to select and forward an alternative proposal to that agent. In order
to select this alternative, the proponent will initiate its own decision mechanism
P4: Select Proposal.
[ap,P5,continue(Si(θ))] → [ap,P4,.]
TR12: The proponent may decide (via P5) to challenge its counterpart to establish the
reason for rejecting its current proposal. In such cases, the proponent will con-
struct an L6: CHALLENGE locution in order to challenge its counterpart for its
justiﬁcation to reject the proposal. Once a respondent receives such a challenge,
it will, in turn, initiate its own R3: Extract Justiﬁcation mechanism that will
search within its knowledge-base (or formulate) the reason for the corresponding
rejection.
[ap,P5,challengeReject(Si(θ))]
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TR13: When the respondent extracts its justiﬁcation for rejecting the proposal (using its
decision mechanism R3), it will assert this via an L8: ASSERT locution to its
counterpart. Once received, this will initiate the proponent’s decision mechanism
P7: Evaluate Justiﬁcations, which will attempt to compare its own justiﬁcation
with its counterpart’s and analyse the cause of the conﬂict.
[ar,R3,H]
L8 → [ap,P7,.]
TR14: While evaluating justiﬁcations, if the agent ﬁnds a premise within its own justiﬁ-
cation (lp) to be invalid, then it will initiate its P8: Update Knowledge mecha-
nism to update its own knowledge-base correcting the invalid premise.
[ap,P7,invalid(lp)] → [ap,P8,¬lp]
TR15: While evaluating justiﬁcations, if the agent ﬁnds a premise within its counter-
part’s justiﬁcation (lr) to be invalid, then it will dispute this premise through an
L9: ASSERT locution. Once received, the respondent will initiate its R4: Up-
date Knowledge mechanism to update its knowledge-base correcting the invalid
premise.
[ap,P7,invalid(lr)]
L9 → [ar,R4,¬lr]
TR16: While evaluating justiﬁcations, if the agent ﬁnds all premises within its own
justiﬁcation (Hp) to be valid, then it will assert its justiﬁcation through an L9:
ASSERT locution. Once received, the respondent will initiate its R4: Update
Knowledge mechanism to update its knowledge by inserting this valid justiﬁca-
tion into its knowledge-base.
[ap,P7,valid(Hp)]
L9 → [ar,R4,Hp]
TR17: While evaluating justiﬁcations, if the agent ﬁnds all premises within its counter-
part’s justiﬁcation (Hr) to be valid, then it will initiate its P8: Update Knowl-
edge mechanism to update its own knowledge by inserting this valid justiﬁcation
into its knowledge-base.
[ap,P7,valid(Hr)] → [ap,P8,Hr]
TR18: While evaluating justiﬁcations, if the agent still requires more information to
evaluate the validity of one of its own premises (lp), it will re-initiate its own P6:
Extract Justiﬁcation mechanism to establish the reasoning behind this premise.
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TR19: While evaluating justiﬁcations, if the agent still requires more information to
evaluate the validity of one of its counterpart’s premises (lr), it will attempt to ac-
quire this knowledge via challenging this assertion. This will, in turn, re-initiate
the opponents R3: Extract Justiﬁcation mechanism.
[ap,P7,needMoreJustiﬁcation(lr)]
L7 → [ar,R3,.]
TR20: If the P6: Extract Justiﬁcation decision mechanism is triggered to establish the
reason behind a certain premise l, then it will extract this justiﬁcation H where
H ` l from its knowledge and pass it back into its P7: Evaluate Justiﬁcations
mechanism.
[ap,P6,H] → [ap,P7,.]
TR21: If the respondent’s decision mechanism R3: Extract Justiﬁcation is triggered to
establishthereasonbehindacertainpremisel, thenitwillextractthisjustiﬁcation
H where H ` l from its knowledge and pass it back to the proponent’s P7:
Evaluate Justiﬁcations mechanism via an L8: ASSERT locution.
[ar,R3,H]
L8 → [ap,P7,.]
TR22: Oncetheproponenthasﬁnishedevaluatingjustiﬁcationsitwillinitiateitsownde-
cision mechanism P5: Find Justiﬁcation, Continue Negotiation, or Terminate
thus, transferring control again back to the main negotiation strategy selection
algorithm.
[ap,P7,evaluationComplete()] → [ap,P5,.]
TR23: If the proponent decides to terminate the dialogue it will indicate this via a L10:
CLOSE-DIALOGUE locution. Once the respondent receives this, it will, in turn,
initiate its own R5: Terminate Interaction decision mechanism.
[ap,P9,exitDialogue(θ)]
L10 → [ar,R5,.]
TR24: When the respondent’s R5: Terminate Interaction is initiated, it will convey its
willingness to close the dialogue via a L11: CLOSE-DIALOGUE locution. Thus,
at this time both the proponent and the respondent will terminate their interaction.
[ar,R5,exitDialogue(θ)]
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3.5 Summary
This chapter presents a coherent formulation of our social argumentation framework
that allows agents to argue, negotiate, and, thereby, resolve conﬂicts in a multi-agent
community. In more detail, we ﬁrst deﬁne a schema that captures social inﬂuences in
an agent society. Secondly, we illustrate two major ways that agents can use this schema
to systematically identifying a suitable set of arguments to resolve conﬂicts within an
agent society. Next, we formulate the language, which allows agents to construct and
express such arguments, and present an axiomatisation of the protocol that can guide
the course of the dialogue toward resolving conﬂicts. Finally, we deﬁne the various
decision making mechanisms that agents need to possess to participate in such argu-
mentative encounters and formulate the various transitions involved in the operation of
our framework. Building on this, the next we map this theory into a computational
argumentation context in order to empirically justify the performance beneﬁts of our
argumentation framework in resolving conﬂicts in agent societies.Chapter 4
Argumentation Context
To evaluate how our argumentation model can be used as a means of managing and
resolving conﬂicts within a multi-agent society, we require a computational context in
which a number of agents interact and conﬂicts arise as a natural consequence of these
interactions. To this end, Section 4.1 presents an overall description of the experimental
context. It clearly speciﬁes the task environment, which presents the agents with the
motivation to interact, and shows how these interactions lead to conﬂicts within the sys-
tem. Subsequently, we present a detailed computational model of the system specifying
the various parameters and the different algorithms used (see Section 4.2). Finally, the
chapter concludes with a discussion on the various design choices used in implementing
this context and highlights the correlation of this abstract context with other real world
computer science problems (see Section 4.3).
4.1 The Scenario
The argumentation context is based on a simple multi-agent task allocation scenario
(similar to that presented in [Karunatillake and Jennings, 2004]) where a collection
of self-interested agents interact to obtain services to achieve a given set of actions.
In the following we give an overall description of the scenario (see Section 4.1.1) and
thereafter explain how conﬂicts arise within the context (see Section 4.1.2) and different
methods that agents may use to overcome these conﬂicts (see Section 4.1.3).
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Time Slot A (α) B (β) C (γ)
£6,000 £4,000 £10,000
t0 α β β
t1 β α β
t2 γ α α
t3 α β γ
TABLE 4.1: A sample scenario.
4.1.1 Overview
In abstract, the context consists of two main elements. On one hand, each agent in the
system has a list of actions that it is required to achieve in a predeﬁned order. On the
other hand, all agents in the system have different capabilities to perform these actions.
However, none of the agents possess the capability to accomplish all their actions. Thus,
they are allowed to interact and negotiate with one another to ﬁnd capable counterparts
that are willing to sell their services to achieve their actions. When an agent manages
to attain all the capabilities required to execute its actions in the predeﬁned order, the
task is completed. Upon completion of the task, the agent receives a speciﬁc reward. It
is this reward that motivates the self-interested agents to complete their tasks, which, in
turn, results in agents interacting within the system.
In more detail, Table 4.1 depicts a sample scenario of a multi-agent community with
three such agents; namely A, B and C. Agent A has the capability to perform the action
α, while B and C are capable of performing β and γ respectively. Each task is presented
as a series of actions. For example, agent A’s task involves four actions, which requires
capabilities α, β, γ and α respectively. The notion of time is an important parameter
in the scenario. Not only must agents achieve their actions in the speciﬁed order, but
also they need to achieve them in the speciﬁed time. Any delays on this time will incur
a penalty charge (the penalty calculation is discussed in Section 4.2.1.3). All agents
operate to a uniﬁed clock and an atomic unit of time is termed a time slot. For example,
A’s task spans four time slots t0 to t3. Thus, for A to attain the complete £6,000 reward,
it will have to ﬁnd capable agents to perform α, β, γ and α at t0, t1, t2 and t3.
How the agents interact to ﬁnd their task partners is a central issue in this work. In the
simplest case, when an agent needs to ﬁnd a certain capability to achieve some action
for a speciﬁc time slot, it will ﬁrst look to see if it possesses the necessary capability to
perform the action on its own. If it does, the agent assigns that action to itself. However,
if it does not possess the required capability, it must attempt to convince another agent to
sell its services for that speciﬁc time slot. In the above example, agent A does not have
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β). Therefore, it will attempt to convince another agent B (that has capability β) to sell
its services for the time slot t1. However, it is worth noting that in certain situations,
even though the agent does possess the capability to accomplish its own action, it may
ﬁnd it more rewarding to pay another to perform it. This may occur, if the agent has
already agreed to sell its services to another, and it is more rewarding for it to maintain
this agreement than to pay another agent to perform its action (refer to Section 4.2 for a
more detailed discussion on the interaction mechanism used by the agents to ﬁnd their
task partners).
If an agent does not manage to convince any of its known acquaintances to sell it their
service, it has to delay that action. Delaying means it will not accomplish any ac-
tion within that time slot. Since the agents need to achieve their actions in the strictly
prescribed sequence, adding these delays naturally lengthens the time required to ac-
complish the task. Hence, in the above example, agent A will insert a delay slot in place
of t1, and the action β at t1 will be scheduled at t2. This process would result in the shift
of all subsequent actions by one time slot, thereby, extending the time slots required to
achieve the task from four to ﬁve. As mentioned above, any task completed after the ini-
tially assigned time incurs a penalty, which in turn, reduces the task’s reward available
for the agent upon completion. The amount of penalty is a ﬁxed value per extended time
slot and is proportional to the task’s initial reward (refer to Section 4.2.1 for a detailed
discussion on the calculation of these penalty charges).
If a certain agent (in the above example B) agrees to provide its services to a speciﬁc
agent (A) for a particular time slot (t1), B will not be able to agree to provide any other
action for t1, unless it cancels its current agreement with A. For example, if C requests
B to perform its action, which requires capability β (refer to Table 4.1) at t1, it cannot
do so unless it reneges on its current contract with A. Our framework allows agents
to renege upon their agreements if they perceive a more proﬁtable opportunity. This
ability to renege on current agreements is important because it promotes opportunities
for the agents that seek services later in the scheduling process to achieve agreements if
they are willing to pay sufﬁciently high premiums for these services.
In this scenario, the main objective of the agents is to maximise their individual earn-
ings. There are two methods of doing so. First, they can complete their assigned tasks.
Once an agent completes its task, it will receive the allocated reward (less the penalty
charges due to delays). This we term the agent’s task earnings (TE). Second, they can
sell their services to other agents (which we term the agent’s service earnings (SE)).Chapter 4 Argumentation Context 95
Both components contribute toward the overall individual earnings (IE) of the agent:
TE = Initial Reward -
X
(Penalty) −
X
(External Service Payment) (4.1)
SE =
X
(External Service Earning) (4.2)
IE = TE + SE (4.3)
Given the task environment, we now detail the structure of the multi-agent society that
interacts within this context. To evaluate how our ABN model can be used as a means
of managing social inﬂuences and to investigate how these social inﬂuences may impact
upon the ABN process, we map the notion of social inﬂuences into our multi-agent soci-
ety. In more detail, as explained in Section 3.1 many researchers now perceive a society
as a collection of roles inter-connected via a web of relationships. Thus, to introduce the
notion of social inﬂuence into our context we ﬁrst introduce a role-relationship structure
into the society (in a similar manner as detailed in [Panzarasa et al., 2001]). For each
relationship in this role-relationship structure, we then introduce a certain number of
social commitments. A social commitment in this context is a commitment by one role,
to another, to provide a certain type of capability when requested (refer to Section 3.1).
Having designed this social structure and the associated social commitments, ﬁnally we
assign these roles to the actual agents operating within our system. Thus, due to these
social commitments, certain agents acting particular roles may be socially obliged to
provide their services to speciﬁc agents, while certain other agents, due to roles they
act, may gain the rights to demand services from other agents (refer to Section 4.2.2
for a detailed discussion on how we model these social inﬂuences and their impact in
the agent interaction). Given the broad overview of the multi-agent scenario and the
assumptions made, we now proceed to explain how interaction within the context leads
to conﬂicts and the three distinct methods used to overcome them.
4.1.2 Computational Conﬂicts
Given an overall description of the scenario, we now explain how these agent inter-
actions within this context give rise to conﬂicts between agents. In particular, we can
identify two broad forms of computational conﬂicts that may occur in the above sce-
nario; namely the conﬂicts of interests that may arise due to the disparate motivations of
the individual agents and the conﬂicts of opinions that may occur due to imperfections
of information distributed within the context (refer to Section 1.2). In the following we
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4.1.2.1 Conﬂicts of Interests
The self-interested motivations of our agents give rise to conﬂicts of interests within
the system. In more detail, when agents attempt to acquire the services of another,
they are motivated to pay the lowest amount they possibly can for that service. This is
because the lower an agent’s external service payments are, the higher its own TE will
be (equation 4.1). However, on the other hand, when agents sell their services, they
are motivated to obtain the highest payment they possibly can to maximise their SE
(equation4.2). Thus, wheneveranagentattemptstoconvinceanothertosellitsservices,
the interaction naturally gives rise to a conﬂict of interest (due to the discrepancy in
motivations to pay the minimum when selling and earn the maximum when buying)
between buyer and seller agents within the system.
The dynamics of interaction become more complicated due to the presence of penalty
charges and the ability of agents to renege on their present agreements. Since agents are
motivated to maximise their TE, they want to avoid penalties (equation 4.1). However,
if a buyer is only willing to offer a very low reward for the service, it has a high prob-
ability of being rejected, and, in turn, stands a high chance of incurring a penalty. This
motivates the agent to make high rewarding proposals. Secondly, because sellers can
renege on their present agreements if they receive better proposals, agreements made
at low values are more likely to be revoked than higher rewarding ones. This may also
motivate buyers to make higher rewarding offers to ensure their agreements are more
secure. Together these opposing motivations dynamically generate conﬂicts within the
system providing a good context to test the performance of our various methods for
overcoming conﬂicts.
4.1.2.2 Conﬂicts of Opinion
Within the context of a multi-agent society, information is usually distributed between
the individual agents. Thus, a certain individual may only possess a partial view about
the facts of the society. Also, in many cases, this distributed nature of information may
lead to inconsistent views about certain facts between individual agents. Thus, when
agents operate within the context of a multi-agent society, in many cases, they have to
perform their actions in environments with such imperfect information.
We recognise this notion of imperfect information within our experimental context.
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tion 4.1.1), they do so with imperfect knowledge about their social inﬂuences.1 In
more detail, agents may not be aware of the existence of all the social inﬂuences that
could or indeed should affect their actions. They may also lack the knowledge of cer-
tain social inﬂuences that guide the behaviour of their counterparts. Therefore, when
agents interact within the society they may lack the knowledge to abide by all their
social inﬂuences.
Such knowledge imperfections may lead to conﬂicts between the agents within the so-
ciety. Since the underlying reason for these forms of conﬂicts are imperfections in view
points between agents, we term these conﬂicts of opinions. For instance, a certain agent
may not be aware of all the roles that it or another agent may act within the society.
This may, in turn, lead to conﬂicts since certain agents may know certain facts about the
society that others are unaware of. To explain this further, consider an instance where
agent a0 is not aware that it is acting a certain role r0, which may prescribe it to hon-
our a certain obligation to another agent a1 acting the role r1. Now, when these agents
interact within the society, a0 may refuse to honour its obligation to a1 (of which it is
unaware) and may refuse to pay any penalty for this violation. Thus, such imperfect
information may manifest itself into a conﬂict between the two agents. Similarly, in
an instance where a0 is aware of its role r0, but is unaware that its counterpart a1 acts
role r1, it may also refuse to honour this obligation. In this instance, the agent’s lack of
knowledge about the roles of its counterpart leads to a conﬂict within the society.
4.1.3 Managing Computational Conﬂicts
Having explained how these different conﬂicts may occur within our multi-agent con-
text, we will now proceed to detail a number of different approaches that agents may
use to overcome them. Speciﬁcally, when an agent encounters a conﬂict with another it
may choose one of three possible paths to overcome this conﬂict (refer to Section 1.2).
First, it may choose to manage this conﬂict through a process of interaction, arguing
and negotiating with its counterpart and thereby attempting to resolve their differences
1Theoretically, it is possible to introduce imperfections to all aspects of the agents’ knowledge (i.e.,
the task parameters, the capability parameters, and the counterparts known within the society). However,
since the objective of our experiments is to prove the concept of how arguments can resolve conﬂicts, in-
stead of designing an exhaustive implementation with all possible imperfections and arguments, we chose
to concentrate on resolving conﬂicts that arise due to imperfect knowledge about their social inﬂuences.
In particular, we concentrate on the imperfections that arise due to the lack of knowledge about the ﬁrst
two premises in the schema Act(ai,ri) and Act(aj,rj) (refer to Section 3.1). Thus, conﬂicts may arise
due to the agents’ lack of knowledge about the role they and their counterparts enact within the society.
Increasing the imperfections would merely increase the reasons why a conﬂict may occur, thus, bringing
more arguments into play. However, this would have little bearing on the general pattern of the results.
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and reach a mutual agreement. However, not all conﬂicts need to be resolved. There-
fore, secondly, when faced with a conﬂict, an agent could ﬁnd an alternative means to
work around the situation; thereby evading the conﬂict rather than attempting to resolve
it. Third, in addition to either evading the conﬂict or arguing and resolving it, an agent
could also attempt to re-plan and alter the means by which it intends to achieve the
objective so that the conﬂict situation is removed. The following explains how we map
these three techniques into our argumentation context.
1. Argue: Use argumentation-based negotiation to resolve conﬂicts
In abstract, when an agent requires a capability from an acquaintance, it generates
a proposal and forwards it to an agent that has that capability. Once received, the
agent evaluates the proposal and decides whether to accept or reject it.2 The agent
will then communicate its decision, either as an acceptance or as a rejection, to
the original agent. If it decides to accept, the interaction ends in an agreement.
However, if the decision is to reject, the onus is transferred back to the original
buyer agent to generate and forward an alternative proposal. To help this interaction
process, the seller agent will accompany its rejection with two additional forms of
meta-information (arguments) that it will convey back to the original buyer agent:
• Reasons for refusal: This details the reason that prompted the refusal. In our
system, seller agents reject due to two types of reasons. First, the agent may be
fully committed to a prior arrangement in the requested time slot, so it returns
an argument indicating that the reason for rejection is because it is unavailable
at that time slot (rather than the offer price being too low). Second, the offer
value may not be sufﬁciently valuable to the agent, in which case it will return
an argument accompanied with its rejection indicating the minimal threshold
that must be exceeded before the proposal will be considered. The return of
such arguments should assist the buyer in its attempt to choose the next pro-
posal to forward. For example, if the reason is unavailability, the buyer would
not make an increased value proposal since doing so would be futile. On the
other hand, if the threshold is returned as reason for refusal, the buyer can use
this to gauge whether to make another proposal to that agent and if it does then
it also indicates the value that should be used in such circumstances. These
form of arguments are analogues to the types of meta-information exchanged
in [Jung et al., 2001].
2Refer to Sections 4.2.4.1 and 4.2.4.2 for a detailed discussion on how agents generate and evaluate
these proposals.Chapter 4 Argumentation Context 99
• Alternative suggestions: If the seller is willing to work for the suggested value
of the offer, but not in the proposed time slot, it will send a number of its
neighbouringtimeslotsasalternativesuggestions. Thesealternativesuggestion
provide additional meta-information to the buyer with respect to its current
work schedule.3 This meta-information helps the buyer agent in ﬁnding agents
for those future time slots. For example, assume that in the attempt to ﬁnd
a partner for t1, agent B indicates to A that it is willing to work for t2 as an
alternative. If agent A requires the same capability for the same price (the price
offeredwhenitgotthealternative)int2, beforerequestingotherrandomagents,
A will ﬁrst ask B who has already expressed its willingness. Thus, alternatives
provide agents with information about their partners’ schedules, which they
will, in turn, use to selectively choose the sequence (instead of strictly adhering
to a random one) in which they request their partners.
If any such proposal results in an agreement the argue method is said to have suc-
ceeded in its objective. However, if all possible proposals fail to make an agreement,
the argue process ends in failure.4
2. Evade: Find an alternative method to achieve the same plan
Unlike the previous method, here the agents do not attempt to use ABN to resolve
their conﬂicts. The buyer agent will only make a single proposal. This is to estab-
lish the willingness of the potential partner. If that offer is rejected the agent will
not attempt to convince the non-willing partner, but will move on to the next known
acquaintance, which has the required capability. However, in this scenario the buyer
chooses to offer the maximum price it can in its single proposal. The rationale for
this choice is to maximise the chances of success of its single proposal, thus this rep-
resentsthemaximally effectiveevadestrategy. Since thesellersarealwaysmotivated
to accept higher offers (equation 4.2), making the highest offer possible maximises
the chances of success in its single proposal. If the seller refuses this proposal the
evade method fails. On the other hand, if it accepts, then the evade method succeeds.
3It is important to note that this information provides only a non-binding indication to the buyer about
the seller’s current availability. Thus, in certain situations when the buyer decides to request it to act upon
the suggestion, the seller may refuse to do so. This sort of situation arises when the state of the society
changes during the time lapse (the lapse of time from the seller making the suggestion and the buyer
deciding to request the seller to enact its suggestion). For example, another agent might have formed a
more proﬁtable agreement during this time or a change in the market conditions might have rendered the
previous suggestion unproﬁtable.
4Clearly, this is toward the simpler end of the possibilities in argumentation. However, our purpose
here is not to exhaustively cover all forms of argumentation. Rather we seek to evaluate the trade-offs
involved in engaging in argumentation and concentrating on the simpler models provides an initial point
of departure. In Chapter 6, where we consider how agents can argue in a multi-agent context, we analyse
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It is important to note that in this form of exchange the seller agent also does not
provide any additional arguments explaining its reasons for refusal or suggesting al-
ternative time slots to induce the buyer into an agreement. Thus, neither the buyer
nor the seller attempt to argue.
3. Re-plan: Change the original plan
When a conﬂict arises at a particular time slot, the buyer agent simply places a delay
slot in its schedule and tries to arrange for the desired capability to be scheduled
to the next time slot. This delays the whole sequence of remaining activities and,
thereby, extends the task’s overall duration by one time slot. While the argue and
evade methods remain the main methods in our strategies, re-plan represents the fall
back option (refer to Section 5.1). Thus, re-planning through delays (since theo-
retically an agent can delay forever) will always ensure success in overcoming any
speciﬁc conﬂict. However, delays may cause subsequent conﬂict situations to arise
and will render the task less rewarding via penalties.
As introduced in Section 1.2, Even though our argue method can be effective at resolv-
ing conﬂicts, there are a number of overheads associated with its use. In more detail, it
takes time to persuade and convince an opponent to change its stance and yield to a less
favourable agreement. Furthermore, it takes computational effort for both parties of the
conﬂict to carry out the reasoning required to generate and select a set of convincing ar-
guments, and to evaluate the incoming arguments and reason whether to accept or reject
them. Thus, given these overheads of argumentation, and the alternative methods avail-
able for overcoming conﬂicts (evade and re-plan), we believe it is important for agents
to be able to weigh up the relative advantages and disadvantages of arguing, before at-
tempting to resolve conﬂicts through argumentation. To this end, Chapter 5 presents
an empirical study of when and under what conditions agents should use argumentation
techniques to resolve conﬂicts within a multi-agent context.
Now, in the event that agents do indeed choose to argue and manage their conﬂicts, the
next important issue that comes into contention is how to argue. In other words, what
issues must agents take into consideration and what strategies should they employ?
To this end, Chapter 6 presents an empirical study on how agents can use our ABN
framework speciﬁed in Chapter 3 to argue, negotiate and resolve the various different
types of conﬂicts that may arise within the above context. Next, however, we present a
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4.2 The System Model
Given an overall description of our scenario and the mechanisms by which conﬂicts
arise and are resolved within the system, we now proceed to explain how these be-
haviours are modelled in our implementation. To this end, ﬁrst, Section 4.2.1 details the
overall parameters of the system explaining how the initial reward and initial time spans
are assigned for the tasks within the society, and how the penalty charges are calculated.
Subsequently, Section 4.2.3 explains how the agents maintain market price estimations,
for both the services they wish to sell and the ones they attempt to buy during the in-
teraction process. Thereafter, Section 4.2.4 explains how the agents use these market
prices to generate and evaluate proposals. This is followed by Section 4.2.5 which for-
mally speciﬁes the three distinct methods (i.e., argue, evade and re-plan) the agents can
use to exchange these proposals to overcome conﬂicts.
4.2.1 Overall System Parameters
As introduced in Section 4.1, the modelled agent society has a series of overall pa-
rameters designed to control the behaviour of the system. Speciﬁcally, these include
the agents’ initial task parameters (rewards and their assigned durations) and the rate of
penalty charges incurred due to delays. The following sections explain these parameters
in detail.
4.2.1.1 Initial Reward and Task Duration
Each agent within the system has an assigned task with a speciﬁc initial duration (de-
noted by Tinit) and a speciﬁc initial reward (denoted by Rinit). To achieve simplicity,
both in calculations and the interpretation of results, the initial durations for all the tasks
are set to a constant (denoted by k). On the other hand, the initial task rewards are nor-
mally distributed within the society with a mean µ and a standard deviation σ. The
reason for choosing a normal distribution as opposed to a mere random variation is to
simulate a realistic task distribution within the society, where a higher number of tasks
have rewards revolving around a speciﬁc mean value with a few exceptions of very high
or very low rewarding ones. Thus, Tinit and Rinit are as follows:
Tinit = k (4.4)
Rinit ∼ N(µ,σ) (4.5)Chapter 4 Argumentation Context 102
Time a0 a1 a2
c(0,0.9),c(1,0.1) c(0,0.1),c(1,0.9) c(0,0.4),c(1,0.5)
£6,000 £4,000 £10,000
t0 θ0 : c(0,0.5) θ0 : c(1,0.2) θ0 : c(1,0.5)
t1 θ1 : c(1,0.3) θ1 : c(0,0.4) θ1 : c(1,0.7)
t2 θ2 : c(1,0.1) θ2 : c(0,0.8) θ2 : c(1,0.6)
t3 θ3 : c(0,0.9) θ2 : c(0,0.4) θ2 : c(0,0.5)
TABLE 4.2: A detailed speciﬁcation of the sample scenario.
4.2.1.2 Capabilities and Actions
As explained in Section 4.1.1, the context consists of two main elements; namely the
list of actions that these agents are required to achieve and the different capabilities they
possess to perform them. The following introduce these main elements in more detail:
Capability: All agents within the domain have an array of capabilities. Each such
capability has two parameters: (i) a type value (x) deﬁning the type of that capability
and (ii) a capability level (d ∈ [0,1]) deﬁning the agent’s competence level in that
capability (1 indicates total competence, 0 no competence). Given this, we denote a
capability as c(x,d) : [x,d].
Action: Each action has three main parameters: (i) the speciﬁed time (ti) the ac-
tion needs to be performed, (ii) the capability type (x) required to perform it, and
(iii) the minimum capability level (dm) required. Given this, we denote an action as
θi : [ti,c(x,dm)].
Eachagentwithinthecontextisseededwithaspeciﬁednumberofsuchactions(denoted
by Tinit see Section 4.2.1.1). Table 4.2 depicts one such sample scenario for a three
agent context (a0, a1, and a2) with their respective capabilities and actions.
4.2.1.3 Penalty Charges
If an agent does not complete the task in the assigned period Tinit, it is penalised for its
delay and, thus, is only eligible to earn a reduced task reward upon completion (refer
to Section 4.1). To model this, we introduce a ﬁxed penalty charge per each extended
time slot proportional to the task’s initial reward. Thus, as agents take more time to
complete the task, their task reward suffers liner depreciation. The rate of depreciation
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parameter termed mdf (referring to the maximum delay factor). Figure 4.1 depicts this
depreciation and the calculation of the penalty per extended time slot is as follows:
Penalty =



Rinit
Tinit∗mdf if Tinit < Text < (Tinit ∗ mdf),
0 if Text ≤ Tinit k Text ≥ (Tinit ∗ mdf)
(4.6)
where:
• Text is the extended task duration taken to achieve the task.
• Tinit is the initial allocated task duration.
• Rinit is the assigned task reward.
• mdf is the maximum delay factor, which is a constant for all agents.
Thus, for example, an agent with a task worth £10,000 spanning 50 time slots, and an
mdf set to 4, will incur a penalty of £50 (£10000
(50∗4) ) per each additional time slot taken to
complete the task. If the agent takes more than 200 (50 ∗ 4) slots its reward would be
zero, and, thereafter, it will not incur penalties. The choice of a linear model of depre-
ciation was made to achieve simplicity in calculations. On the other hand, the rationale
for charging a penalty proportional to the task’s initial reward was to simulate the oppor-
tunity cost [Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2001] for the society of delaying tasks that are
worth more. In more detail, in a society where resources are constrained, they should
be ideally utilised to obtain the maximum beneﬁt to the society. In our context, this
relates to using the limited capabilities to complete the tasks to achieve a higher reward
collectively as a society. However, self-interested agents always attempt to complete
their own task irrespective of its impact to the society. In such a context, if a certain
limited resource is used to complete a lower rewarding task in place of a task with a
higher reward, it has a higher negative impact to the society as a whole. Or, in other
words, using the resource to complete the lower rewarding task, has a high opportunity
cost for the society since it results in not completing the high rewarding task. By using
a penalty function proportional to the task reward, this reﬂects this higher opportunity
cost to the society, since if a task with higher reward is delayed, such a function incurs
a higher penalty reﬂecting it more than when a lower rewarding task is delayed.
4.2.2 Modelling Social Inﬂuences
Given our argumentation context, we now describe how social inﬂuences are mapped
into it. In order to provide the agents with different social inﬂuences, we embody a role-Chapter 4 Argumentation Context 104
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FIGURE 4.1: Final reward available upon completion.
relationship structure into the multi-agent society. To do so, ﬁrst, we deﬁne a speciﬁc
number of roles and randomly link them to create a web of relationships. This deﬁnes
the role-relationship structure. Figure 4.2(a) shows an example of such a representation
between 3 roles: r1, r2, and r3, where 1 indicates that a relationship exists between the
two related roles, and 0 indicates no relationship.
Given this role-relationship structure, we now randomly specify social commitments
for each of the active relationship edges (those that are deﬁned as 1 in the mapping). A
social commitment in this context is a commitment by one role, to another, to provide
a certain type of capability when requested. As per Section 3.1, an important compo-
nent of our notion of social commitment is its associated degree of inﬂuence. Thus,
not all social commitments inﬂuence the agents in a similar manner (for more details
refer to [Karunatillake et al., 2005]). Here, we map these different degrees of inﬂu-
ence by associating each social commitment with a decommitment penalty. Thus, any
agent may violate a certain social commitment at any given time. However, it will be
liable to pay the speciﬁed decommitment value for this violation (this is similar to the
notion of levelled commitments introduced by Sandholm and Lesser [1996]. For more
information refer to Section 2.3.1). Since all our agents are self-interested, they prefer
not to lose rewards in the form of penalties, so a higher decommitment penalty yields a
stronger social commitment (thereby, reﬂecting a higher social inﬂuence). The follow-
ing represents such a mapping. For instance, in Figure 4.2(b) the entry [400:100] in row
1, column 2 indicates that the role r0 is committed to provide capabilities c0 and c1 to
a holder of the role r1. If the agent holding the role r0 chooses not to honour this com-
mitment it will have to pay 400 and 100 (respectively for c0 and c1) if asked. Having
designed this social structure and the associated social commitments, ﬁnally we assign
these roles to the actual agents operating within our system as shown in Figure 4.2(c).
From this representation, we can easily extract the rights and the obligations of eachChapter 4 Argumentation Context 105
r0 r1 r2
r0 0 1 0
r1 1 0 1
r2 0 1 0
(a) Rol-Rel mapping.
r0 r1 r2
r0 [0:0] [200:0] [0:0]
r1 [400:100] [0:0] [200:600]
r2 [0:0] [700:200] [0:0]
(b) Social commitment mapping.
r0 r1 r2
a0 1 0 0
a1 0 1 1
a2 0 1 0
(c) Ag-Rol mapping.
FIGURE 4.2: Social inﬂuence model.
agent within our system. For instance, the agent-role mapping shows the fact that agent
a0 acts the role r0. Given this, its obligations and rights can be extracted as follows:
• Obligation to provide:
- c0 to an agent acting r1; obliged to pay 400 if decommitted.
- c1 to an agent acting r1; obliged to pay 100 if decommitted.
• Rights to demand:
- c0 from an agent acting r1; right to demand 200 if decommitted.
Given this global representation of social inﬂuence, we will now detail how we seed
these agents with this information. Since one of the aims in our experiments is to test
howagentsuseargumentationtomanageandresolveconﬂictscreatedduetoincomplete
knowledge about their social inﬂuences, we generate a number of settings by varying
the level of knowledge seeded to the agents. More speciﬁcally, we give only a subset
of the agent-role mapping.5 We achieve this by randomly replacing certain 1s with 0s
and give this partial knowledge to the agents during initialisation. Thus, a certain agent
may not know all the roles that it or another agent may act. This may, in turn, lead
to conﬂicts within the society, since certain agents may know certain facts about the
society that others are unaware of. By controlling this level of change, we generate
an array of settings ranging from perfect knowledge (0% missing knowledge) in the
society, to the case where agents are completly unaware of their social inﬂuences (100%
missing knowledge).
To explain this further, consider for instance that when initialising a0 we seeded it with
an incomplete agent-role map by replacing the 1 in column 1, row 1 with a 0. Thus,
a0 is unaware that it is acting the role r0. As a result, it is not aware of its ensuing
obligations and rights highlighted above. Now, when agents interact within the society
this may lead to conﬂicts between them. For example, if a0 refused to provide c0 to a1,
5As explained in Footnote 1 in Section 4.1.2.2, even though it is possible to introduce imperfec-
tions to all the premises within the schema (i.e., Act(ai,ri), RoleOf(ri,p), AssocWith(SCri←rj,p),
InﬂuenceOf(O,f) etc.; see Section 3.1), here we concentrate on the ﬁrst two premises. This simpliﬁca-
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it may request that the violation penalty of 400 be paid. However, since a0 is unaware
of its obligation it will not pay the amount. On the other hand, when initialising a0 if we
replace the 1 in column 2, row 3 with a 0, a0 would now be unaware of its obligations
towards agent a2 since its lacks the information that its counterpart a2 acts the role r1.
This, in turn, would also lead to conﬂicts with the society. In these situations, agents
can use the argumentation process explained in Chapter 6 to argue and resolve such
conﬂicts.
4.2.3 Market Price Estimations
To generate and evaluate proposals the agents need a means to identify the current
market value of the services that they are attempting to sell or buy. To this effect,
the system allows each agent to maintain its own independent valuations of what it
believes to be the current market price of its own capability. This is termed the agent’s
thresholdpriceanditprovidestheagentwithameanstocompareandevaluateproposals
forwarded by other agents requesting its service. While the threshold price is used as a
reﬂection of the current market price for its own capability, the agent also maintains the
market price estimations of the other capabilities that it does not own, but may wish to
buy from other agents. Knowing and maintaining estimations of these market prices are
useful for the agent to decide how much to offer when generating proposals to acquire
others’ services. In the following, we ﬁrst explain how the agents calculate their own
threshold values, and then proceed to explain how the market price estimations of the
services that they do not own are evaluated.
The threshold price of an individual agent is denoted by P i
th, which reﬂects its value
after the ith offer received and evaluated by that agent.6 At the start of the simulation,
the threshold prices of all agents are assigned to P 0
th, which is calculated as follows:
P
0
th =
µ
Tinit
(4.7)
In order to derive the above valuation we make the assumption that all service types
are equally available within the society (i.e. if there are 10 agents with capability α
there are also 10 agents each with capabilities β and γ respectively).7 Therefore, since
6It is important to note that the threshold price is an individual agent’s estimation of the market price.
Thus, it is a parameter calculated by each respective agent for itself. Therefore, the actual notation should
be Pi
th|j, where j represents the agent. However, for simplicity we ignore stating the agent explicitly in
the notation.
7This is assumed to both simplify our calculations, as well as to reduce the variability of the system.
We adhere to this constraint in all our experiments within this section. Therefore, each agent in eachChapter 4 Argumentation Context 107
the average agent in the society can afford to spend µ (equation 4.5) to acquire its Tinit
resources (which are equally available according to the above assumption) it would be
willing to spend
µ
Tinit per time slot. As the average buyer agent can afford to spend
µ
Tinit
initially to acquire these services, all seller agents set their initial expected price to that
value, which gives us the above valuation.
As agents interact to ﬁnd partners, these threshold values will be progressively updated
to reﬂect the current market price of the capability. Each individual agent updates its re-
spective threshold values based on the offers it receives from other agents. For example,
when a certain agent receives its ﬁrst proposal (valued at P1), after evaluating (refer to
Section 4.2.4.2 for a detailed explanation on how the agents evaluate these proposals)
it based on its current threshold value P 0
th, the agent will update its new threshold to
P 1
th. The calculation of P 1
th will take into account the current threshold value P 0
th, the
weightings parameter w1 (explained below), and the value of the offer received P1 as
follows:
P
1
th = P
0
th + (P1 − P
0
th) ∗ w1 (4.8)
It is important to note that not all offers have the same inﬂuence of change to the current
threshold value. If the offered price is closer to the current threshold value, then the
agent would consider that offer to be a more realistic reﬂection of the current market
price. Thus, an offer made with a price closer to the current threshold value will have
a higher degree of inﬂuence (w) on changing the current value. On the other hand,
if the agent receives an offer quite different (either higher or lower) from the current
threshold (which represents its previous belief of the market price) it will consider this
as an unrealistic offer and will give it a low degree of inﬂuence to change its current
estimation. This degree of inﬂuence is controlled via the wi weighting parameter. To
reﬂect this variation of w, we use an approximated Gaussian distribution to calculate its
value. Figure 4.3 depicts its variation where σ0 represents σ
Tinit (equation 4.5).
However, if an agent receives more than one offer for the same agent to the same time
slot, it will negate the impact made by the previous offer to the threshold value.8 Thus,
the agent will only consider the most recent offer received by a speciﬁc agent for a
certain time slot when updating its threshold. For example, assume a second offer P2
was received from the same agent that forwarded the P1 offer. In that event, the new
experimental setting will have access to an equal number of agents per capability. Refer to Section 5.2
for more details.
8This is used to avoid the update mechanism distorting the threshold value by buyers forwarding
incremental offers for the same service. We will explain how this is mechanism works via an example
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FIGURE 4.3: Different weightings for different quotations.
threshold is calculated as follows:
P
2
th = (P
1
th − d1) + (P2 − (P
1
th − d1)) ∗ w2 (4.9)
where d1 is the effect caused by the previous offer:
d1 = (P1 − P
0
th) ∗ w1
Thus, the updated threshold value after the ith offer P i
th is generalised as follows:
P
i
th = (P
i−1
th − dx) + (Pi − (P
i−1
th − dx)) ∗ wi (4.10)
where dx is the effect caused by the previous most recent offer forwarded by the same
agent for the same time slot. Assuming this to be the xth offer, dx is as follows:
dx = (Px − P
x−1
th ) ∗ wx
The rationale for introducing this correction is to negate the effect of partial offers (of-
fers less than the maximum an agent can afford to pay for the service) making a cu-
mulative impact on the agent’s threshold estimations. To explain this rationale and the
functionality of the above equations, consider a situation where an agent B having ca-
pability β, which it has estimated to have a value (threshold value) of £200. Also
assume that agent A wishes to acquire this service and is willing to pay up to a max-
imum of £250 for it.9 However, A quotes £100 as its ﬁrst offer. Since the £100
offer value is less than its expected threshold value of £200, B will reject this offer.10
However, agent B will use this offer to update its threshold value. Thus, according to
equation 4.7, B will reduce its threshold by 10 down to 190 (e.g., A’s current thresh-
9The calculation of this maximum price is discussed later in Section 4.2.4.1.
10The mechanism of proposal evaluation is discussed later in Section 4.2.4.2.Chapter 4 Argumentation Context 109
old is £200 and since σ0 is 50 (2500
50 ), wi will be 0.1 (refer to Figure 4.3), which will
yield £190 (200 − (200 − 100) ∗ 0.1)) as its new threshold (as per equation 4.7). If A,
upon receiving the reject, makes a higher offer of £150, and if no correction was made
to negate the cumulative impact of the previous offer, the new threshold will be £182
(190−(190−150)∗0.2) where the new wi will be 0.2 as per Figure 4.3. However, since
theimpactofA’sinitialofferiscorrectedthiscumulativenegativeeffectisavoidedinthe
calculations, which will give us the new threshold as £192, a more accurate estimation
than £182 (i.e. as per equation 4.9 we get £192 ((190+10)−((190+10)−150)∗0.2))
Having explained how the agents in our system assign values to their own capabilities,
we will now explain the mechanism by which they estimate current market prices of
resources that they do not own, but may wish to acquire. These estimations are useful
for the agent to decide on how much to offer when it generates proposals.11 The initial
values of the market prices for the capabilities that they do not own, are calculated in a
similar manner to how they initially evaluated their own capabilities (equation 4.7):
P
0
mkt =
µ
Tinit
(4.11)
However, as the agents do not receive offers for the capabilities that they do not own, a
means different from the threshold update mechanism (described previously) is needed
to update these market price estimations. For example, if agent B has capability β it
will only receive offers for that capability, and not for either α or γ. Thus, B will use
the following response values to update its market price estimations for α and γ:
1. The value used in the offer if it gets accepted.
Assume agent B makes an offer to acquire α for a certain value. If that offer is
accepted, then the agent will update its market price estimation for capability α
using this offer value.
2. The internal acceptance value given as reasons if the offer gets rejected.
As mentioned in Section 4.1.3, when agents use the argue method to resolve con-
ﬂicts, if a certain offer is not sufﬁciently valuable, the buyer agent will return its
current acceptance value asking not to make offers below it. The buyer agent B,
uses this additional meta-information to update its current market value.12
11How agents use these values to generate proposals is detailed in Section 4.2.4.1.
12It is important to note that this latter updating only occurs when the agent uses the argue method to
resolve conﬂicts, because the evade and re-planning methods do not give such reasons back to the buyers.Chapter 4 Argumentation Context 110
Since these values are far more deﬁnite estimations of the current market value (either
accepted offers or reasons given for rejection) than random indeﬁnite offers used in the
mechanism for threshold update, a simpler moving average method is used to update
the market price estimations. In addition, because there is no cumulative effect due
the partial offers, we do not use the correction mechanism explained above. Thus, if
the current successful offer is accepted or the internal acceptance value returned as the
reason for rejection is denoted by P i−1
response, the estimated market price is updated as
follows:
P
i
mkt =
P
i−1
mkt + P i−1
response
2
(4.12)
4.2.4 Proposal Generation and Evaluation
Having explained how agents calculate their threshold values and market price estima-
tions, the following sections introduce how they use these estimations to generate and
evaluate proposals.
4.2.4.1 Proposal Generation
As mentioned in Section 4.1.3, when agents need to acquire the services of another they
must ﬁrst generate proposals, offering a certain amount of reward for the selling agent.
To do so, the agent ﬁrst ascertains the minimum price (Pmin) it is going to offer and
then the maximum price (Pmax) it can afford to offer to acquire that capability for that
time slot. In our model, the minimum price an agent could offer is set to zero. This
is based on the rationale that any self-interested buyer agent is motivated to pay the
minimum to acquire another’s service (refer to Section 4.1.2 for a detailed explanation
on the different motivations of the agents). However, since it is not logical to forward
proposals with negative price offers, we use zero as the minimum possible offer:
Pmin = 0.0 (4.13)
On the other hand, the maximum price that an agent will offer for a service will depend
on two factors. First, on the amount of resources it can afford to spend on the service.
This amount will depend both on the amount of potential funds available to the agent
(which are not already committed either as penalty charges or as payment agreements
for previous time slots) and on the number of services that it needs to ﬁnd using these
funds. Thus, this maximum price P res
max(l), indicating the maximum price for the lthChapter 4 Argumentation Context 111
time slot based on resource availability, is expressed as follows:
P
res
max(l) =
Rinit −
l−1 P
i=1
(Pi) −
l−1 P
i=1
(Penalty)
Tinit − (l − 1)
where:
• l represents the current time slot. Thus, l − 1 represents the number of time slots
that have previous been allocated.
• Pi represents the price promised for the ith time slot. Thus,
l−1 P
i=1
(Pi) represents the
accumulated funds already committed for the previous (l − 1) time slots.
•
l−1 P
i=1
(Penalty) represents the total penalty charges suffered till the last (l−1) time
slot.
• Tinit − (l − 1) represents number of time slots yet to be ﬁlled in the future with
the above funds.13
Second, the agent considers the current market price for the required service. More
speciﬁcally, it considers the opportunity (or the economic) cost [Samuelson and Nord-
haus, 2001] of not acquiring the resource at that speciﬁc time slot. The opportunity cost
is deﬁned as the cost of the next best alternative, which, in this situation, amounts to
the cost to the agent of not acquiring that service and buying it in the next time slot
after suffering a penalty charge for the delay. Thus, the opportunity cost of acquiring
the service in the next time slot (or the cost of not acquiring the service at this time slot)
is the cumulative value of the penalty charge and the current expected market price for
that service. Therefore, this market based maximum price (P mkt
max(l)) is calculated as
follows:
P
mkt
max(l) = P
l
mkt +
Rinit
Tinit ∗ mdf
(4.14)
where:
• P l
mkt represents the agent’s approximation of the current market price for that
capability (refer Section 4.2.3).
13Since we make the assumption that all service types are equally available in the context (refer to
Section 4.2.3), distributing the available funds at any given point equally among the services yet to be
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•
Rinit
Tinit∗mdf represents the penalty charge that it will suffer if the agent does not make
an agreement in this time slot (refer to Section 4.2.1.3).
Having computed both these values, the agent will choose the minimum of the two.
The rationale for doing so is derived from the self interested nature of the agent and its
desire to make prudent use of the available resources. For example, if the agent can only
afford to pay a maximum of £200, but the opportunity cost is £100 (this can occur if
there is low competition in the society and the agent’s initial task reward is high) it is
more prudent to pay only up to the £100. On the other hand, if the market based price
is too high for the agent to bare at this point, (this can occur if there is a high degree
of competition, which may have caused a temporary increase in the market price) it is
rational to pay only the amount it can afford to pay and not more than the opportunity
cost. Thus, the ﬁnal maximum price is calculated as follows:
Pmax = Min(P
res
max,P
mkt
max) (4.15)
Using Pmin and Pmax as the lower and the upper boundaries, the agent generates an
array of potential quotations:
Pi = [Pmin ...Pmax]
= [Pmin,(Pmin + I),(Pmin + 2I),...,Pmax]
(4.16)
where I represents a ﬁnite value of increment14:
I =
µ
Tinit
∗ 0.1 (4.17)
4.2.4.2 Proposal Evaluation
As mentioned above, each generated proposal incorporates a price quotation (Pi) and
a time slot (Tl) which will indicate, respectively, the price that the buyer is willing to
pay and the time slot that it is requesting the service for. When the seller receives this
proposal, it will ﬁrst consider the requested time slot to determine whether it has already
made a prior agreement to provide its service to another at this time. If it has not done
so and the time slot is vacant, then the seller will compare the proposed price with
its current threshold value (before receiving the proposal) P
i−1
th . The rationale for this
comparison is to determine whether the proposal offers a higher reward than the agent’s
14The choice of this value is based on our initial experiments, which showed it to be a satisfactory
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own estimation of the current market price. If the proposed price is higher than the
current market value, the agent would accept. Otherwise, it will reject the offer. This
evaluation process is as follows:
response =



accept if Pi > P
i−1
th ,
reject if Pi ≤ P
i−1
th
(4.18)
However, on the other hand, if the agent has already made a prior agreement to another
to provide its service, then the agent will compare the current offer against its previously
agreed price Px. Thus, in this instant, for the proposal to be worthwhile, it needs to
provide the agent with a higher reward than the previously agreed price. Therefore, in
such a case the proposal is evaluated as follows:
response =



accept if Pi > Px,
reject if Pi ≤ Px
(4.19)
4.2.5 Methods of Overcoming Conﬂicts
Giventhemechanismbywhichagentsgenerateandevaluateproposals, wenowproceed
to specify in detail the three different methods (refer to Section 4.1.3) used by the agents
to overcome conﬂicts.
• Argue
As introduced in Section 4.1.3, the argue method allows the buyer agent to use a
series of proposals to form an agreement with the seller and resolve the conﬂict of
interest. The seller, on the other hand, will evaluate these proposals (as per Section
4.2.4.2) and will decide to either accept or reject them. Once decided, the agent will
convey its decision, accompanied by the reasons for that decision and any alternative
suggestions it might wish to convey, if it rejects the proposal (refer to Section 4.1.3).
The buyer will use these reasons and alternative suggestions in generating the next
proposal. Thus, the use of the argue method to resolve the conﬂict with the xth agent
could either result in a success if it manages to resolve the conﬂict with that agent.
Otherwise, it will return a fail. While the detailed algorithm for the argue method is
presented in Algorithm 4, the overall functionality of the method is as follows:
Argue(i=x) →



success if argue method resolved the conﬂict,
fail if argue method failed to resolve the conﬂict
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We use Argue(i=x, ..., y) to indicate the agent attempting to use the above argue
method with a series of agents (ordered from x to y) in an iterative manner. Thus,
it can also either end in a success if one of the agents agrees to provide the service
or in a failure if the last (yth) agent rejects. More speciﬁcally, the agent would ﬁrst
attempt to argue and form an agreement with the xth agent. If it fails to do so, it will
argue with the next ((x + 1)th) agent. It will continue to do so either till one of the
argue attempts succeeds in forming an agreement or the very last interaction with the
yth agent fails to form an agreement. Thus, the algorithm for using the argue method
with a series of agents is detailed in Algorithm 5 and its overall functionality is as
follows:
Argue(i=x, ..., y) →



success if any argue attempt results in a success,
fail if all argue attempts fail
(4.21)
• Evade
As discussed in Section 4.1.3, the evade method does not use a series of proposals to
convince a non-willing partner. Rather it will simply forward its best proposal in its
single interaction,15 and if refused will end the interaction. Thus, the evade method
will result in a success if it manages to resolve the conﬂict and form an agreement
with that agent. Otherwise if the seller refused that offer the evade method will end
with a fail. The detailed algorithm for the evade method is presented in Algorithm
6, whereas the overall functionality of the method used to resolve a conﬂict with the
xth agent is stated as follows:
Evade(i=x) →



success if evade method resolved the conﬂict,
fail if evade method failed to resolve the conﬂict
(4.22)
Similar to the argue method, we deﬁne Evade(i=x, ..., y) to indicate the agent at-
tempting to use the above evade method with a series of agents (ordered from x to y)
in an iterativemanner. While thealgorithm for the iterative evademethod is speciﬁed
in Algorithm 7, the overall functionality is as follows:
Evade(i=x, ..., y) →



success if any evade attempt results in a success,
fail if all evade attempts fail
(4.23)
15Refer to Section 4.1.2.1 for a detailed explanation of the motivations for quoting a higher price.Chapter 4 Argumentation Context 115
• Re-plan
Finally, there-planmethodwouldresolvetheconﬂictbydelayingthecurrentactivity
(refer to Section 4.1.3). Since re-plan will always succeed in resolving the speciﬁc
conﬂict this would always result in a success:16
Re-plan → success (4.24)
Algorithm 4 The Argue Method: Will return success if the seller agrees to a proposal.
Otherwise if all proposals were rejected it will return fail.
1: Pi ← [P0,P1,...,Pmax] {equation 4.16}
2: proposal ← P0
3: result ← “fail”
4:
5: /*
6: * Loop till either the agent agrees or the last proposal fails.
7: */
8: while (result 6= “success” k proposal ≤ Pmax) do
9: response ← forward(proposal)
10: if (response = “accepted00) then
11: result ← “success”
12: else
13: evaluate(reason)
14: evaluate(alternatives)
15: if (proposal 6= Pmax) then
16: proposal ← determineNextProposal()
17: end if
18: end if
19: end while
20: return result
Algorithm 5 Using the argue method with an ordered series of agents.
1: Agi ← [Agx,Agx+1,...,Agy]
2: k ← x
3: result ← “fail”
4: while (result 6= “success” k k ≤ y) do
5: result ← Argue(i=k)
6: k ← k + 1
7: end while
8: return result
16We do not here present the algorithm for re-plan as it simply amounts to adding a delay as explained
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Algorithm 6 The Evade Method: Will return success if the seller agrees to the single
proposal. Otherwise, if rejected will return fail.
1: Pi ← [P0,P1,...,Pmax] {equation 4.16}
2: proposal ← Pmax
3: result ← “fail”
4: response ← forward(proposal)
5: if (response = “accepted00) then
6: result ← “success”
7: end if
8: return result
Algorithm 7 Using the evade method with an ordered series of agents.
1: Agi ← [Agx,Agx+1,...,Agy]
2: k ← x
3: result ← “fail”
4: while (result 6= “success” k k ≤ y) do
5: result ← Evade(i=k)
6: k ← k + 1
7: end while
8: return result
4.3 Summary
In choosing a scenario in which to empirically evaluate our ABN model we face one of
the fundamental problems of empirical research; should we use a concrete real world
domain or base it in an abstract environment? Both these choices have their own ad-
vantages and disadvantages [Cohen, 1995]. The former increases the complexity of im-
plementing context and reduces the ability to interpreting the behaviour of the system.
On the other hand, the latter, which abstracts away certain complexity of a real world
system, raises questions about certain simplifying assumptions and the applicability of
the model in the real world.
Our scenario speciﬁed above falls in the latter category, representing an abstract prob-
lem of multi-agent task allocation. Thus, in our efforts to make the context simple to
implement and test, we make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we assume
that each agent within the system has complete and accurate knowledge of its own task
(i.e., its reward, the actions required, and the sequence in which they need to occur to
achieve the task). Thus, during the interaction, the service providers would not be able
to give any new information about the task that the buyer would not already know, or
be able to convince the buyers on anything contrary about their task speciﬁcation. For
example, the sellers won’t be able to suggest that the actual task is worth less than its
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one speciﬁed) to achieve the same task. Second, the agents in our system only plan one
time slot at a time (i.e., in a just-in-time basis), but not the whole task plan at once in
a complete manner. Hence the agents tend to exhibit sub-optimal myopic behaviour in
their planning approach within our system. This is a simplifying assumption adopted
to ease both the modelling and implementation of system. Third, we assume that the
agents are truthful when they communicate information to others, and do not attempt to
deceive them into making incorrect decisions. Finally, we assume the interactions con-
sist of single encounters, thus, issues such as trust and reputation do not have a material
effect within the context.
Even though all the above are real issues present in multi-agent environments in gen-
eral, our motivation for excluding them from the initial experiments is to attain simplic-
ity within the argumentation context. Our desire is to design a context that is simple,
yet expressive enough to simulate conﬂicts and methods of overcoming them, but not
to simulate the most sophisticated simulations of these behaviours. Additionally, ex-
cluding these parameters limits the variability present in the system. This allows us to
predict more accurate hypotheses about the system, gain a better understanding of the
dynamics of the multi-agent interaction, and explain the reasons for the observations
with more ease.
Nonetheless, our abstract scenario does indeed represents a generalisation of a number
of key real world and computer science problems. First, the task allocation problem
is a common problem present within large scale computing environments such as grid-
based computing [Foster et al., 2004]. In more detail, one of the key issues present
in such domains is the allocation of computing resources to processes which require
these capabilities. By perceiving the invocation of these processes as actions in our
scenario and the computing resources as the agents’ capabilities, we can see how our
scenario has strong correlation to this real world problem. The form of late completion
penalties, similar to that of Section 4.2.1.3, are common in most manufacturing service
industries (i.e., building construction). In particular, they are used to control quality
of service and delivery time in such industries. In the grid environments these forms
of clauses can also be used to reduce waiting time for processors. Furthermore, the
notion of social inﬂuences and social structure present within our multi-agent context
allows us to simulate not only peer-to-peer systems, but also more structured societies
such as organisations prevalent in the real world. In addition, our work, presents a more
generic way of capturing social inﬂuences of roles and relationships (i.e., using social
commitment with different degrees of inﬂuence). This, not only provides a simple
uniﬁed mechanism to simulate such social contexts with a wide array of relationships
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with our agents’ ability to argue, negotiate and resolve conﬂicts in such disparate social
systems.
Having successfully mapped our ABN framework to a computation context, next we
proceed to address our ﬁrst research question of when to argue in a multi-agent society.Chapter 5
Deciding When to Argue
As explained in Section 1.2, even though ABN can provide agents with a promising
means to interact and resolve their conﬂicts, a number of overheads (both in terms of
time and computational resources) are associated with its use. Furthermore, not all
conﬂicts need to be resolved. In particular, agents can choose to avoid conﬂicts either
by ﬁnding an alternative means to work around the situation (here termed evade) or
by altering the means by which they intend to achieve their objectives (here termed re-
plan). Given the overheads of argumentation, and the alternative methods available for
overcoming conﬂicts, we believe it is important for the agents to be able to weigh up the
relative advantages and disadvantages of arguing, before attempting to resolve conﬂicts
through argumentation. Thus, when to argue becomes an important decision criteria for
the agents when interacting within a multi-agent context.
To this end, we present an empirical analysis that seeks to identify when and under what
conditions argumentation gives a better option for agents to overcome conﬂicts. In more
detail, we design our experiments to evaluate the relative performance beneﬁts (in terms
of effectiveness and efﬁciency) of using ABN, as opposed to evasion and re-planning,
to overcome conﬂicts in a multi-agent system. More speciﬁcally, we simulate a multi-
agent context (as per Section 4.1), and specify the agents with different strategies to
overcome the conﬂicts that dynamically arise within the system. The observed overall
performance of the society (in terms of efﬁciency and effectiveness) is measured, and
used to carry out a comparative analysis between these strategies. Thereafter, we use
these comparisons to draw conclusions regarding the overall impact of ABN as opposed
to evasion in multi-agent conﬂict resolution.
The remainder of this section is organised as follows. First, Section 5.1 speciﬁes the
different strategies used by the agents to resolve conﬂicts within our argumentation
119Chapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 120
context (speciﬁed in Section 4.1). Next, Section 5.2 details the experimental setting and
the metrics used to evaluate the overall performance of the society. Subsequently, Sec-
tion 5.3 presents the results and analyses them as a series of key observations. Section
5.4 concludes this chapter by summarising the main contributions of this experimental
effort.
5.1 Conﬂict Resolution Strategies
In this section, we present six different strategies for conﬂict resolution which differ in
terms of the way they order the methods argue, evade and re-plan (see Section 4.1.3).
These strategies are deﬁned to give a range of different behaviours for resolving con-
ﬂicts. However, they are neither meant to be an exhaustive, nor the most optimal list.
Rather their purpose is to allow us to perform a comparative analysis of the relative
performance of arguing versus evasion in conﬂict resolution. For clarity, ﬁrst we give
an overview explanation on the behaviour of these strategies and subsequently specify
a more precise deﬁnition later:
• Evade 1: Randomly select one agent. Evade with that agent. If fail, re-plan.
• Argue 1: Randomly select one agent. Argue with that agent. If fail, re-plan.
• Always Evade: Randomly select one agent at a time and evade. Continue evade
till either an agent agrees or the last agent is reached. If fail with last agent,
re-plan.
• Evade Finally Argue: Similar to Always Evade. Thus, continue to evade till
penultimate agent, however, with the last agent argue. If fail with the last agent,
re-plan.
• Argue First then Evade: SimilartoAlways Evade, butarguewiththeﬁrst agent.
If fail with this agent continue evade till either an agent agrees or last agent is
reached. If fail with last agent, re-plan.
• Always Argue: Similar to Always Evade, but in all encounters argue till either
an agent agrees or the last agent is reached. If fail with last agent, re-plan.
From the above, Evade 1 and Argue 1 only allow the agents to interact with a single
partner. Strategies Always Evade and Always Argue allow agents to interact with all
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to resolve conﬂicts (either evade or argue), thus they are here termed pure strategies.
In contrast, Evade Finally Argue and Argue First then Evade are hybrid strategies that
selectively use argumentation with evasion; the former gives priority to evasion, while
the later gives priority to argumentation. Having introduced our argumentation context,
we now turn to detail our system model.
Given the overall behaviour of these strategies, the following specify a more detailed
deﬁnition of their operation. To do so, we use the three methods argue, evade and re-
plan speciﬁed in Section 4.2.5 (see equations 4.20 to 4.24) and, in addition, use the two
methods select and fail deﬁned as follows:
• Select(x,n)
This performs a random selection and ordering function. The method will ran-
domly select x different agents out of a population of size n. These selected agents
are ordered from 1 to x, where the ﬁrst chosen agent is referred to as Ag1 and the
last chosen agent as Agx:
Select(x,n) → [Ag1,Ag2,...,Agx] (5.1)
• Fail(i=x)
This reﬂects a Boolean test condition. If the method used to resolve the conﬂict
(either argue, evade or re-plan) with agent Agx results in a failure, the Fail method
returns a true value. Otherwise if it results in a success, it returns false:
Fail(i=x) →



true if the method failed to resolved the conﬂict,
false if the method succeeds in resolving the conﬂict
(5.2)
Using this notation, we can now specify our six conﬂict resolution strategies as follows:
• Evade 1
The agent will randomly select one agent out of the n known agents that have the
required capability. It will attempt evasion with that agent (as per equation 4.22).
If it fails to form an agreement the agent will re-plan:
Select(1,n)
Evade(i=1)
If Fail(i=1) Re-planChapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 122
• Argue 1
Similar to the above, the agent will select one random agent. Here it will attempt
to argue (as per equation 4.20) and resolve its conﬂict with that agent. If the argue
method fails, it will re-plan to avoid the conﬂict:
Select(1,n)
Argue(i=1)
If Fail(i=1) Re-plan
• Always Evade
This is similar to Evade 1. However, if the agent fails to form an agreement with
the ﬁrst agent, it will continue to use evasion with all agents (randomly picked)
one after another (refer to Algorithm 7). This will continue until either agreement
is reached with one agent, or all n agents refuse. If the last agent refuses, it will
re-plan:
Select(n,n)
Evade(i=1, ..., n)
If Fail(i=n) Re-plan
• Evade Finally Argue
This strategy is similar to Always Evade. However, the agent will evade only till
the penultimate encounter, and on the last encounter it will attempt to argue. If
the last agent refuses, it will re-plan:
Select(n,n)
Evade(i=1, ..., n-1)
Argue(i=n)
If Fail(i=n) Re-plan
• Argue First then Evade
Similar to Always Evade. However, unlike above, the agent will attempt to argue
with its ﬁrst encounter. If it fails to yield an agreement, it will continue to evade
till the last encounter. If the last agent refuses, it will re-plan:
Select(n,n)
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Evade(i=2, ..., n)
If Fail(i=n) Re-plan
• Always Argue
Here the agent will attempt to argue in all its (randomly ordered) encounters (refer
to Algorithm 5). If the last agent refuses, it will re-plan:
Select(n,n)
Argue(i=1, ..., n)
If Fail(i=n) Re-plan
Having speciﬁed the different strategies, we now proceed to introduce the various pa-
rameters and the distinct metrics used to measure performance within this empirical
study.
5.2 Experimental Setting
The experiments are set within a society of 75 agents and the number of capability types
within the context is set to 3 (referred to as α, β and γ).1 Each agent is assigned with
a competence level of 1 for a certain capability type (either α, β, or γ) and 0 for the
remaining two. Therefore, any given agent within the society has the ability to perform
only one capability type. Within the society these capabilities are equally distributed
with 25 agents having the ability to perform a certain capability type. All agents are
assigned a single task spanning 50 time slots (as per equation 4.4 in Section 4.2.1.1).
Each time slot contains a single action that requires a competence level of 1 (of the
speciﬁed type) to achieve it. These capability types required are randomly distributed
within a task. The initial rewards for the tasks are set according to a normal distribution
(as per equation 4.5 in Section 4.2.1.1) with a mean £10,000 and a standard deviation
of £2,500. Based on our initial experiments, the mdf parameter for the penalty charge
is set to 4 (as per equation 4.6 in Section 4.2.1.3).
In each experiment, the society differs in terms of its availability of resources. These
are termed resource settings and are referred to as RSi where i represents the number
1It is important to note that even though the reported results are for an agent community with 75
individuals, we have carried out these experiments in a broad range of settings where we have observed
the same trends. Thus, although we present results for a speciﬁc instance here, the results are broadly
indicative of what we have seen elsewhere.Chapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 124
Simulation Parameter Value
Number of agents within the society 75
Types of capabilities α,β,γ
Initial task duration – Tinit 50
Initial Reward – Rinit µ = £10,000; σ = £2,500
mdf parameter 4
Resource settings RS1,RS2,...,RS25
TABLE 5.1: Summary of the simulation parameters.
of other agents that each agent is aware of per capability. For example, at RS4 each
agent is aware of the existence of 4 other agents with capability α, 4 with β and 4 with
γ. In the maximum resource setting (referred to as RS25), each agent knows about all
the other agents, hence it has maximum access to the resources within the system. On
the other hand, in the most constrained resource setting (referred to as RS1), each agent
is only aware of the existence of a single (randomly selected) agent per capability. In
between these two extremes, we deﬁne a series of 12 intermediate settings, where each
agent is aware of the existence of 2, 4, ..., 24 other agents per capability (referred to as
RS2, RS4 etc.). Table 5.1 presents a summary of these simulation parameters.
It is important to point out that all three methods (argue, evade, and re-plan) used in
this evaluation, tend towards the simpler end of their respective possibilities. However,
our purpose here is not to exhaustively cover all forms of argumentation, evasion, or re-
plan techniques. Rather we seek to evaluate the broad trade-offs involved in engaging
in argumentation, thus, concentrating on the simpler models provides an initial point
of departure. To this end, we disable the social inﬂuence model to prevent conﬂicts
of opinions occurring within this context and concentrate mainly on the conﬂicts of
interests that occur due to disparate motivations of the respective agents (refer to Sec-
tion 4.1.2). However, in Chapter 6 where we explore how agents may argue in a society,
we enable both forms of conﬂicts and carry a more detailed in depth analysis of the
different ways an agent may use argumentation to resolve these within a multi-agent
context.
To evaluate the overall performance of the different strategies (speciﬁed in Section 5.1)
in the experimental settings described above, we used the following metrics:2
• Effectiveness of the Strategy
We use the total accumulated penalty incurred by all agents within the society as
a measure of effectiveness. If this value is low, the strategy has been effective in
2These metrics are not novel to our work, both [Jung et al., 2001] and [Ramchurn et al., 2003] used
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handling the conﬂicts that have arisen in the society. On the other hand, if the
value is high, the strategy presents a less effective means of resolving conﬂicts.
• Efﬁciency of the Strategy
This reﬂects the computational cost of interaction incurred by the society, while
using a particular strategy to resolve conﬂicts. We use the total number of mes-
sages exchanged between all agents within the society during the interaction as a
metric to measure this effect. This provides a good metric because longer interac-
tions, which tend to consume more resources from the agents, also take a higher
number of messages to complete. On the other hand, shorter interactions, which
tend to consume fewer resources, only incur a smaller number of messages. Thus,
the number of messages exchanged has a strong correlation to the amount of re-
sources used within the system. The total number of messages encapsulate the
messages used to overcome conﬂicts and reach agreements (including reasons
and alternatives exchanged as meta-information), and the messages associated
with reneging from agreements. Thus, in this context, a strategy that involves
fewer messages is said to have performed more efﬁciently than one that uses a
higher number.
Having detailed the experimental setting, we now state our main observations, analyse
them, and draw conclusions regarding their impact within a multi-agent society.
5.3 Results and Observations
Given these experimental settings, we now turn to detail the actual results. We analyse
these results as a series of observations. Each observation is supported by a detailed
explanation providing reasons for this behaviour to occur within the society and ex-
perimental evidence to justify the reasoning. All reported results are averaged over 50
simulation runs to diminish the impact of random noise, and all observations empha-
sised are statistically signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level.3 Given this, Figures 5.1(a)
and 5.1(b) show our main results from which we draw the following key observations:
3The statistical signiﬁcance tests are commonly used in sampling theory to approximately predict the
mean of the population (µ), within a certain error range, using a known sample mean (x) and sample
variance (s2). For instance, for a sample size of n, the population mean is stated to range between the
limits µ = x ± t ∗ (s/
√
n). Here, the parameter t increases or decreases the error element (t ∗ (s/
√
n)
and is said to determine the level of conﬁdence in this approximation. For small samples, this t parameter
follows the Student’s t distribution, which, in turn, speciﬁes the certain t value to be used in order to
attain approximations at different levels of conﬁdence. For instance, to attain a 99% conﬁdence level forChapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 126
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FIGURE 5.1: Variation of total penalty and total messages with different resource set-
tings.Chapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 127
5.3.1 Arguing in Resource Constrained Settings
Observation 5.1: In highly resource constrained settings, argumentation
signiﬁcantly enhances the overall effectiveness of the society.
In Figure 5.1(a), we observe that at highly resource constrained levels (i.e., RS1 and
RS2), the strategies that use argumentation to resolve conﬂicts (i.e., Argue 1, Evade-
Finally Argue, Argue First then Evade and Always Argue) incur a signiﬁcantly lower
penaltychargethanthosethatmerelyevade(i.e., Evade 1andAlways Evade). Inpartic-
ular, Table 5.2 presents a summary of the penalty charges in these settings, which shows
this distinction to be most apparent in RS1, where the resources are most constrained.
The difference is approximately of a magnitude of 1.84 times (i.e., Evade 1 and Always-
Evade have an average penalty of £394,250, whereas Argue 1, Evade Finally Argue,
Argue First then Evade and Always Argue have an average of £213,487). Although
slightly reduced, this effect is also observable in RS2, where the difference is ap-
proximately a magnitude of 1.41 between Evade 1 and Argue 1, and 1.47 between
Always Evade and Evade Finally Argue, Argue First then Evade and Always Argue.
The reason for this behaviour can be explained as follows. In such scarce resource set-
tings, the number of alternative solutions available to the agent to overcome conﬂicts
is highly constrained. The absence of such alternatives leads the evasion techniques
to fail more frequently, as they tend to evade conﬂicts in search of these non-existent
alternatives and, thereby, incur higher penalties. On the other hand, strategies that at-
tempt to resolve these conﬂicts through ABN tend to form more agreements and, thus,
incur fewer penalty charges. Figure 5.2(a) presents additional evidence to substanti-
ate this reasoning. It depicts decomposition on the percentage of total conﬂicts that
result in both agreements and failures for RS1. In both evasion strategies, a lower per-
centage of conﬂicts (on average 22.4%) resulted in agreements. In comparison, the
four argue strategies resulted in a higher percentage (on average 42.8%) of agreements.
This analysis substantiates our reasoning that argue methods allow agents to form more
agreements, which, in turn, cause a smaller number of failures. More speciﬁcally, as per
Figure 5.2(a), evade methods on average cause 77.6% of conﬂicts to result in failures,
as opposed to 57.2% when agents argue. Thus, arguing allows the agents to resolve
their conﬂicts more effectively with lower penalty charges in high resource constrained
settings.
both upper and lower limits (termed as two-tail) in a population size of 50, it speciﬁes a t value of 2.576.
Against this background, all our graphs and results use this notion to calculate the standard statistical
error in the results and all reported results are signiﬁcantly higher than this standard statistical error. For
a more detailed description on both statistical signiﬁcance and Student’s t distribution and their use in
empirical research refer to [Cohen, 1995; Kempthorne and Folks, 1971].Chapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 128
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FIGURE 5.2: Analysis of conﬂicts resulted in agreements and failures.
Total Penalty – RS1 Total Penalty – RS2 Strategy
Mean Std Div Mean Std Div
Evade 1 394729.0 12506.90 284603.0 5554.09
Argue 1 209011.0 5981.24 202435.0 5701.19
Always Evade 393770.0 11719.50 185017.0 6605.63
Evade, ﬁnally Argue 212178.0 7716.62 116264.0 3622.68
First Argue, then Evade 215645.0 9411.64 139855.0 5083.22
Always Argue 217114.0 7246.18 122414.0 3385.35
TABLE 5.2: Summarised penalty charges for the RS1 and RS2.
Further support for this observation can be drawn by comparing the behaviour of strate-
gies Evade 1 and Argue 1 over all resource settings. Both of these strategies attempt
to overcome conﬂicts by interacting with a single randomly chosen partner. Although
from the outset this does not appear to be a very prudent strategy (constraining oneself
to a single partner when there are a higher number of potential partners available), they
were speciﬁcally designed to experiment with the relative impact of using argumenta-
tion in resource-constrained settings. To this end, Figure 5.1(a) shows how Argue 1
continuously incurs lower penalties than Evade 1. Since these strategies constrain the
agents to interact with just a single partner, irrespective of how many resources are
available to them, the agents still operate in limited resource settings. Thus, the alterna-
tives available to them are limited throughout all these settings. This lack of alternatives
leads Evade 1 to incur a higher percentage of failures and, thereby, incur higher penalty
charges than Argue 1. We can see this effect in Figure 5.2(b), which shows the per-
centage of conﬂicts resolved when using Evade 1 continuously, tend to be less than the
percentage resolved when using Argue 1. These observations further justify our con-
clusion that using ABN to resolve conﬂicts tends to be a more effective method than
evasion in resource-constrained settings. This ﬁnding is consistent with the experimen-Chapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 129
tal results observed in Kraus et al. (refer to Section 2.2), where they highlighted the
beneﬁts of using a strategy similar to Always Argue (as opposed to avoid arguing and
re-plan) in a two agent setting. Furthermore, it generalises their ﬁnding to be true in all
resource constrained settings and is not just constrained to a two agent context.
5.3.2 Argue versus Evade in Higher Resource Levels
Observation 5.2: As resource levels increase, both the argue and evade
methods become more effective, but the relative difference between them
decreases.
Figure5.1(a)alsoshowsthatthepenaltychargesreduceforthestrategiesAlways Evade,
Evade- Finally Argue, Argue First then Evade and Always Argue, as resource levels
increase within the society. This effect is seen more clearly in Figure 5.3(a), which
presents a magniﬁed view of the penalty variation for these four strategies. The primary
reason for these reductions is the increase in resource level. Thus, as resources increase,
so does the potential to ﬁnd an alternative agreeable partner. Further evidence for this
effect is shown in Figures 5.4(a) and 5.4(b). As resource levels increase, a higher per-
centage of conﬂicts result in agreements (refer to Figure 5.4(a)), which, in turn, leads
to a reduction in conﬂicts that end in failures (refer to Figure 5.4(b)). This reduction in
the number of conﬂicts that result in failures, lowers the penalty charges incurred by the
agents. Thus, as resources become increasingly available within the society, the agents
become generally more effective in resolving their conﬂicts using both the evade and
the argue strategies.
Arguably a more interesting observation is the differences in the rate of penalty reduc-
tion for the strategies that use argumentation and the ones that use evasion. Speciﬁcally,
as shown in Figure 5.3(a), the penalty charge of Always Evade decreases more rapidly
than Always Argue. Figure 5.3(a) also shows Always Evade surpassing Always Argue
in RS4 and thereafter maintaining its higher performance (lower penalty charges and
lower number of messages).
The reason for this difference is a combination of two factors. First, as the potential
alternatives increase within the society, the need to convince a non-willing partner de-
creases. Arguing strategies, which attempt to convince their non-willing partners before
attempting to search for these alternatives, do not use these options to the same degree
as evasion strategies do. We can see the evidence of this effect in Figures 5.4(a) and
5.4(b). When using Always Evade the percentage of conﬂicts resulting in agreementsChapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 130
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FIGURE 5.4: Conﬂicts resulted in agreements and failures for all resource settings.
increased from 22.4% in RS1 to 79.3% in RS25, initiaing a large decease in the rate of
delays incured by the society (a decrease from 77.6% in RS1 to 20.8% in RS25). On the
other hand, the Always Argue has its percentage of agreements increased from 42.8%
in RS1 to 84.8% in RS25 (a decrease in delays from 57.1% in RS1 to 15.2% in RS25).
Thus, the Always Evade method uses the increased potential alternatives to reduce its
delays to more effect than Always Argue has done.
However, this still only gives a partial explanation for why the Always Argue incurs a
higher penalty charge than Always Evade. If we closely examine the number of delays
incurred when using Always Argue for RS25, on average, it results in incurring 719.88
delays as opposed to 789.92 when using Always Evade. However, irrespective of this
fact that Always Argue incurred a lower number of delays, it incurred a higher penalty
charge in comparison to Always Evade (£24918.7 with Always Argue as opposed to
£21688.5 with Always Evade as per Table 5.3). To explain the reason for why this
lower number of delays resulted in a higher penalty charge, Figure 5.5 depicts how the
delaysaredistributedwithinthedifferenttasksofthesocietywhenusingbothstrategies.
It shows that Always Argue tends to cause delays to agents with higher valued tasks.
Thus, even though the number of delays incurred is lower when using Always Argue,
they tend to be more costly to the society.
To assist the explanation, Figures 5.5(c) and 5.5(d) partition this distribution of delays
shown in Figure 5.5 into two parts; ﬁrst the delays that occur before time slot TS50
(the signiﬁcance of TS50 is explained below) and then the delays occurred thereafter.
This shows that most of the delay in Always Argue occurred before TS50. During this
time period all agents in the society compete for resources.4 Thus, as shown in Figure
4This is because all agents have 50 actions to complete to accomplish their task so no agent will be
able to ﬁnish their activities till TS50. However, thereafter the agents with higher rewarding tasks willChapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 132
Total Messages Total Penalty (£) Strategy
Mean Std Div Mean Std Div
Evade 1 14397.7 142.95 254634.0 9113.30
Argue 1 21473.4 274.07 216523.0 7913.68
Always Evade 33836.8 1347.78 21688.5 1452.01
Evade, ﬁnally Argue 28500.3 361.04 15800.8 439.64
First Argue, then Evade 38607.7 578.20 14873.9 445.52
Always Argue 51425.3 1188.25 24918.7 866.41
TABLE 5.3: Summarised penalty charges and the message counts for the complete
resource setting.
5.5(b), at this high level of competition agents tend to offer higher prices to outbid
others which cause the seller agents to increase their threshold values. These increased
thresholds cause buyer agents with even moderate purchasing power to incur delays
(refer to Figure 5.5(c)), which explains why with Always Argue even agents with higher
rewarding tasks incurred delays, causing the system to incur a higher overall penalty.
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(c) Delay Distribution for time slots less than 50.
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FIGURE 5.5: Distribution of delays with the population.
use their higher purchasing power to ﬁnish their tasks early. Thus, the level of competition will decrease
after TS50. We will explain this in more detail in the Section 5.3.3.Chapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 133
5.3.3 Selective Arguing versus Non-arguing
Observation 5.3: Even at high resource settings, selective use of argumen-
tation tends to increase the effectiveness of the system.
Figures 5.1(a) and 5.3(a) show that the penalty charge incurred with strategies Evade-
Finally ArgueandArgue First then Evaderemainslowerthanthechargeincurredwith
the Always Evade strategy. This behaviour remains unchanged throughout all resource
settings. This presents an interesting observation in our experiments. As explained in
Section 5.1, both Evade Finally Argue and Argue First then Evade are hybrid strate-
gies that selectively combine the argue and evade techniques to overcome conﬂicts.
As we can observe in Figure 5.3(a), this selective use of argumentation allows the
agents to reduce a signiﬁcant amount of their penalty charge compared to agents al-
ways using evasion. For example, in RS25 (refer to Figure 5.3(b) and Table 5.3), Al-
ways Evade incurs a penalty charge of £21688.5, whereas Evade Finally Argue and
Argue First then Evade only incurs £15800.8 and £14873.9 respectively.
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FIGURE 5.6: Threshold value and the number of delays incurred over time slots.
The reason for this behaviour is as follows. During time slots TS0 to TS50 the market
for services is highly competitive. This is because all agents in the society have 50 ac-
tions per task (refer to parameters in Table 5.1) and they tend to compete for the limited
resources during this period. However, after TS50 this level of competition eases, as
agents with higher rewarding tasks tend to use their higher purchasing power to out-
bid others, thus, forming agreements and completing their tasks by TS50. This only
leaves agents with lower rewarding tasks to compete with each other thereafter. On
the other hand, since the seller agents set their threshold prices to reﬂect the level of
demand, which is directly inﬂuenced by the level of competition in the market (refer to
Section 4.2.3), this high level of competition during TS0 to TS50 inﬂuences all sellerChapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 134
agents to keep their respective threshold prices high in that period. However, after TS50,
the sooner the information ﬂows to these agents regarding this eased level of compe-
tition (explained above), the sooner they reduce their threshold values, which, in turn,
reduces the number of delays suffered by the agents with low purchasing power after
TS50. When agents are selectively arguing with each other, the meta-information that
ﬂows within the process of arguing allows this information about changing market con-
ditions to ﬂow more quickly to the seller agents. This enables the seller agents to adapt
their threshold prices faster to suit the changed market conditions, thereby, reducing the
penalties incurred by the agents (having lower purchasing power) after TS50. On the
other hand, when agents are always evading arguments, this information ﬂows slowly
to the seller agents, which results in the agents with lower purchasing power needlessly
incurring delays. This explains the decrease in the overall penalty charge suffered by
the society when they use selective arguing strategies such as Evade Finally Argue and
Argue First then Evade as opposed to using Always Evade.
Figures 5.6(a) and 5.6(b) present experimental evidence to justify our reasoning. More
speciﬁcally, Figure 5.6(a) shows how the threshold prices adapt during the interaction
when using these three strategies. We can clearly see that selective use of argumentation
in both strategies does not cause a signiﬁcant difference on the threshold value during
TS0 to TS50, when compared with the Always Evade strategy. However, after TS50
when market conditions change, this selective use of argumentation contributes by al-
lowing the seller agents to gain information regarding the changing market conditions
and adapt their threshold prices more quickly than when they use the Always Evade
strategy. We can also see in Figure 5.6(b) that this quick ﬂow of information prevented
both strategies Evade Finally Argue and Argue First then Evade incurring delays un-
necessarily after TS50 (unlike Always Evade), in turn, reducing the overall penalty
charge suffered by the society. Thus, this observations allows us to draw the conclu-
sion that the selective use of argumentation is an effective technique even in settings
where resources are abundant.
5.3.4 Selective versus Indiscriminate Arguing
Observation 5.4: Using argumentation indiscriminately has a negative im-
pact on the overall effectiveness of the system.
Figure5.3(b)alsoallowsustocomparetheperformanceofAlways ArgueversusEvade-
Finally Argue and Argue First then Evade. Unlike the selective argumentation used
by Evade Finally- Argue and Argue First then Evade, Always Argue indiscriminatelyChapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 135
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FIGURE 5.7: Conﬂict variation over different strategies in complete resource setting.
argues in all interactions. However, in both Figures 5.3(a) and 5.3(b) we can see that
Always Argue incurs a higher penalty value than those strategies that selectively argue.
Therefore, wecanobservethatusingargumentationindiscriminatelyreducestheagent’s
effectiveness in resolving conﬂicts, thereby, deceasing the performance of the society.
To help us analyse the reasons for this effect, Figure 5.7 presents the number of con-
ﬂicts that occur when using all six strategies in resource setting RS25.5 It depicts these
conﬂicts classiﬁed into two parts; namely, the primary conﬂicts that arise when the
agents ﬁrst attempt to ﬁnd partners and the secondary conﬂicts that arise due to agents
reneging upon their agreements. Here we can observe that strategies Always Evade,
Evade Finally Argue, Argue First then Evade and Always Argue incur approximately
the same number of primary conﬂicts. However, the strategies Evade Finally Argue and
Argue First then Evade, which give priority to the argue method, incur a signiﬁcantly
higher number of secondary conﬂicts. The reason for this is that when agents argue
to form agreements, they manage to convince the sellers to make lower price agree-
ments. However, this allows another arguing agent to potentially come forward and,
using ABN, negotiate a higher valued contract, which breaks the previous agreement.
On the other hand, when agents evade, as they tend to offer the maximum possible re-
ward, they formulate agreements that are difﬁcult to break, thus, reducing the likelihood
of secondary conﬂicts occurring within the society.
5Here our focus is to analyse the relative merits of the different ABN strategies. Thus, we choose the
RS25 setting as point of analysis, to isolate away the effects due to the resource constraints present in
other settings. Furthermore, Figure 5.2(a) clearly shows that the results from RS25 hold for all the other
settings at an even more magniﬁed level.Chapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 136
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FIGURE 5.8: Analysis of the threshold value and the number of delays for strategies
Evade Finally Argue, Argue First then Evade and Always Argue.
Given the reasons for the discrepancy in the number of conﬂicts, we proceed to explain
the negative impact of indiscriminate argumentation. The differences in the number
of conﬂicts allow us to explain the difference between Evade Finally Argue and Al-
ways Argue. Speciﬁcally, Figure 5.7 shows that a lower number of conﬂicts arise within
the society when using Evade Finally Argue, which, in turn, results in a lower number
of delays. More speciﬁcally, on average 521 delays were caused by 3545 conﬂicts with
the Evade Finally Argue strategy, as opposed to 720 delays caused due to 4731 conﬂicts
with Always Argue. Even though Argue First then Evade caused only a small number
of conﬂicts fewer than Always Argue (4442 as opposed to 4731), most of them get re-
solved which resulted in only 508 (11.5%) delays with Argue First then Evade (which
is a much lower amount when compared with the 720 (15.2%) delays that occured with
Always Argue).
Apart from this higher number of delays incurred with Always Argue (in comparison to
Evade- Finally Argue and Argue First then Evade), Figure 5.8(a) shows the distribu-
tion of these delays within the population versus their original task reward. This showsChapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 137
that the Always Argue strategy, apart from incurring a higher number of delays, causes
the agents with higher rewarding tasks to incur delays as well. This is because when all
agents argue, they tend to push the threshold prices higher, which causes agents with
even higher rewarding tasks to incur delays since they cannot afford to purchase the
required services. This effect of higher threshold prices causing more delays to occur
is clearly depicted in Figures 5.8(b) and 5.8(c). Due to this reason, when agents use the
Always Argue strategy, the penalty charges for the society become considerably higher,
thereby, reducing the effectiveness of the society. Thus, the combination of both these
factors (i.e., higher number of delays and more expensive delays), makes indiscriminate
argumentation a less effective technique within multi-agent conﬂict resolution. Thus,
this observation, leads us to conclude that selective use of ABN in combination with
evasion is a more effective strategy than indiscriminate argumentation.
5.3.5 Overall Performance of Arguing as the Last Resort
Observation 5.5: Using argumentation as the last resort tends to produce
a higher overall performance than the other strategies.
Figures 5.3(a) and 5.3(b) show a small difference in penalty charges between strate-
gies Evade- Finally Argue and Argue First then Evade (as per Table 5.3, £15,800.8
versus £14,873.9 in RS25). However, Figure 5.1(b) shows a much larger difference be-
tween the number of messages used to achieve this outcome between these two strate-
gies (i.e., the difference is of a magnitude of 1.35 times; 28,500.3 message units for
Evade Finally Argue versus 38,607.7 for Argue First then Evade for RS25 as per Ta-
ble 5.3). When both strategies are almost equally effective, the strategy which gives
priority to evasion should be preferred, since it incurs fewer messages, thus, is a more
efﬁcient strategy in resolving conﬂicts.
The reason for this quite signiﬁcant difference in the number of messages is as fol-
lows. When the agents use Argue First then Evade, they always argue in their ﬁrst
interaction, which in some instances, may not yield any agreement. However, since it
has already argued with that agent, its message count has already increased, without
making a signiﬁcant contribution in reducing the penalty charge. On the other hand,
when using Evade Finally Argue, the agent will attempt to argue only if it gets to the
very last encounter, which in many cases will not happen, since it may resolve the con-
ﬂict before it gets to the last agent. As experimental evidence to justify this reasoning,
Figures 5.9(a) and 5.9(b) present how agents incur messages and delays during their
interaction. This difference in messages is clearly depicted in Figure 5.9(a), where theChapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 138
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FIGURE 5.9: Analysis of the number of messages and the average number of delays
for strategies Evade-Finally Argue and Argue First then Evade
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FIGURE 5.10: Analysis of the threshold value and the number of messages for strate-
gies Always Evade and Always Argue
Argue First then Evade strategy uses a higher number of messages on average with a
high frequency during time slots TS0 to TS50 (when the market is highly active), which,
in turn, leads to an increase in its total number of messages used. However, as seen in
Figure 5.9(b), this increased number of messages only makes a small reduction to the
number of delays incurred by the society. On the other hand, the Evade Finally Argue
strategy incurred a reduced number of messages, since it only uses argumentation as
the last resort, without causing a high deterioration on its effectiveness. Thus, consid-
ering both efﬁciency and effectiveness, adopting the Evade Finally Argue strategy for
conﬂict resolution presents a better overall performance to the society.
Another observation worth noting is the differences in the number of messages used by
Always Evade and Evade Finally Argue. The former, which always attempts to evade,Chapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 139
uses a higher number of messages than the latter, which follows the same technique
other than selectively arguing in its last encounter. As per Table 5.3, Always Evade
use an average of 33,836.8 messages, as opposed to Evade Finally Argue, which uses
only 28,500.3. Figures 5.10(a) and 5.10(b) present the reason for this difference. As
explained in Section 5.3.3, since the Evade Finally Argue method argues with agents,
when the market reaches its ﬁnal stages (beyond time slots TS50) it allows the seller
agents to adapt quickly to the decease in the level of competition, thus, reducing their
threshold prices fast to represent the decreased demand. Thus, selective use of arguing
allows information to ﬂow faster in the society. However, when using Always Evade,
since the agents evade in all their interactions this information ﬂows slowly to the sell-
ers, thereby, reducing the threshold values much more slowly. We can observe this
behaviour in Figure 5.10(a). It clearly shows the Evade Finally Argue strategy inﬂuenc-
ing the threshold values to decrease faster, thus, allowing the agents to spend a reduced
number of interactions on average to reach agreements, thereby, reducing the num-
ber of messages needed to resolve conﬂicts. On the other hand, Always Evade incurs
a constant amount of messages after TS50, since the remaining agents almost always
tend to evade till their last encounter (as they cannot afford to pay the unrealistically
high threshold value). We can observe this effect in Figure 5.10(b), where both strate-
gies incur the same number of messages on average till TS50, but, thereafter, while
Evade Finally Argue results in a highly reduced number of messages, Always Evade
incurs a constant value (which causes the differences in the message counts highlighted
above).
When taken together, both these observations show that selective use of argumenta-
tion improves not only the effectiveness, but also the efﬁciency of the system. Thus,
when both efﬁciency and effectiveness are taken together we can conclude that evading
ﬁrst and arguing as the last resort tends to be the most preferable option among these
strategies.
5.3.6 Contribution of Meta-Information Exchange
Observation5.6: Exchangeofmeta-information, suchasreasonsandalter-
natives, allows agents to resolve their conﬂicts more efﬁciently than using
a simple negotiation approach without such an exchange.
Finally, we observe the impact of exchanging meta-information within the negotiation
process. To this end, Figure 5.11 presents the total number of messages used by the
society in the complete resource setting (RS25), both when negotiation involves theChapter 5 Deciding When to Argue 140
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meta-information.
exchange of meta-information and when it does not. When negotiating without ex-
changing meta-information, the seller agents do not incorporate reasons and alterna-
tives when they respond to proposals, whereas when they do incorporate them, they
argue as speciﬁed in Algorithm 4 in Section 4.2.5. In Figure 5.11, it is clearly observ-
able that incorporating meta-information into the interaction process allows the agents
to reduce the number of messages used to resolve their conﬂicts. This is most appar-
ent in the Argue-1 and Always Argue strategies, which predominantly use the argue
method to resolve conﬂicts. The improvement is also present to a lesser degree in Ar-
gue First then Evade, which gives priority to argue, but is only marginally present in
Evade Finally Argue strategy that argues only in the last encounter. The reason for this
reduction is due to buyer agents using the additional information provided by the sellers
in their proposal selection and partner selection techniques. Speciﬁcally, as explained
in Section 4.1.3, when agents receive reasons, either as an unavailable message or as
recommended prices, they, in turn, use this information to decide on their next proposal.
On the other hand, alternatives suggested by the sellers are used to select the order of
contacting potential partners in future interactions. Both of these uses help to reduce
the number of unnecessary proposals exchanged within the society, so they increase the
efﬁciency of the argue method. This ﬁnding is consistent with the experimental results
observed by Jung et al. (refer to Section 2.2), which presents the positive contribution
of incorporating meta-information on the negotiation effort. The ability to consistently
replicate their observations within our domain, adds further support to our formulated
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5.4 Summary
ABNhasbeenproposedasapromisingmeansforagentstointeractandresolveconﬂicts
in multi-agent society (refer to Section 1.1.3). However, a number of overheads are
associated with its use. In particular, it takes both time and computational resources
for agents to argue and negotiate with each other and, thereby, resolve their conﬂicts
within a multi-agent context. Furthermore, in many cases, not all conﬂicts need to be
resolved; some can be overcome through other non-arguing methods such as evasion
or re-planning. In such a context, it is important for the agents to identify the speciﬁc
situations where arguing is beneﬁcial and those in which it is not. To this end, this
chapter presented an empirical evaluation to assess the efﬁciency and effectiveness of
using ABN as a means to resolve conﬂicts with respect other non-arguing methods
in our experimental domain. In particular, ﬁrst we implement our multi-agent task
allocation scenario speciﬁed in Chapter 4. Within this context, we then created an
array of different experimental settings each allowing agents access to varying levels
of resources to accomplish their actions. Next, we encode our agents with a series
of interaction strategies that allows them to use argue, evade, and re-plan methods to
overcome conﬂicts each in a different manner. We then run experiments and observe
their performance both in terms of efﬁciency and effectiveness to draw conclusions
about the relative advantages of these arguing and non-arguing methods.
Our main results can be summarised as three main points. First, we observe that the
effectiveness of using an ABN method is very much related to the resources available in
the system. In particular, our chosen ABN method presents a far more effective method
in resolving conﬂicts than evasion when the resources are highly constrained. However,
this relative advantage tends to diminish as resources become more abundant within the
society. Moreover, we show that when agents attempt to always argue in high resource
settings it yields an inferior outcome (both in terms of efﬁciency and effectiveness) than
always using evasion. Second, we show that selective use of argumentation is a far more
effective and efﬁcient strategy than indiscriminate argumentation. This observation is
prevalent in all resource settings. Finally, we show the strategy of evading ﬁrst and
arguing as the last resort tends to yield the most favourable overall performance among
these strategies with this context.
Given a detailed empirical analysis on the issue of when to argue, next our investigation
moves forward to address our second research question of how to argue within a multi-
agent society.Chapter 6
Deciding How to Argue
As introduced in Chapter 1, conﬂicts are an endemic feature within multi-agent systems
in which autonomous agents perform actions to attain their individual and collective
objectives. In such a social context, ABN is proposed as an effective interaction mech-
anism that endows agents with a means to argue, negotiate, and, thereby, potentially
resolve such conﬂicts. However, we argued that computationally bounded entities, such
as agents, need to consider two critical questions before they can use ABN as a viable
and a feasible mechanism to manage their conﬂicts: First, the issue of when to argue.
Second, the issue of how to argue. Given a comprehensive empirical analysis on this
former research question (refer to Chapter 5), we now shift our attention towards the
latter. To this end, here we present an empirical evaluation on how agents can use our
ABN framework (proposed in Chapter 3) to argue and negotiate efﬁciently and effec-
tively in a multi-agent society and, thereby, successfully manage and resolve conﬂicts
that may arise within such a computational context.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, Section 6.1 gives an
overview of the main types of conﬂicts present within a multi-agent society, explains
their causes, and lays the foundation for our discussion on how agents can use ABN to
manage such conﬂicts. Second, Section 6.2 details our experimental settings highlight-
ing the main algorithms that form the basis for our ABN strategies. Next, Section 6.3
presents a detailed empirical study of a series of strategies analysing each of their rel-
ative performance beneﬁts to an agent society. Section 6.4, concludes this chapter by
summarising our main results and highlighting their contributions towards the overall
aims of the thesis.
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6.1 Conﬂict Types and Underlying Reasons
In a multi-agent society, a number of distinct types of conﬂicts arise due to an array of
different reasons (see discussion in Section 1.2). Thus, before discussing the different
ways by which agents can argue and resolve such conﬂicts, it is important to ﬁrst anal-
yse how and what reasons cause such conﬂicts to occur within such communities. In
abstract, within a multi-agent society, two types of conﬂicts occur; namely conﬂicts of
interest and conﬂicts of opinion (refer to Section 4.1.2). These occur due to the follow-
ing distinct reasons.
First, the disparate nature of inﬂuences that motivate individual agents within a soci-
ety give rise to conﬂicts of interest between agents (refer to Section 4.1.2.1). In more
detail, when autonomous agents operate within a multi-agent context, their actions are
inﬂuenced via two broad forms of motivations. First, the internal inﬂuences reﬂect the
intrinsic motivations that drive these individual agents to achieve their own internal ob-
jectives. Second, as agents reside and operate within a multi-agent society, the social
context itself also exerts a signiﬁcant inﬂuence upon their actions. For instance, within
a structured society an agent may assume certain speciﬁc roles or be part of certain re-
lationships. These, in turn, may inﬂuence the actions that it may perform within that
social context. For example, when an agent takes the role of PhD student, this, in turn,
may inﬂuence the agent to perform certain actions (such as writing and reviewing pa-
pers) within that social context. Here, we categorise such external forms of motivations
as social inﬂuences.
Now, in many cases, both these forms of inﬂuence are present and they may give con-
ﬂicting motivations to the individual agent, which can, in turn, lead to conﬂicts of in-
terest between agents. For instance, an agent may be internally motivated to perform a
speciﬁc action. However, at the same time, it may also be subject to an external social
inﬂuence (via the role it is enacting or the relationship that it is part of) not to perform
it. In such a case, if the agent decides to pursue its internal motivation at the expense of
its social inﬂuence, this may, in turn, lead to a conﬂict of interest between it and another
of its counterparts who may have an interest in the former abiding its social inﬂuence.
Also an agent may face situations where different social inﬂuences motivate it in a con-
tradictory manner (one to perform a speciﬁc action and the other not to). Similar to
above, in such an an event, if the agent decides to abide by a certain social inﬂuence
and forgo the other, this may also lead to conﬂicts of interest between agents.
Second, the distinct imperfections of knowledge distributed within the individuals of the
society can cause conﬂicts of opinion to occur within the social context (refer to Sec-Chapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 144
tion 4.1.2.2). In more detail, in a multi-agent society, in most cases, agents have to carry
out their actions with imperfect knowledge about their environment. Speciﬁcally, when
agents operate within a society they may not have complete knowledge about each oth-
ers’ capabilities, the roles and the relationships that they and their counterparts should
be part of, or the ensuing commitments that they and their counterparts are deemed to
enact within the society. Therefore, in such instances, an agent may not be aware of
the existence of all the social inﬂuences that could or indeed should affect its actions
and it may also lack the knowledge of certain speciﬁc social inﬂuences that motivate
other agents’ actions. Such imperfections in knowledge may, in turn, lead to conﬂicts of
opinion between the agents when they function within a society. For instance, a certain
agent may believe that it acts a speciﬁc role within the society (which may give it certain
rights to demand speciﬁc capabilities). If another agent within the society is unaware
of this fact (i.e., the former agent assumes this role), it may not feel obliged to provide
these capabilities, which in turn, lead to a conﬂict of opinion between the two agents.
Therefore, when agents operate within a society with incomplete knowledge and with
diverse and conﬂicting inﬂuences, they may, in certain instances, lack the knowledge,
the motivation and/or the capacity to enact all their social commitments. However, in
certain instances, agents may violate speciﬁc social commitments in favour of abiding
by a more inﬂuential internal or external motivation. In other cases, they may inadver-
tently violate such commitments simply due to the lack of knowledge of their existence.
However, to function as a coherent society it is important for these agents to have a
means to resolve such conﬂicts and manage their social inﬂuences in a systematic man-
ner.
Against this background, in the remainder of this chapter we will investigate a number
of different interaction strategies that allow the agents to use our ABN model to argue,
negotiate, and, thereby, manage their social inﬂuences within a multi-agent context.
We base our experiments within the multi-agent task allocation scenario speciﬁed in
Chapter 4. To this end, we next detail the experimental settings used within this context,
highlighting in particular the basic algorithms that allow these agents to interact within
this context. These, in turn, act as the initial points of departure for our various ABN
strategies discussed within this empirical study.
6.2 Experimental Setting
The experiments are set within the argumentation context speciﬁed in Chapter 4 with
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to achieve their actions. In this task environment, the number of actions assigned to
each agent vary randomly between 20 and 30, while their respective rewards for each
action 1 are set according to a normal distribution with a mean 1000 and a standard
deviation 500. Each agent is also assigned three capabilities (similar to our experiments
in Chapter 5), however, here with different levels of competence for each capability type
varied randomly between 0 and 1 (refer to Table 4.2 in Section 4.2.1.2 for a sample
scenario with three such agents).
Since, our main focus here is how agents can use different ABN strategies to interact
and resolve conﬂicts within a social context, in these experiments we shift our attention
away from both evade and re-plan strategies and concentrate mainly on the different
variations of the argue methods to resolve conﬂicts. To enable us to perform a compre-
hensive analysis, we incorporate a rich social structure into our experimental context
with roles, relationships, and social commitments as detailed in Section 4.2.2. These
roles are assigned to the agents in a random manner and the maximum number of roles
within the society varies between different experiments. By varying the level of knowl-
edge about this social structure seeded into our agents, we create an array of experi-
mental settings where agents have different levels of imperfections in their knowledge
about the social structure and its inﬂuences. This level of imperfection varies between
0 to 100, where 0 indicates perfect knowledge and 100 represents a complete lack of
knowledge about the social structure. This, in turn, dictates the number of conﬂicts of
opinion present within the society; the greater the lack of knowledge about the society,
the greater the number of conﬂicts between the agents.
Next, asourmaininterestintheseexperimentsisonhowagentscanargue, negotiateand
reach agreements with their counterparts, in order to accommodate the more complex
argumentation algorithms used within our experiments, we make a minor simpliﬁcation
to the original scenario by relaxing the strict constraint of order between actions within
each task. In more detail, in the scenario speciﬁed in Section 4.1.1, agents are required
to achieve all their actions in the pre-speciﬁed order. Thus, if an agent is unable to
reach an agreement on a speciﬁc action, it was required to delay that action and, in turn,
shift all subsequent actions forward by one time slot. Here, we relax this constraint and
assign rewards per action (instead of to the task in total). Thus, if an agent is unable to
reach an agreement with a counterpart to perform the required action, it will leave it as
unallocated and proceed to negotiate for its next required action. As a consequence of
this, the notion of charging penalties for delays is excluded within the context as agents
1Instead of allocating the total reward for the task (as deﬁned in Section 4.2.1.1), here we allocate
individual rewards for each action within the task. This simpliﬁes the computational effort required when
operating with more complex ABN algorithms. The rationale for this minor alteration and its effects are
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areonlyawardedrewardsfortheactionsthattheyactuallymanagetoachieve. Thus, this
relaxation has no signiﬁcant impact on the main results (only a change in the measure-
ment of effectiveness from reducing delay penalties to maximising earnings as stated
below). However, this simpliﬁes the main algorithm by reducing the rippling effect
within tasks (actions shifted forwards and backwards) as agreements are not reached
and tasks get delayed or de-committed from. Finally, we simplify the market price up-
date mechanism (refer to Section 4.2.3) by nullifying the effect of feedback from offers,
for simplicity, and maintain the price per capability at the initial expected level.
Having detailed the multi-agent context, we now present the basic ABN algorithm (refer
to Algorithm 8) that allows agents to negotiate the services of other willing and capable
counterparts within this social setting. Algorithm 8 is similar to the interaction algo-
rithm 4 presented in Section 4.2.5. In essence, an agent that requires a certain capability
will generate and forward proposals to another selected agent within the community, re-
questing that agent to sell its services in exchange for a certain reward. If the receiving
agent perceives this proposal to be viable and believes that it is capable of performing
the proposal, then the agent will accept the proposal. Otherwise it will reject the pro-
posal. In case of a reject, the original proposing agent will attempt to forward a modiﬁed
proposal. The interaction will end either when one of the proposals is accepted or when
all valid proposals that the proposing agent can forward are rejected. The two main de-
cision elements within this negotiation are generating and evaluating proposals. In the
following we will discuss how our ABN model presented in Chapter 3 is used to design
these two decision elements:
Proposal Generation: When generating a proposal, an agent needs to consider two
aspects (refer to Algorithm 2 in Section 3.4.1): (i) whether it is capable of carrying out
the reward and (ii) whether the beneﬁt it gains from the request is greater than the cost
incurred while performing the reward. In general, a proposal from an agent ai to an
agent aj, in which ai requests aj to perform θj and in return promises to perform θi as a
reward, will take the form PROPOSE(do(aj,θj),do(ai,θi)). In this context, the beneﬁt
of the request to agent ai is the utility associated with the action θj; for short denoted
as uj. On the other hand, the cost of the reward is the opportunity cost of performing
action θi at the suggested time. Here, all agents have a minimum asking price per time
slot (set to 1000, the mean reward value; see the experimental settings above) if they are
not occupied, or, if they are, the cost will be this initial price plus any de-commitment
cost of the previously agreed action. If the proposal contains only a monetary reward,
the above generic proposal reduces to the form PROPOSE(do(aj,θj),do(ai,m)) where
θj is the requested action and m is the monetary reward. Here, calculating the cost
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Algorithm 8 The negotiate() method.
1: [p0,p1,...,pmax] ← generateProposals()
2: p ← p0
3: isAccepted ← false
4:
5: {Loop till either the agent agrees or the last proposal fails.}
6: while (isAccepted 6= true k p ≤ pmax) do
7: response ← PROPOSE(p)
8: if (response = “accept00) then
9: isAccepted ← true
10: else
11: if (p 6= pmax) then
12: p ← getNextViableProposal()
13: end if
14: end if
15: end while
16: return isAccepted
the implementation, in the ﬁrst part of our experiments (Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2) we
constrain our system to produce proposals with only monetary rewards. Thus, an agent
would generate an array of proposals with increasing amounts of monetary rewards,
the lowest being 1 and the highest being (uj − 1). However, in the second part of
our experiments (Section 6.3.3) we explore the effect of using more composite rewards
(monetary in conjunction with rights, obligations, and actions) as promises and threats
and observe their impact in the ABN interactions.
Proposal Evaluation: When the receiving agent evaluates a proposal it also considers
two analogous factors: (i) whether it is capable of performing the request and (ii) if
the beneﬁt it gains from the reward is greater than the cost of carrying out the request
(refer to Algorithm 3 in Section 3.4.1). To evaluate capability, the agent compares its
own level with the minimum required to perform the action. Similar to above, the cost
of performing the request is the current opportunity cost (initially set to the minimum
asking price and, in the case where the agent is already occupied, this initial price plus
the de-commitment cost of the previously agreed action). The beneﬁt, in the simplest
case, is the monetary value of the reward m. In the event, the proposal contains an
action in return as the suggested reward, then the beneﬁt of the proposal will be the
utility of that action to the evaluating agent. However, in a case where the evaluating
agent has a social commitment to provide that capability to the requesting agent, then
the de-commitment penalty of this social commitment is added to the above individual
beneﬁt (monetary rewards or the utility of the action) in order to calculate the overall
beneﬁt of the proposal.Chapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 148
Algorithm 9 The argue() method.
1: {Challenge for the respondent’s justiﬁcation}
2: Hr ← challenegeJustiﬁcation()
3: {Generate personal justiﬁcation}
4: Hp ← generateJustiﬁcation()
5:
6: if (isV alid(Hr) = false) then
7: {Assert invalid premises of Hr}
8: else
9: {Adopt premises of Hr into personal knowledge}
10: end if
11: if (isV alid(Hp) = false) then
12: {Correct invalid premises of Hp within personal knowledge}
13: else
14: {Assert Hp}
15: end if
Finally, given the negotiation interaction, we will now detail how agents argue to re-
solve conﬂicts that may arise due to the knowledge imperfections present within their
multi-agent society (such as the one highlighted in Section 4.2.2). In order to resolve
such a conﬂict, agents must ﬁrst be able to detect them. In this context, they do so
by analysing the de-commitment penalties paid by their counterparts for violating their
social commitments. Speciﬁcally, when an agent with the right to demand a certain
capability would claim the penalty from its counterpart if it believes that the latter has
violated its obligation. To reduce the complexity, here, we assume that agents do not
attempt to deceive one another.2 Thus an agent will either honour its obligation or pay
the penalty. However, due to agents having imperfect knowledge about their context, in
certain instances a counterpart may not be fully aware of all its obligations and may pay
a penalty charge different to what it should have paid. In such an instance, if the actual
amount paid in response is different from the amount it expects to receive, the agents
would detect the existence of a conﬂict.
Once such a conﬂict is detected, agents attempt to resolve it by exchanging their re-
spective justiﬁcations. These justiﬁcations would take the form of the social inﬂuence
schema (see formulae 3.5 and 3.6 in Section 3.1). For instance, an agent may say that
it paid a certain penalty value px because it believe it acts the role ri and its counterpart
acts the role rj and due to the relationship between ri and rj it believes that it entails
an obligation Ox which demands a payment of px in the event of its violation. Sim-
ilarly, an agent may say it paid a zero amount as its penalty because it couldn’t ﬁnd
2This is an assumption used right through the course of this thesis (see Section 4.3) as intentional
deception and lying are beyond the scope of this study.Chapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 149
any justiﬁcation as to why it should pay a certain penalty. Once an agent receives its
counterpart’s justiﬁcation, it can generate its own justiﬁcation as to why the counterpart
should pay a penalty value it believes it has the right to demand. By analysing these two
justiﬁcations, agents can uncover certain invalid premises within these. For instance an
agent may believe its counterpart acts a certain role that the latter believes it does not. In
such an event, agents can use the social arguments highlighted in Section 3.2.1; Type-1
to argue about these justiﬁcations by disputing certain which they deem invalid. Even
if both the justiﬁcations are valid, they can still be inconsistent due to the incomplete
knowledge between the two agents. For example, an agent may have paid a certain
penalty because it believes that its counterpart acts a certain role (which in fact is cor-
rect). However, the agent may be missing the knowledge that the counterpart also acts
another role which give its counterpart the right to demand a higher penalty charge. In
such instances, agents can use the social arguments highlighted in Section 3.2.1; Type-
2 to assert such missing knowledge by pointing out these alternative justiﬁcations and
thereby overcoming such imperfections in their knowledge. The overall functionality
of our argue method is highlighted in Algorithm 9.
One important functionality required to achieve these arguments is the ability to deter-
mine the validity of these premises. This is generally referred to as the defeat-status
computation and is an extensively researched area within argumentation literature (re-
fer to Sections 2.3.4.1 and 2.3.4.2). The models proposed range from the use of arbitra-
tion [Sycara, 1990], defeasible models [Dung, 1995; Amgoud and Prade, 2004], self-
stabilising models [Baroni et al., 2005], and different forms of heuristics [Kraus et al.,
1998; Ramchurn et al., 2003; Bentahar et al., 2006]. However, here we do not attempt
to invent a new defeat-status computation model. Since we are mainly interested in the
broad impact of ABN in an agent society, in our implementation, we abstract away this
functionality by using a validation heuristic which simulates a defeasible model such
as [Amgoud and Prade, 2004]. Speciﬁcally, the validation heuristic considers a given
basic premise and returns true or false depending on its validity, thereby, simulating a
defeasible model or an arbitration model.
Finally, similar to our experiments in Chapter 5, here we use two metrics to evaluate the
overall performance of the different strategies. First, the total earnings of the population
is used as a measure of effectiveness of the strategy; the higher the value, the more
effective the ABN strategy is in ﬁnding willing and capable counterparts to perform
their actions. Second, we use the total number of messages used by the population as
a measure of efﬁciency (the lower the value, the more efﬁcient the strategy). Given
our experimental settings, we now proceed to detail the different ABN strategies and
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reported results are averaged over 30 simulation runs to diminish the impact of random
noise, and all observations emphasised are statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence
level.3
Given this, we will now proceed to investigate a number of different strategies that
agents can use to manage conﬂicts within this context. It is important to note that
these strategies are neither meant to be an exhaustive list, nor the most optimal set of
strategies to resolve the combinatorial problem of multi-agent task allocation. On the
contrary, their objective is to act as a proof of concept within our experimental effort
in highlighting how ABN can be used to effectively and efﬁciently manage and resolve
conﬂicts within a multi-agent context.
6.3 Strategies, Results and Observations
In a multi-agent society, an agent’s decision to perform (or not) a certain action is
based on its internal and/or social inﬂuences that motivates its behaviour (refer to Sec-
tion 3.2.1). Thus, these inﬂuences formulate the justiﬁcation (or the reason) behind
each action that an agent may perform within a society. Allowing agents to argue about
such inﬂuences (social/internal) provides them with a method to systematically resolve
certain conﬂicts (i.e., inconsistencies or incompleteness) that may be present in such
justiﬁcations. Such interactions, we believe, not only allow agents to socially inﬂuence
each others’ decisions within a multi-agent society, but also allow them to perform their
actions more effectively and efﬁciently as a society, even under certain imperfections
in knowledge. Furthermore, as highlighted in Section 3.2.2, agents can also use ne-
gotiation as a tool to trade social inﬂuences. This would, in turn, provide the agents
with a mechanism to re-allocate their social inﬂuences and utilise them in a more useful
manner, thereby, again functioning in a more efﬁcient and effective manner within a
multi-agent context.
Using these as the fundamental intuitions, we will now analyse a number of strategies
that allow agents to argue, negotiate and, thereby, manage conﬂicts more effectively and
efﬁciently within a multi-agent society. More speciﬁcally, we draw inspiration from our
social inﬂuence schema and the argumentation framework (speciﬁed in Sections 3.1 and
3.2) and analyse three major ways that agents can argue and negotiate to resolve con-
ﬂicts within our experimental multi-agent society. The ﬁrst two methods focus on how
3For a more detailed discussion on how these signiﬁcance and the conﬁdence levels are calculated
refer to Footnote 3 in Section 5.2.Chapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 151
Algorithm 10 Claim Penalty Non Argue (CPNA) strategy.
1: isAccepted ← negotiate()
2: if (isAccepted = false) then
3: compensation ← demandCompensation()
4: end if
Algorithm 11 Claim Penalty Argue (CPA) strategy.
1: isAccepted ← negotiate()
2: if (isAccepted = false) then
3: compensation ← demandCompensation()
4: if (compensation < rightToPenalty) then
5: argue()
6: end if
7: end if
agents can socially inﬂuence each others’ decisions by arguing about their social in-
ﬂuences and, thereby, effectively and efﬁciently overcome conﬂicts of opinions present
within an agent society. The motivation for these two methods stems from our social
inﬂuence schema (see Section 3.1), which gives the agents different rights in the event
where an obligation is violated; namely the right to demand compensation (refer to Sec-
tion 6.3.1) and the right to challenge non-performance (refer to Section 6.3.2) of social
commitments. Finally, we shift our focus to how agents can negotiate their social in-
ﬂuences (refer to Section 6.3.3) and, thereby, attempt to negotiate and resolve certain
conﬂicts by way of trading and re-allocating social inﬂuences within our experimental
multi-agent context. We will now analyse these strategies in more detail.
6.3.1 Demanding Compensation
If an agent violates a certain social commitment, one of the ways its counterpart can
react is by exercising its right to demand compensation. This formulates our baseline
strategy which extends our negotiation algorithm by allowing the agents to demand
compensation in cases where negotiation fails. Once requested, the agent that violated
its social commitment will pay the related penalty. Speciﬁcally, Algorithm 10 speci-
ﬁes the overall functionality of this strategy which we term Claim Penalty Non Argue
(CPNA). However, in imperfect information settings, a particular agent may violate a
social commitment simply because it was not aware of it (i.e., due to the lack of knowl-
edge of its roles or those of its counterparts, as explained in Section 6.2). In such
situations, an agent may pay a de-commitment penalty different to what the other agent
believes it should get, which may, in turn, lead to a conﬂict. In such situations, our sec-
ond strategy, titled Claim Penalty Argue (CPA), allows agents to use social argumentsChapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 152
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FIGURE 6.1: Efﬁciency and effectiveness of the argue and non-argue strategies with
30 agents and 3 roles.
to argue about their social inﬂuences (as per Section 3.2.1) and, thereby, manage their
conﬂicts. Algorithms 10 and 11 deﬁne the overall behaviour of both these strategies.
Our hypothesis here is that by allowing agents to argue about their social inﬂuences
we are providing them with a coherent mechanism to manage and resolve their conﬂicts
and, thereby, allowing them to gain a better outcome as a society. To this end, the former
strategy, CPNA, acts as our control strategy and the latter, CPA, as the test strategy.
Figures 6.1(a) and 6.1(b) show our main results from which we make the following
observations:
Observation 6.1: The argumentation strategy allows agents to manage conﬂicts related
to their social inﬂuences even at high uncertainty levels.
If agents are aware of their social inﬂuences, they may use them as parameters within
their negotiation interactions. In certain instances, agents can use these social inﬂu-
ences to endorse their actions which may otherwise get rejected (see Section 3.2.2).
This would, in turn, increase the population earnings as more actions are accomplished.
However, if the agents are not aware of their social inﬂuences, they may not be able
to use these social inﬂuences to endorse such actions. We can observe this social phe-
nomenon within our results. More speciﬁcally, Figure 6.1(a) shows a downward trend
in the population earnings for both the CPNA and CPA strategies, as the agent’s knowl-
edge level about their social inﬂuences decreases (0 on the X-axis indicates perfect
information, whereas 100 represents a complete lack of knowledge about the social
structure).
However, we can also observe that the non-argue strategy (CPNA) falls more rapidly
than the argue one (CPA) (refer to Figure 6.1(a)). This is because the argue methodChapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 153
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FIGURE 6.2: Information ﬂow between argue and non-argue strategies with 30 agents
and 3 roles.
within CPA allows agents to manage and resolve conﬂicts of opinion that they may
have about their social inﬂuences. For instance, if a certain agent is unaware of a role
that another acts, it may correct this through arguing with that agent as explained in
Section 6.2. Thus, arguing allows agents to correct such gaps in their knowledge and,
thereby, resolve any conﬂicts that may arise as a result. In this manner, ABN allows
the agents to manage their conﬂicts and, thereby, become more aware about their social
inﬂuences even at high uncertainty levels (e.g., 40% to 80% as seen in Figure 6.1(a)).
Further evidence of this can be seen in Figures 6.2(a) through to 6.2(d), which plot the
percentage of information known to the agents during the course of their interactions.
For instance, Figure 6.2(b) shows how agents start their interaction with only 60% of
knowledge (40% missing) about their social inﬂuences. The graph highlights that, when
using the CPA strategy to interact within the society, the argumentation process embed-
ded within it allows agents to resolve conﬂicts and, thereby, become increasingly aware
of their social inﬂuences during the course of their interaction (approximately 90% by
end of the simulation). However, since when using CPNA agents do not attempt to re-Chapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 154
solvesuch conﬂictsof opinion, thisknowledge remainsmissing rightthroughthe course
of the interaction. Therefore, we can clearly observe that by using an argumentation-
based strategy to interact within a society, agents can accomplish more of their actions
and gain a higher total earnings value even with high levels of missing knowledge. The
non-arguing approach, which does not allow these agents to argue about their social
inﬂuences and manage such conﬂicts, reduces the population earnings faster as knowl-
edge imperfections increase (i.e., region of 40% to 80% in Figure 6.1(a)) within the
social system.
Observation 6.2: In cases of perfect information and complete uncertainty, both strate-
gies perform equally.
The reason for both strategies performing equally when there is perfect information
(refer to 0% in Figure 6.1(a)) is because there are no knowledge imperfections. This
is depicted more clearly in Figure 6.3(a) which shows both strategies having access to
100% of the knowledge about their social inﬂuences. Therefore, in such situations,
agents do not need to engage in argumentation to correct conﬂicts of opinions simply
because such conﬂicts do not exist. On the other hand, the reason for both strategies per-
forming equally when there is a complete lack of knowledge is more interesting (refer
to 100% level in Figure 6.1(a) and the information ﬂow in Figure 6.3(b)). Here, since
none of the agents within the society are aware of any social inﬂuences (even though
they exist), they are not able to detect any conﬂicts or violations. Consequently, agents
do not resort to arguing to manage such conﬂicts (refer to the protocol speciﬁcation in
Section 3.3.2 where the conﬂict recognition stage is deﬁned as a pre-requisite for con-
ﬂict management). Thus, when there is a complete lack of knowledge, the strategy that
uses the argue (CPA) performs the same as the non-argue one (CPNA).
Observation 6.3: At all knowledge levels, the argumentation strategy exchanges fewer
messages than the non-arguing one.
Figure 6.1(b) shows the number of messages used by both strategies under all knowl-
edge levels. Apart from the two end points, where argumentation does not occur (see
Observation 2), we can clearly see the non-arguing strategy exchanging more messages
(therefore, performing less efﬁciently) than the argue one. The reason for this is that
even though agents do use some number of messages to argue and correct their incom-
plete knowledge, thereafter they use their corrected knowledge in subsequent interac-
tions. However, if the agents do not argue to correct their knowledge imperfections,
they negotiate more frequently since they cannot use their social inﬂuences to endorseChapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 155
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FIGURE 6.3: Information ﬂow between argue and non-argue strategies with 30 agents
and 3 roles. In such setting, since both strategies, CPA and CPNA, are unable to resolve
conﬂicts and improve the % of information known to the agents, both plots remain
constant at 100% and 0% respectively and overlap one another.
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FIGURE 6.4: Number of messages used by negotiate and argue methods at 50% level
of missing knowledge.
their actions. Thus, this one-off increase of argue messages becomes insigniﬁcant when
compared to the increase in the propose, accept, and reject messages due to the in-
creased number of negotiations. For instance, Figures 6.4(a) and 6.4(b) show the num-
ber of messages used by the agents both for negotiating and arguing with one another
at the 50% level of missing knowledge. These clearly highlight a signiﬁcant reduction
of negotiation messages used by the agents during their encounters (i.e., from 335,424
with CPNA to 293,594 with CPA; a reduction of 41,830) for a small increase of 728
argumenation messages with CPA.
Observation 6.4: When there are more social inﬂuences within the system, the perfor-
mance beneﬁt of arguing is only signiﬁcant at high levels of knowledge incompleteness.Chapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 156
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FIGURE 6.5: Total population earnings with 20 agents and a varying number of roles.
Figures 6.5(a) through to 6.5(f) show the effectiveness of both the strategies as the num-
ber of roles increases within the society from 3 to 20. One of the key observations here
is the decline rate of the non-argue strategy. We can see that as the number of roles
increase, the rate of decline of the non-argue method becomes less pronounced. Fur-
thermore, the crossover point, where the non-argue method starts to be less effective
than the argue strategy, also shifts increasingly to the right (i.e., higher knowledge im-
perfections; refer to Figures 6.5(a) through to 6.5(f)). This again is a very interesting
observation. As agents gain a higher number of roles, they acquire an increasing num-
ber of social inﬂuences. Now, as explained in Observation 1, the agents use these socialChapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 157
inﬂuences as a resource to endorse their actions. Thus, when an agent has a higher num-
ber of social inﬂuences, its lack of knowledge about a certain particular inﬂuence makes
little difference. The agent can easily replace it with another inﬂuence (which it is aware
of) to convince its counterpart. Therefore, under such conditions, agents arguing about
their social inﬂuences to correct their lack of knowledge would have little reward since
the non-argue method can more simply replace it with another known inﬂuence and
still achieve the same end. In such high resource settings, only when an agent has a
near complete lack of knowledge (i.e., 80%, 90% levels) does the argue strategy yeild
signiﬁcant performance gains. This observation complements our previous study (refer
to Section 5.3.1) on the worth of argumentation at varying resource levels, where we
show that the beneﬁt of arguing is more pronounced at low resource settings and under
higher resource conditions the beneﬁt is less.
6.3.2 Questioning Non-Performance
In the event that a particular social commitment is violated, apart from the right to de-
mand compensation, our social inﬂuence schema also gives the agents the right to chal-
lenge and demand a justiﬁcation for this non-performance (see Section 3.1). It is gen-
erally argued in ABN theory that allowing agents to exchange such meta-information
in the form of justiﬁcations gives them the capability to understand each others’ rea-
sons and, thereby, provides a more efﬁcient method of resolving conﬂicts under un-
certainty [Rahwan et al., 2003a]. In a similar manner, we believe that providing the
agents with the capability to challenge and demand justiﬁcations for violating social
commitments also allows them to gain a wider understanding of the internal and social
inﬂuences affecting their counterparts, thereby, providing a more efﬁcient method for
managing social inﬂuences in the presence of incomplete knowledge.
This intuition forms the underlying hypothesis for our next set of experiments. More
speciﬁcally, we use our previous best strategy Claim Penalty Argue (CPA) as the con-
trol experiment and design two additional strategies; Argue In First Rejection (AFR)
and Argue In Last Rejection (ALR).4 In more detail, in both these cases we attempt
to experiment with the effect of allowing the agents to challenge non-performance at
different stages within the negotiation encounter. More speciﬁcally, the former allows
agents to challenge after the receipt of the ﬁrst rejection and the latter after the last rejec-
4It is important to note that these two strategies AFR and ALR are different from the
Evade Finally Argue and the Argue First then Evade strategies discussed in Chapter 5. There the agent
would attempt to use argue or evade methods with either its ﬁrst or last counterparts, whereas in the AFR
and ALR strategies the arguments occur during the negotiation interaction either after the ﬁrst or the last
proposal is rejected.Chapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 158
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FIGURE 6.6: Efﬁciency and effectiveness of the various argumentation strategies.
tion. Thus, the two differ on when agents attempt to ﬁnd the reason (in the ﬁrst possible
instance or after all proposals have been forwarded and rejected). Algorithms 12 and 13
specify the overall behaviour of these two approaches. To formulate these two strategies
we extend our CPA algorithm, by incorporating a challenge phase into its negotiation
element in order to ﬁnd the reason for rejecting a proposal. In the case of AFR, this
challenge is embedded after the ﬁrst proposal is rejected (refer to Algorithm 12), while
in the case of ALR it is embedded after the rejection of the ﬁnal proposal (refer to Al-
gorithm 13). Given this, Figures 6.6(a) and 6.6(b) show our results and the following
highlight our key observations:
Observation 6.5: The effectiveness of the various argumentation strategies are broadly
similar.
Figure 6.6(a) shows no signiﬁcant difference in the effectiveness of the three ABN
strategies. This is due to the fact that all three strategies argue and resolve the conﬂicts
even though they decide to argue at different points within the encounter. Therefore,
we do not expect to have any signiﬁcant differences in the number of conﬂicts resolved.
Thus, the effectiveness stays the same.
Observation 6.6: Allowing the agents to challenge earlier in the dialogue, signiﬁcantly
increases the efﬁciency of managing social inﬂuences.
Figure 6.6(b) shows a signiﬁcant difference in the number of messages used by the
three strategies at all levels of knowledge. In more detail, the number of messages used
by the Argue In Last Rejection (ALR) strategy is signiﬁcantly lower than our original
Claim Penalty Argue (CPA) one. Moreover, the Argue In First Rejection (AFR) strat-
egy has the lowest number of messages exchanged.Chapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 159
Algorithm 12 The Argue In First Rejection (AFR) strategy.
1: [p0,p1,...,pmax] ← generateProposals()
2: p ← p0
3: isAccepted ← false
4:
5: {Loop till either the agent agrees or the last proposal fails.}
6: while (isAccepted 6= true k p ≤ pmax) do
7: response ← PROPOSE(p)
8: if (response = “accept00) then
9: isAccepted ← true
10: else
11:
12: {CHALLENGE to ﬁnd reason if the ﬁrst proposal is rejected.}
13: if (p = p0) then
14: reasonsToRefuse ← CHALLENGE(p)
15: if (reasonsToRefuse = notCapable) then
16: requestedCapability ← reasonsToRefuse
17: updateMyKnowledge(agent, requestedCapability)
18: else if (reasonsToRefuse = notV iable) then
19: threasholdPrice ← reasonsToRefuse
20: updateMyKnowledge(agent, time, threasholdPrice)
21: deemedCompensation ← reasonsToRefuse
22: if (deemedCompensation < rightToPenalty) then
23: argue()
24: end if
25: end if
26: end if
27:
28: if (p 6= pmax) then
29: p ← getNextViableProposal()
30: end if
31: end if
32: end while
33:
34: if (isAccepted = false) then
35: compensation ← demandCompensation()
36: end if
The reason for this behaviour is based on how the agents use these reasons exchanged
during the argue phase. In the CPA strategy the main objective of arguing is to resolve
theconﬂictregardingthepenaltyvaluethatshouldbepaid. However, itdoesnotattempt
to ﬁnd out the actual reason why its counterpart rejected its proposal. For instance, a
certain agent may fail to honour a speciﬁc social commitment simply because it does
not possess the necessary capability level to carry out the requested action. It may also
be occupied at the requested time and may perceive this action to be less viable to de-Chapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 160
Algorithm 13 The Argue In Last Rejection (ALR) strategy.
1: [p0,p1,...,pmax] ← generateProposals()
2: p ← p0
3: isAccepted ← false
4:
5: {Loop till either the agent agrees or the last proposal fails.}
6: while (isAccepted 6= true k p ≤ pmax) do
7: response ← PROPOSE(p)
8: if (response = “accept00) then
9: isAccepted ← true
10: else
11:
12: {CHALLENGE to ﬁnd reason if the last proposal is rejected.}
13: if (p = pmax) then
14: reasonsToRefuse ← CHALLENGE(p)
15: if (reasonsToRefuse = notCapable) then
16: requestedCapability ← reasonsToRefuse
17: updateMyKnowledge(agent, requestedCapability)
18: else if (reasonsToRefuse = notV iable) then
19: threasholdPrice ← reasonsToRefuse
20: updateMyKnowledge(agent, time, threasholdPrice)
21: deemedCompensation ← reasonsToRefuse
22: if (deemedCompensation < rightToPenalty) then
23: argue()
24: end if
25: end if
26: end if
27:
28: if (p 6= pmax) then
29: p ← getNextViableProposal()
30: end if
31: end if
32: end while
33:
34: if (isAccepted = false) then
35: compensation ← demandCompensation()
36: end if
commit from than its prior agreement. By challenging for the reason for the rejection,
the latter two strategies allow the requesting agent to gain such meta-information, which
they can, in turn, use both in their current encounter and any subsequent ones. For
instance, if a certain agent refuses to perform a speciﬁc action because it does not have
the necessary capability level, then the requesting agent can exclude that counterpart
from any future service requests that may require a capability level the same or greater
than the refused action. Furthermore, by challenging the reasons for refusal, agentsChapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 161
can also gain knowledge about the current asking price of their counterparts. Agents
can then use this information to straight away forward a proposal that meets this asking
price, rather than sequentially incrementing its offering rewards which would eventually
get rejected.
In this manner, such reasons give useful meta-information to the agents for their future
negotiations. So the strategies AFR and ALR allow the agents to exploit such informa-
tion and interact more efﬁciently as a society. Furthermore, AFR which allows agents to
argue in the ﬁrst rejection, provides this information earlier in the negotiation encounter,
which, in turn, gives the agent more potential to exploit such information (even during
the present negotiation) than getting it in the last encounter (as in ALR). Given this,
we can conclude that, in our context, allowing the agents to challenge non-performance
earlier in the negotiation allows them to manage their social inﬂuences more efﬁciently
as a society.
Finally, in this line of experiments, we design a strategy that allows agents to reveal
information selectively after taking into consideration the future consequences of such
revelation. In more detail, in certain instances, an agent may act certain roles that may
entail more obligations than rights. In such instances, it would be to the advantage of
that agent not to reveal that information to its counterparts. Thus, agents may choose
to exploit the lack of knowledge of their counterparts and, thereby, play a more self-
interested strategy and choose to forgo certain rights to obtain a long term gain by not
carrying out (or paying violation penalties) for its obligations. To explain this more
clearly, consider our simple supervisor student example detailed in Section 3.1 with
two agents A and B; A playing the role of the supervisor, B the role of a student.
Now, assume that agent A, due to this supervisory role, gains a single right (i.e., to
demand the student to submit the thesis on time) and two obligations (i.e., to correct the
student’s papers and to provide ﬁnancial aid) towards its student. Due to the imperfect
information present within the society, in certain instances, agent B may not be aware
of either the fact that agent A assumes the role of supervisor or that it assumes the role
of student. In such instances, B would be not be aware of the corresponding obligations
and the rights it has with A. In such a case, if A believes that its two obligations cost
more than the beneﬁt it gains from exercising its right, it may play a more self-interested
strategy and exploit B’s lack of knowledge by choosing not to reveal this information,
thus, foregoing its less important right in the view of a long term potential to violate its
two obligations without any de-commitment.
Our motivation here is to explore the broad impact of agents using such a self-interested
strategy to manage their social inﬂuences within a society. In order to test the impactChapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 162
Algorithm 14 The selectiveArgue() method.
1: {Challenge for the opponent’s justiﬁcation}
2: Ho ← challenegeJustiﬁcation()
3: {Generate personal justiﬁcation}
4: Hp ← generateJustiﬁcation()
5:
6: if (isV alid(Ho) = false) then
7: if (isAssertV iable(Ho) = true) then
8: {Assert invalid premises of Ho}
9: end if
10: else
11: {Adopt premises of Ho into personal knowledge}
12: end if
13: if (isV alid(Hp) = false) then
14: {Correct invalid premises of Hp within personal knowledge}
15: else
16: if (isAssertV iable(Hp) = true) then
17: {Assert Hp}
18: end if
19: end if
of this behaviour, here we alter our current best strategy, AFR, and allow agents to
evaluate the long term beneﬁts and costs before revealing information about their social
inﬂuences within the argumentation process. More speciﬁcally, we modify our argue
function speciﬁed in Algorithm 9 and introduce an addition test condition before all
assertions (refer to Algorithm 14). This test condition (the isAssertViable method) eval-
uates the long term beneﬁt by calculating the total beneﬁt of the rights that the agent
would gain minus the cost of obligations it would incur in the event of revealing a cer-
tain information to its counterpart. We then use this modiﬁed selective argue method in
place of the argue function in line 22 of the AFR algorithm 12 to formulate our selective
argue strategy; titled Selective Argue In First Reject (SAFR) (refer to Algorithm 15).
Figures 6.7(a) and 6.7(b) show the effectiveness and efﬁciency of using this strategy
(SAFR) in comparison to AFR.
Observation 6.7: Allowing agents to selectively reveal information reduces the perfor-
mance of the society both in terms of effectiveness and efﬁciency.
In Figures 6.7(a) and 6.7(b) we can clearly observe a slight decrease in the overall
performance of the society when agents are using SAFR in comparison to AFR. Both
in terms of effectiveness and efﬁciency, it is clear that when using SAFR the agents
as a society tend to achieve a lower overall earnings value (see Figure 6.7(a)) and also
use a higher number of messages (see Figure 6.7(b)) to accomplish this outcome. TheChapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 163
Algorithm 15 The Selective Argue In First Rejection (SAFR) strategy.
1: [p0,p1,...,pmax] ← generateProposals()
2: p ← p0
3: isAccepted ← false
4:
5: {Loop till either the agent agrees or the last proposal fails.}
6: while (isAccepted 6= true k p ≤ pmax) do
7: response ← PROPOSE(p)
8: if (response = “accept00) then
9: isAccepted ← true
10: else
11: {CHALLENGE to ﬁnd reason if the ﬁrst proposal is rejected.}
12: if (p = p0) then
13: reasonsToRefuse ← CHALLENGE(p)
14: if (reasonsToRefuse = notCapable) then
15: requestedCapability ← reasonsToRefuse
16: updateMyKnowledge(agent, requestedCapability)
17: else if (reasonsToRefuse = notV iable) then
18: threasholdPrice ← reasonsToRefuse
19: updateMyKnowledge(agent, time, threasholdPrice)
20: deemedCompensation ← reasonsToRefuse
21: if (deemedCompensation < rightToPenalty) then
22: selectiveArgue() {selectiveArgue() is used in place of argue()}
23: end if
24: end if
25: end if
26: if (p 6= pmax) then
27: p ← getNextViableProposal()
28: end if
29: end if
30: end while
31:
32: if (isAccepted = false) then
33: compensation ← demandCompensation()
34: end if
difference is more pronounced at settings with higher levels of missing knowledge (i.e.,
70%, 80%, 90% levels).
To help us explain the reason for this behaviour, Figures 6.8(a) through to 6.8(d) plot
the percentage of information known to the agents during the course of their interac-
tions while using both these strategies. From this we can observe that when using
SAFR, because the agents selﬁshly choose not to reveal information about their social
inﬂuences in instances where it is to their individual long term disadvantage, certain
conﬂicts within the society remains unresolved. This, in turn, causes the percentageChapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 164
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FIGURE 6.7: Efﬁciency and effectiveness of the AFR and the SAFR strategies with 30
agents and 3 roles.
of information known to the agent to increase at a much slower rate than when using
AFR and, moreover, a signiﬁcant proportion still remains missing even at the end at
the 70% and 80% levels. This lack of information causes the agents to achieve a fewer
number of actions since they are not aware of the social inﬂuences which may have
been able to endorse those actions. Thus, as a society, the agents perform less effec-
tively. This lack of information also causes the agents to act less efﬁciently since they
do not know about their social inﬂuences and, therefore, they need to negotiate more
with their counterparts. These increased negotiations use a signiﬁcantly higher number
of propose, accept, and reject messages, thereby, increasing the total message count
used within the soicety.
6.3.3 Negotiating Social Inﬂuence
As discussed in Section 6.1, apart from allowing agents to resolve conﬂicts of opinion
within a society, argumentation can also allow them to augment their negotiation pro-
cess by way of incorporating threats and promises along with their proposals. More
speciﬁcally, within a social context, agents can use negotiation as a tool to trade social
inﬂuences by incorporating these as additional parameters within the negotiation object.
Allowing them to do so would, in turn, enhance their ability to bargain and, in certain
instances, increase their chances of reaching mutually acceptable agreements within a
society.
This acts as the main underlying hypothesis in our following experiments. More specif-
ically, here we use our argumentation model to design two extended ABN strategies that
allow agents to use their social inﬂuences to argue and negotiate within our experimen-Chapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 165
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FIGURE 6.8: Information ﬂow between the AFR and the SAFR strategies.
tal multi-agent context. In more detail, in certain instances within our context, agents
may ﬁnd that they do not have the necessary ﬁnances to meet the required demands of
their counterparts. In such situations, agents may be able to endorse such actions with
extra social inﬂuences by way of trading away some of their existing rights to inﬂuence,
which they believe to be redundant or less important to attain their overall objectives.
Since, within our context, the degree of inﬂuence associated with each speciﬁc social
right or obligation is reﬂected by its associated de-commitment penalty, agents have the
ability to trade away such rights and obligations in exchange for another by simply ne-
gotiating this penalty charge. For example, if an agent desires to increase the inﬂuence
of a certain social right in exchange for a decrease of another, it can do so by negotiat-
ing with its counterpart and agreeing to increase the penalty charge associated with the
former in exchange for a decrease of the latter. In this manner, these extended strategies
allow agents to increase the inﬂuence of a certain social right at the expense of another,
presumably a less important one, and thereby negotiate social inﬂuences to achieve their
actions.
We implement both these extended strategies by enhancing our current best ABN algo-Chapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 166
rithm, AFR (refer to Algorithm 12). More speciﬁcally, we allow agents to trade their
social inﬂuences in the event that their basic negotiation interaction (trading with pro-
posals) has been unsuccessful in reaching an agreement. In such instances, both of these
strategies allow agents to trade an existing social right it may have, in exchange for a
stronger one with a higher penalty value and, thus, a higher inﬂuence. However, they
differ in the manner in which they select this replaceable right to inﬂuence. The ﬁrst
strategy, AFR-NCR (Argue First Reject Negotiate Current Redundant), allows agents
to choose a redundant social right that they may have upon the same counterpart in or-
der to demand a different capability type within the same time-slot. Since, within our
context, agents have only a single action that requires only a single capability per time
slot, any rights that might have demanded another capability type would be redundant
given their overall objectives. Thus, in this strategy, the agents are allowed to trade
those redundant capabilities in exchange of increasing the inﬂuence for a more required
right.
On the other hand, the second strategy, AFR-NFLI (Argue First Reject Negotiate -
Future Less Important), allows agents to ﬁnd their substitute right from a future action
that they believe to be less important than the current one. In more detail, if a certain
action has a higher reward value, then the agent can afford to spend more to convince
another agent to perform it (refer to the proposal generation algorithm in Section 6.2
where the maximum monetary offer is deﬁned as the reward value for action rj - 1).
Since an agent can afford to spend more in such actions, it can utilise any social inﬂu-
ences it may have on others in order to accomplish its more ﬁnancial constrained ones
(i.e., actions with a lower reward, and, therefore, more ﬁnancially constrained). Using
this as the main intuition, the AFR-NFLI strategy allows agents to trade these less im-
portant social inﬂuences in exchange for supplementing actions that fail to even meet
the initial asking price of their counterparts. Speciﬁcally, Algorithms 16 and 17 specify
the overall behaviour of both of these strategies. Figures 6.9(a) and 6.9(b) plot their
performance (both in terms of effectiveness and efﬁciency) in comparison to our AFR
strategy and the following analyses the main observations.
Observation 6.8: Allowing agents to negotiate social inﬂuence enhances the effective-
ness of the society.
Figure 6.9(a) shows a clear increase in the total earnings of the population when the
agents are allowed to trade their social inﬂuences. Thus, both the extended strategies,
AFR-NCR and AFR-NFLI, outperform the original AFR strategy; allowing the agents
a means of performing more effectively within a social context. We can explain the
reason for this observation as follows. As explained in Observation 1, social inﬂuencesChapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 167
Algorithm 16 Argue First Reject Negotiate Current Redundant (AFR-NCR) strategy.
1: isAccepted ← negotiateAFR()
2:
3: {If the maximum possible proposal for an action is refused.}
4: if (isAccepted = false && p = pmax) then
5: {Attempt to negotiate social inﬂuences from the current time slot that are redun-
dant.}
6: substituteRight ← ﬁndSubstituteCurrentRedundent()
7: if (substituteRight 6= null) then
8: negotiateRights(currentRightInNeed, substituteRight)
9: response ← PROPOSE(p)
10: if (response = “accept00) then
11: isAccepted ← true
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
15:
16: if (isAccepted = false) then
17: compensation ← demandCompensation()
18: end if
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FIGURE 6.9: Efﬁciency and effectiveness of the AFR, AFR-NCR, and the AFR-NFLI
strategies with 30 agents and 3 roles.
act like a resource for the agents to endorse their actions. In such a context, when
these agents are allowed to trade their social inﬂuences, they gain the opportunity to re-
allocate these resources in a more useful manner. In more detail, both strategies allow
agentsthe opportunityto supplementcertain actionsthat requiresuch anendorsement in
exchange for foregoing certain social inﬂuences that are either redundant or less useful.
This, in turn, allows the agents to achieve a higher number of actions.
Morespeciﬁcally, withinoursimulations, whileusingAFRagentswerecapableofcom-
pleting 61.5% (with a 0.8% standard error) of their actions on average. However, whenChapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 168
Algorithm 17 Argue First Reject Negotiate Future Less Important (AFR-NFLI) strat-
egy.
1: isAccepted ← negotiateAFR()
2:
3: {If the maximum possible proposal for an action is refused.}
4: if (isAccepted = false && p = pmax) then
5: {Attempt to negotiate social inﬂuences from the future time slots that are less-
important.}
6: substituteRight ← ﬁndSubstituteFutureLessImportant()
7: if (substituteRight 6= null) then
8: negotiateRights(currentRightInNeed, substituteRight)
9: response ← PROPOSE(p)
10: if (response = “accept00) then
11: isAccepted ← true
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
15:
16: if (isAccepted = false) then
17: compensation ← demandCompensation()
18: end if
they were allowed to trade social inﬂuence, both the strategies signiﬁcantly increased
this completion level allowing agents to reach 69.4% (0.6% standard error) with AFR-
NCR and 71.9% (0.7% standard error) with AFR-NFLI. This signiﬁcant increase in the
number of actions completed, allowed the agents to increase their earnings, thereby,
performing more effectively as a society. When comparing AFR-NCR and AFR-NFLI,
the latter allowed agents to perform more effectively as a society. The reason for this
depends on how successful the agents are in ﬁnding a substitute social inﬂuence to
trade with. In the former case, agents constrain themselves to only the current time slot,
whereas the latter allows them to search through a number of future time-slots. This, in
turn, increases the probability of AFR-NFLI successfully ﬁnding a substitute to trade
with, thus, signiﬁcantly enhancing its effectiveness.
Observation 6.9: When agents negotiate social inﬂuences they also achieve their tasks
more efﬁciently as society.
Figure 6.9(b) shows a signiﬁcant reduction in the number of messages used by the
agents when they are allowed to trade their social inﬂuences within a society. More
speciﬁcally, agents used a total of 112164 messages when using the AFR strategy. How-
ever, when using AFR-NCR this number is reduced to 100811 (a 10.1% reduction) and
with AFR-NFLI up to 96642 (a 13.8% reduction). As explained above, when agentsChapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 169
are allowed to trade social inﬂuences, they are able to re-arrange their inﬂuences in a
more suitable manner to endorse their actions. As a result, this increases the probability
of reaching an agreement with their counterparts within the current encounter. Due to
this increased success in their current negotiation encounters, agents are less likely to be
required to iterate through the society ﬁnding alternative counterparts and exhaustively
negotiating with each other to reach agreements. This, in turn, signiﬁcantly reduces the
negotiation messages (open-dialogue, close-dialogue, propose, reject) used within the
society and out numbers the small increase in the messages used by the agents to trade
social inﬂuences. Furthermore, the AFR-NFLI strategy (in comparison to the AFR-
NCR) allows agents to perform at a much higher efﬁciency level within the society.
Again this is because the AFR-NFLI strategy is less constrained than the AFR-NCR
strategy (i.e., not constrained only to the current slot, but allows them to search through
an array of future time slots) in allowing agents to ﬁnd a successful substitute to trade
with.
6.4 Summary
Increasingly, ABN has been proposed as a promising means for agents to interact and
resolve conﬂicts within a multi-agent society (refer to Chapter 1). However, compu-
tationally bounded entities, such as software agents, require a coherent argumentation
framework (that is both theoretically sound and computationally tractable) and a set of
ABN strategies to successfully argue, negotiate, and manage such conﬂicts. Having
speciﬁed the ABN framework in Chapter 3, here we mainly focus on the ABN strate-
gies, presenting an empirical analysis on how agents can use an array of techniques to
argue, negotiate and manage conﬂicts within a social context. More speciﬁcally, here
we extend our multi-agent task allocation scenario, speciﬁed in Chapter 4, to present
the agents with a rich social structure where both major forms of conﬂicts (i.e., con-
ﬂicts of interest and conﬂicts of opinion) arise due to the disparate motivations and the
imperfect knowledge present within the society. In such a context, we design a number
of ABN strategies that allow agents to interact and achieve their actions and, in turn,
observe and empirically analyse their relative performance beneﬁts for the society.
Inspired by our ABN framework (see Chapter 3) and more speciﬁcally, the social in-
ﬂuence schema (see Section 3.1), we classify our strategies into three main types. The
ﬁrst allows agents to exercise their right of demanding compensation, which, in turn,
provides a means to detect certain conﬂicts of opinion within the society and the oppor-
tunity to manage and resolve them. In this line, our results show that allowing agentsChapter 6 Deciding How to Argue 170
an ABN mechanism to manage such conﬂicts enhances their ability to achieve actions
both efﬁciently and effectively, even at high uncertainty levels, when compared to a
non-arguing approach. We also show that this comparative advantage diminishes as the
number of social inﬂuences (which act as resources) increase within the context. The
second allows agents to exercise their right to question non-performance in the event
of a rejection, thereby, allowing them to encapsulate the argumentation process into
the negotiation interaction. In our results we observe that allowing the agents to do so
further enhances their efﬁciency. Moreover, we observe that agents that are allowed to
challenge one another earlier in the negotiation encounter (as opposed to using it as the
lastresort)performatamoreincreasedefﬁciencylevelsincetheycanusetheexchanged
meta-information to guide both their current and future negotiation encounters. Next, in
this line, we allow agents to reveal information in a more selective and a self-interested
manner. Here, we observe that employing such a strategy constrains the performance
of the society, both in terms of effectiveness and efﬁciency. Finally, we design a set of
strategies that allows agents to negotiate their social inﬂuences. Here, we observe that,
allowing them to do so, enhances their ability to re-allocate these social inﬂuences in
a more useful manner, thus, enhancing the performance of the society both in terms of
efﬁciency and effectiveness.
Given a detailed empirical analysis on our second research question of how to argue
within a multi-agent society, we now shift towards the main conclusions of this thesis
and the possible future directions of this research.Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter concludes the thesis by bringing together the main contributions high-
lighted in Chapter 1 with the ﬁndings identiﬁed during this investigation. To this end,
ﬁrst we present the main conclusions in Section 7.1. Thereafter, in Section 7.2 we
conclude the thesis by identify a number of possible areas of future research.
7.1 Conclusions
As highlighted in Chapter 1, this thesis centres around two broad areas of artiﬁcial
intelligence; namely multi-agent systems and argumentation-based negotiation. In par-
ticular, here we focus on two important research questions that are central to the ap-
plication of ABN in multi-agent systems. First is when to argue; that is, under what
conditions would ABN, as opposed to other non-arguing methods, present a better op-
tion for agents to overcome conﬂicts. Second is how to argue; that is, a computationally
tractable method to successfully formulate such sophisticated ABN dialogues and a set
of strategies to use them to resolve conﬂicts within a multi-agent context. To both of
these ends, this thesis presents a comprehensive investigation, adding signiﬁcant contri-
butions to the state of the art in both the theory and the practice of ABN in multi-agent
systems (refer to Section 1.3).
In particular, ﬁrst, the proposed ABN framework adds a signiﬁcant contribution to the
theory of ABN in multi-agent systems. Speciﬁcally, this thesis presents a coherent
argumentation framework that agents can use to argue, negotiate, and, thereby, resolve
conﬂicts within a multi-agent society (refer to Chapter 3). In abstract, the framework
consists of four main elements: (i) a schema which captures how agents reason within
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a structured society, (ii) a mechanism to systematically use this schema to extract a set
of social arguments to argue within such a context, (iii) a language and protocol to
exchange these arguments, and (iv) a set of decision functions for individual agents to
participate in such dialogues.
One of the main unique features of this framework is the fact that it explicitly takes
into consideration the societal element (the social structure and its different inﬂuences
within it) of a multi-agent system and how it impacts the ABN process. In more detail,
by using the social inﬂuence schema, we explicitly capture social inﬂuences endemic
to structured agent societies and identify a number of different ways agents can use
these inﬂuences constructively in their dialogues. Even though a number of authors
have highlighted the importance of these inﬂuences of the society in the argumentation
process (e.g., [Rahwan et al., 2003a; Reed, 1997]), no one has previously presented a
framework to capture this element. Existing work tends to focus on two agent con-
texts which largely ignores the impact of the society. Analysing systems based on such
frameworks gives only a partial picture of the effect of ABN in multi-agent systems. In
contrast, our framework, which explicitly captures these inﬂuences of a society, leads
the way to a thorough analysis on the constructive interplay between ABN and social
inﬂuences. Thus, to this end, our work presents a signiﬁcant contribution to the state of
the art in both multi-agent systems and argumentation.
Furthermore, the various ways that we use to design the different elements within the
framework also add a number of sub-contributions to the state of the art in both ar-
gumentation and multi-agent systems. First, the social inﬂuences schema represents a
novel way of capturing the inﬂuences within a multi-agent society. In particular, we use
the notion of social commitments (which results in obligations and rights to the respec-
tive agents) to capture inﬂuences within a structured society. We, in turn, use the notion
of sanctions (penalties) to associate a degree of inﬂuence to these motivations and allow
agents to use it as a parameter to reason about these and make choices whether to adhere
or to violate these inﬂuences. In doing so, this work stands apart from the deliberative
cognitive models, which are difﬁcult to implement within a larger agent context, and the
prescriptive models, which do not allow agents to choose and selectively violate their
social inﬂuences (refer to Sections 2.3.1 and 3.1). More speciﬁcally, our approach fol-
lows a middle ground, allowing agents to make choices between their different social
inﬂuences and their internal ones, yet by reasoning at the level of actions and com-
mitments (using the notion of sanctions) we can do so in a computationally tractable
manner.
From the argumentation theory point of view, analogous to the argumentation schemeChapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 173
for practical reasoning and the scheme for expert opinion, our social inﬂuence schema
presents a new argumentation scheme for reasoning within structured societies. More-
over, the way we used our schema to systematically identify arguments within an agent
society also presents a successful attempt to use such schemes in computational con-
texts. This is a developing area in argumentation in the multi-agent systems literature,
where a number of authors have conceptually argued for the potential of such schemes
in computational contexts [Reed and Walton, 2004; Walton, 2005]. This work, in line
with Atkinson et al. [2004], contributes to this ﬁeld. In particular, while Atkinson et al.
present a model that explores the use of argumentation schemes for practical reasoning,
this thesis presents the use of such schemes for social reasoning in multi-agent systems.
The language, protocol, and decision functions of our model also add contributions to
both the argumentation and multi-agent systems communities. More speciﬁcally, we
present a protocol for agents to argue and resolve conﬂicts in multi-agent systems. Sim-
ilar to the work by McBurney et al. [2003], we ground our protocol by specifying its
semantics both in axiomatic and operational terms. Even though grounded in the same
manner, our protocol achieves a different purpose. In particular, while McBurney et al.
presents an ABN protocol for consumer purchase negotiations, the language and pro-
tocol deﬁned in this thesis allow agents to manage conﬂicts related to social inﬂuences
in multi-agent systems. Moreover, we go a step further than McBurney et al. in our
domain. In particular, while McBurney et al. explore the completeness of their protocol
by explaining its operation in a number of case studies, we deﬁne concrete algorithms,
implement them, and experiment how agents can use our model to resolve conﬂicts in
a multi-agent task allocation scenario.
Given these distinct theoretical contributions, the second set of contributions of this
thesis come from our work in bridging this theory to practice divide. In particular,
we use our theoretical model to formulate concrete algorithms and, in turn, use them
to implement the various decision functions connected to our protocol. In so doing,
we successfully map our theory into a computational context and implement an ABN
method to resolve conﬂicts in a multi-agent task allocation scenario.
This is important because, as pointed out in Section 1.2, there is currently a large gap
between the theory and the practice in argumentation research. Most frameworks tend
to focus more on the theoretical soundness and the completeness of their models and
choose to ignore the computational costs associated with their suggested models. They
either present no implementations of their models or, in very rare instances, present lim-
itedexperimentsinhighlyconstrainedtwoagentcontexts. AspointedoutinSection1.2,
however, this limited form of experiments contributes little in terms of evidence for theChapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 174
use of ABN techniques or their computational costs in larger multi-agent contexts. In
contrast, our framework is designed with the implementation in mind. Most design
choices reﬂect this. For instance, when capturing the social behaviour, we chose to
reason at the level of actions and commitments (with the use of sanctions) and avoided
following a fully cognitive deliberation process. This simpliﬁes implementation algo-
rithms related to the agent reasoning process, thus, helping us develop our ABN model
within a larger multi-agent context. Moreover, since we chose a much simpler ofﬂine
argument extraction method, inspired by the argumentation schemes work and, thereby,
avoided a more complex belief based reasoning model, it really helped us reduce the
computational cost of implementing this in a multi-agent society with a signiﬁcant size.
In addition to extending the state of the art in forwarding a fully implemented ABN
model, we also successfully use this model to develop a number of conﬂict resolution
strategies into our argumentation context. In particular, our strategies capture inspi-
ration from both social science and multi-agent systems literature (i.e., exercising the
right to claim compensation, question non-performance, negotiating social inﬂuence;
refer to Section 6.3) and represent an array of ways of how agents can manage conﬂicts
in a multi-agent society. Thus, our experiments are neither based on a constrained two
agent setting, nor are limited to one or two carefully chosen ABN methods dedicated
to that context. By mapping these diverse set of strategies within our framework we
demonstrate its versatility and ﬂexibility.
Thirdly, this thesis adds a signiﬁcant contribution via its experimental ﬁndings. In par-
ticular, in both our research questions of when and how to argue in a multi-agent context
we observe a number of interesting results. More speciﬁcally, our ﬁrst set of results on
when to argue shows that the effectiveness and efﬁciency of arguing is very much re-
lated to the resources available within the context. In particular, our results show that
the simulated ABN method does indeed present a more efﬁcient and effective means of
resolving conﬂicts when compared to evasion in resource constrained settings. How-
ever, this relative performance advantage that the agents gain by using the ABN method
tends to diminish as resources become more abundant within the society. Moreover,
we show that attempting to always argue in high resource settings yields an inferior
outcome (both in terms of efﬁciency and effectiveness) than always using evasion to
manage conﬂicts. Next, we demonstrate the superior performance of hybrid strategies
(i.e., those that selectively use both argumentation and evasion in a combined manner)
as opposed to pure strategies that always attempt to use either one or the other in con-
ﬂict resolution. In particular, these hybrid strategies present both a more efﬁcient and
effective way of managing conﬂicts than both the pure strategies. Finally, we show the
strategy of evading ﬁrst and arguing as the last resort tends to yield the most favourableChapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 175
overall performance among these strategies within this context (for more details refer to
Chapter 5).
Next, our results on how to argue also present a number of interesting ﬁndings. In
more detail, ﬁrst we allow agents to exercise their right to demand compensation when
managing conﬂicts. In particular, here we design two strategies; one that merely de-
mands and collects compensation (non-ABN) and the other that allows agents to resort
to argumentation to resolve any discrepancies that may arise while negotiating such
compensations (ABN). Our results show that allowing agents an ABN mechanism to
do so enhances their ability to resolve conﬂicts even at high uncertainty levels. This,
in turn, shows a more efﬁcient and effective strategy when compared to a non-arguing
approach. We also show that this comparative advantage diminishes as the number of
social inﬂuences (which act as resources) increase within the context. This later ob-
servation further justiﬁes our previous experimental result on the negative correlation
of the beneﬁt of arguing and resources available within the context. Second, we allow
agents to exercise their right to question the non-performance in the event of a conﬂict
and, thereby, allow them to argue about the reason for the conﬂict. Here, our results
show that allowing agents to challenge earlier in their encounter (as opposed to using it
as the last resort) enhances their efﬁciency in managing conﬂicts. Finally, we design a
set of strategies that allow agents to negotiate their social inﬂuences. Here, we observe
that by allowing them to do so, enhances their ability to re-allocate these social inﬂu-
ences in a more useful manner. Thus, this achieves a more efﬁcient and effective way
of managing conﬂicts within a society (for more details refer to Chapter 6).
Given the main conclusions of this thesis, we now proceed to identify a number of
potential future directions for this research.
7.2 Future Work
Despite the success we archived in this study, there a number of open issues that remain.
In the remainder of this section we explore the main ones.
7.2.1 Incorporating a Learning Model
In our framework, agents use the social inﬂuence schema to extract arguments. This
schema captures the stereotypical behaviour of the society. Thus, the arguments ex-
tracted, in turn, would be effective against a typical agent that operates within the con-Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 176
text. However, in certain instances, if agents have different individual characteristics
certain arguments or argumentation techniques may work better with certain individ-
uals (i.e., socially inﬂuencing decisions would be a better way of managing conﬂicts
with understanding individuals since you can reason with them, rather than resorting to
threatening them while negotiating social inﬂuences). Moreover, in certain instances,
the settings within the argumentation context may change (i.e., agents may ﬁnd a better
information source, which gives them an increasing level of access to global knowl-
edge). In such instances as well, certain argumentation strategies may again provide a
more effective way of managing conﬂicts.
In such situations, if the agents can learn and adapt their strategies to suit the individual
or the context, it would provide a more effective way of arguing in such diverse and
dynamic environments. This can be achieved by incorporating a learning model into
the argumentation framework, thus, allowing agents to adapt their arguments or argu-
mentation strategies based on their experience on the past encounters. One possibility
here would be a re-enforcement learning technique [Kaelbling et al., 1996] that allows
agents to proﬁle certain agents (or contexts) based on their success or failure in their
previous attempts to use a certain argument or argumentation strategy.
7.2.2 Analysing the Social Inﬂuence Schema at a Cognitive Level
In this research, we choose to model agents’ reasoning at the level of actions and com-
mitments. This choice to stay at this level and not to take the cognitive path, is mainly
motivated by our desire to follow an experimental route (as opposed to a mere theoret-
ical path) to evaluate our model. Even with recent advances, implementing this BDI
form of reasoning in multi-agent system of a signiﬁcant size is generally accepted as a
computationally costly approach [Rao and Georgeff, 1995].
However, a potential area of future research is to analyse (both in a theoretical and
an experimental manner) how agents can reason about social inﬂuences at a cognitive
level; especially with the possibility to selectively violate certain obligations and the
normative implications of such violations. One of the main challenges in formalising
such a system is to model the notion of obligation. General deontic logic prescribes
that an agent entails an intention to perform its obligations. However, such a model
would fail to recognise the agents’ ability to selectively violate such obligations. This
is famously known as the contrary-to-duty reasoning problem in deontic logic van der
Torre and Tan[1999]. A good exampleis the moral dilemmaexperiencedby the Sartre’s
soldier; the obligation by duty to kill and the moral obligation not to kill. LogiciansChapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 177
have deﬁned two main approaches to handle this problem. The ﬁrst follows a practical
reasoning approach which deﬁnes two basic models on obligations: a conﬂict-tolerant
model [Brown et al., 1993] and prima-facie obligations [Ross, 1941]. The alternative
is to follow a more mainstream formal approach similar to preference-based dyadic
obligations approach suggested by van der Torre and Tan [1999]. Even though a number
of authors have tried to use some of these variants (e.g., [Dignum et al., 2001]) their
models still remain incomplete and far from an implementable solution. Therefore, this
remains a potential area of future research.
7.2.3 Extending the Argument Selection Strategies
In our experiments, we present the use of an array of argumentation strategies to re-
solve conﬂicts in a multi-agent context. However, it is by no means an exhaustive set.
Moreover, the framework does not limit the number of strategies that can be used to
resolve conﬂicts. Within the rules of the protocol, a number of additional strategies can
be designed and experimented with. This can, in turn, lead to a more extensive study on
argument selection.
Furthermore, the modular nature of the framework also allows it to be used to experi-
ment in a context different than that of resolving conﬂicts over social inﬂuences. In such
instances, a researcher can replace our social inﬂuence schema with one of their own,
and can use that to extract the arguments and the domain language. They can, in turn,
combine this with the existing communication language to argue and resolve conﬂicts
in a different context. They may also add or extend the different decision criteria. For
instance, while generating and evaluating a certain proposal, we consider its viability
and feasibility for that agent (refer to Algorithms 2 and 3 in Section 3.4.1). However,
these can be extended to incorporate certain other parameters such as trustworthiness or
the reputation level of the other party which are deemed to be important in open multi-
agent systems [Huynh, 2006]. In all of these aspects, our framework provides a good
point of departure for such investigations within multi-agent systems.
7.2.4 Testing with Different Defeat-Status Computation Models
Defeat-status computation is an important functionality required to evaluate arguments.
In particular, it allows agents to evaluate and determine whether a certain argument
is valid and/or stronger than others during the argumentation encounter. This is an
extensively researched area within argumentation literature (refer to Sections 2.3.4.1Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 178
and 2.3.4.2). Given this, a number of models have been proposed that range from
the use of arbitration [Sycara, 1990], defeasible reasoning [Dung, 1995; Amgoud and
Prade, 2004], self-stabilising models [Baroni et al., 2005], and different forms of heuris-
tics [Kraus et al., 1998; Ramchurn et al., 2003; Bentahar et al., 2006].
Since the main aim of this study is to identify the broad impact of ABN in multi-agent
systems (i.e., how and when ABN presents a more effective and efﬁcient method of
managing conﬂicts), we abstract away this functionality by using a validation heuristic
to simulate its behaviour. In particular, the validation heuristic considers a given basic
premise and returns true or false depending on its validity, thereby, simulating a defeasi-
ble model or an arbitration model (refer to Section 6.2). However, a possible extension
would be to replace this heuristic with different defeat-status computation models advo-
cated in existing literature. In so doing, our framework could then be used as a testbed to
empirically evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of these theoretical models.
Since most of these models are advocated at a theoretical level and never been tested,
such an empirical evaluation would provide a signiﬁcant contribution to the state of the
art in both argumentation and multi-agent systems.
7.2.5 Extending the Experiments into Other Domains
As with all empirical research, the experiments and the results observed in this thesis
were couched within a speciﬁc scenario (speciﬁed in Chapter 4). However, even though
the scenario captures a generic issue in multi-agent systems, it does not encapsulate
all possible problems. Thus, using such an argumentation context to experiment the
effect our model, subjects our observations to the criticism that they may be endemic
to that speciﬁc context. However, this is a common criticism levied against all empiri-
cal research [Cohen, 1995]. Moreover, since argumentation is highly contextual (what
arguments would be more effective depends on both the context and the participants),
such a criticism within the argumentation domain is somewhat common and justiﬁed.
Irrespective of this criticism, we believe that most of the results that we have highlighted
are generic in nature. For instance, our results on the negative correlation between the
performance of argumentation and the level of resources available within the context,
we believe, are generic in nature. We can also observe this phenomenon even in human
societies. However, some results we believe may depend on the context. For instance,
ourArgue First then EvadestrategytendstooutperformtheEvade Finally Arguestrat-
egy, which we believe may depend on the environment.
Therefore, to gain a better understanding of the notions identiﬁed in this thesis, exten-Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 179
sive testing is required in different domains and under different test conditions. This
study presents an initial point of departure to formulate, implement, and test argumen-
tation in multi-agent systems. Moreover, the modular nature of our model makes such
a broad investigation easier because we identify the different decision functions at an
abstract level before formulating the speciﬁc algorithms. However, a signiﬁcant amount
of research is still required to test these concepts in a number of different multi-agent
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